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Abstract

A New Way of Doing Politics: The Movement against CAFTA in Costa Rica
by
Jeremy Rayner

Advisor: David Harvey
In October of 2007, Costa Ricans voted in a referendum to ratify a Free Trade Agreement
with the United States (DR-CAFTA, or CAFTA). The first referendum in their nation’s history—
and the first referendum ever held on a Free Trade Agreement—marked the culmination of a
cycle of contention over liberalization that transformed practices and expectations of politics in
a country often considered an exemplar of representative democracy. In this dissertation I
provide an account of the opposition to CAFTA (the NO), based on two years of ethnographic
research with the Patriotic Committees (Comités Patrióticos), the decentralized, grassroots
network at the heart of the movement against the treaty.
I emphasize the contested meanings of democracy invoked in the struggle between the
grassroots NO campaign and the transnational elite coalition that promoted the treaty (the SI). I
argue that the opposition to CAFTA in Costa Rica was a movement to defend the “social state”
(Estado social) against a globalizing neoliberal property regime, while challenging existing
forms of political representation in the name of a more authentic popular democracy. I show
how the struggle over CAFTA was shaped by an ongoing process of contention over
liberalization and representation in the context of Costa Rica’s particular social democratic
institutions and traditions. I argue that, as the struggle evolved, the SI and the NO appealed to
different aspects of the country’s “institutionality” (institucionalidad), raising some
fundamental contradictions within and between liberalism and democracy. One outcome was a
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controversial and ambiguous popular consultation, an exercise in “direct democracy” that
paradoxically highlighted the limits of an elite-dominated political order.
Drawing on theory and scholarship of populism and direct democracy, I show how
protagonists of the NO turned a diversity of interests into unity of purpose, enabling them to
nearly win a markedly asymmetrical contest. I also explain how the Patriotic Committees
worked with established social idioms to pioneer new forms of political participation as they
challenged the limits of existing representative institutions. I argue that in doing say they
articulated a conception of democracy and social state that makes a distinctive contribution to
discussions of post-neoliberalism.
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Prologue

It’s September 30th, 2007—one week before Costa Ricans will vote to decide whether or
not their country will adopt the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States
(CAFTA). From the vantage of the pedestrian bridge straddling the avenue, the march is a
multicolored river running in both directions along San José central thoroughfare. Banners and
signs, mostly hand painted, float above the crowd. They carry messages against the Free Trade
Agreement and the names of the diverse organizations represented in the march. Many signs
name the neighborhood-based “Patriotic Committees” that had sprung up around the country
and had helped to organize the turnout.
Down among the crowd, I snap photos, collect flyers, chat with friends and
acquaintances, and try to jot down a few notes while committing the rest to memory. Many are
wearing white t-shirts emblazoned with “NO” in the blue and red of the Costa Rican flag (with
the ‘o’ drawn as a figurative heart). Some have come in costume, or with props. A black vulture
wearing Uncle Sam’s striped top-hat perches atop a life-size wooden guillotine, whose bloodied
blade, marked “CAFTA,” hangs over a map of Costa Rica. A group of protesters march inside of a
giant cardboard and cloth Trojan horse, behind a sign asking “what’s inside?” Others drop
donations in an oversized piggy-bank emblazoned with the NO.
Among the diversity of messages one theme captures my attention. Three men in
stovepipe hats are wearing a banner identifying them as one Filibuster Yes and two Vende
Patrías (literally, sellers of the fatherland). The reverse side bears the message, “peoples that do
not defend their own are doomed to become tenants of their own country,” a quotation
1

attributed to “Juanito” Mora that could be found on signs and t-shirts throughout the march.1
As president of Costa Rica in 1856, Juan Rafael Mora Porras led a hastily organized army north
to confront the invading forces of William Walker—the medical doctor, journalist and
“filibuster” from Tennessee who had proclaimed his intention to reinstate slavery throughout
Central America. The climax of the Campaña Nacional against Walker’s gringos at the
Nicaraguan town of Rivas is a foundational event in the narrative of Costa Rican nationhood.
The main airport, Juan Santamaría, is named for a common soldier who, the story goes,
sacrificed himself setting fire to Walker’s redoubt in the decisive battle, ensuring Costa Rica’s
victory and the freedom of Central America. The message, of course, is that the filibusteros are
back, and ready to take what is yours.
Suddenly, the crowd erupts into a spirited chant of “No, no, no al TLC” [no to the FTA]. I
raise my camera above my head and record, trying to capture something of the intensity of the
moment. I’m sure that it won’t do it justice (it doesn’t), but it seems important to have some
evidence of the passion that moves those gathered together here. I hope that by a bricolage of
bits and pieces like this I might make a narrative adequate to the sense of a historic moment that
so many have shared with me.
Of course a historic moment is defined by a narrative. And most historical narratives
outside of Costa Rica have little room for this small Central American republic. Precious few in
the United States even know the name William Walker. This is shocking for Costa Ricans, for
whom the Campaña Nacional was a quintessentially historical event. But people were even
more surprised (and dismayed) to hear that outside of activists and corporate lobbyists, the US
public as a whole knew next to nothing of their Free Trade Agreement with Central America—
despite the many thousands of US citizens that visit (or even settle in) Costa Rica every year.

“Los pueblos que no defienden lo suyo terminan siendo inquilinos de su propio país” (the quotation is
sometimes cited with minor variations).
1

2

This is not a history of Costa Rica or of relations between Costa Rica and the United
States. It is an account of how some Costa Ricans who felt that they were protagonists in a
historic moment. Because this historicity was defined by a confluence of national, transnational
and global processes, I hope that I can tell the story in such a way that readers might find
something of (or for) themselves in it. To me it offers a distinct perspective on the current
condition of, and possibilities for, a more substantive democracy—a question that many are
concerned with today.
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Introduction
Democracies and Exceptions

In October of 2007, a grassroots movement in a small Central American country came
close to defeating a powerful coalition of domestic elites, transnational corporations, and the
administration of George W. Bush, to prevent ratification of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement with the United States (CAFTA). 2 This is my account of the movement that almost
won this asymmetrical contest, and how, in doing so, it worked to revive democratic ideals in
danger of being sacrificed to the narrow freedoms of the marketplace.
By the spring of 2007, CAFTA had languished for three years in the Costa Rican national
legislature, the deadline for ratification of the treaty was fast approaching, and the opposition
movement was becoming larger and more confident by the day. The referendum organized to
provide a “democratic” resolution to this impasse was the first in Costa Rica’s long history of
popular elections, and the first plebiscite to be held on a free trade agreement anywhere in the
world. This novel exercise in “direct democracy” catalyzed a grass roots movement to vote “no”
on CAFTA, a movement that was itself remarkable for its participatory, direct and horizontal
practices. But while authoritative international observers and the victorious “SI” (Yes) campaign
declared in unison that the referendum exemplified Costa Rica’s democratic vocation,
protagonists of the NO denounced the betrayal of longstanding democratic traditions in what
many bitterly dismissed as a “frauderendum.”

The current full name of the treaty in English is the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement, with the corresponding acronym of DR-CAFTA. In order to avoid unwieldiness I will use the
more concise CAFTA, with no intention of diminishing the importance of the involvement of the
Dominican Republic.
2
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How did one of the world’s oldest democracies find itself riven with contention over its
representative and electoral institutions? Why was there so much controversy over a Free Trade
Agreement in a country that was a model of global integration, with the highest value of exports
per capita in Latin America (see Clark 1997 and 2001; Hidalgo 2003)? And why this eruption of
patriotic fervor in a country with a historically amicable relationship with the United States,
home to tens of thousands of US expatriates and site of the first McDonalds outside of North
America, a place often dismissed by other Latin Americans as gringolandia?
For those of us steeped in the doxa of turn-of-the-century corporate-managed liberalism
and its characteristic modes of opposition, finding an answer to these questions may challenge
some assumed truths and even open up some political possibilities: democracy outside of
elections, “free trade” as an obstacle to freedom, an effective welfare state in a developing
country. These challenges come from the lived reality and common sense of the protagonists of
this movement to say “no” to CAFTA, who were (extra) ordinary people from a variety of
backgrounds: teachers, students, electricians, engineers, peasants and farmers.
They pointed out that this so called “free trade” agreement had very little to do with
either freedom or trade, and everything to do with imposing a made-in-the-USA neoliberal
template on a unique social democratic state. By refusing to submit their Estado Social (social
state) to the expanding empire of neoliberal law, the protagonists of this movement asserted the
sovereignty of the Costa Rican people over the transnational corporations that profit from their
land and labor. They turned a diversity of interests into unity of purpose, and created an
incipient common identity under the banner of “NO.” And they pioneered new forms of political
participation, including a decentralized network of Comités Patrióticos (Patriotic Committees),
groups of concerned citizens that met in living rooms and schoolhouses in every corner of the
country to coordinate the campaign against CAFTA in their neighborhoods. For a moment, at
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least, the protagonists of this movement were conscious of being agents and authors of their
nation’s history.
The movement of the NO was opposed by the SI (Yes), an elite transnational coalition of
politicians, diplomats and executives equipped with all the powers granted by control of
powerful public and private organizations: the authority and patronage networks of political
office; extensive financial resources; predominance in print and television media; control over
workplaces; and the ambiguous but ominous threat of retaliation by the United States. From the
outset of the struggle over CAFTA, the contest between these asymmetrical forces of NO and SI
was as important to participants and observers as the treaty itself.
In the chapters that follow I explore how and why protagonists of the NO organized to
confront “free trade” and create a more vigorous popular democracy, drawing principally on my
experience as a participant and ethnographer during two years between 2007 and 2009. In this
introductory chapter I will provide the theoretical and historical context for my discussion of
democracy in Costa Rica, introduce my principal aims and claims for the work as a whole, and
say a few words about my research methods.

1. An Exceptional Democracy
Costa Rica is often held up as a democratic exception to a Latin American rule, a
representation that shapes scholarship abroad as well as narratives of nationhood at home.
Costa Rica’s history of regular competitive elections and civil peace certainly stands out in a
century and a region so often riven by violence and ruled by terror. Inspired by this anomaly, an
extensive literature has taken up the promise of a natural experiment by asking why Costa Rica
developed a liberal democracy, while other Central American nations suffered dictatorships and
political violence (e.g., Booth 1998; Bowman 1999; Holden 2006; Lehoucq 2012; Mahoney
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2002; Martí I Puig 2004; Paige 1997; Pérez Brignoli 1989; Rueschmeyer, et al. 1992; Williams
1994; Wilson 1998; Woodward 1985; Yashar 1997).
Within Costa Rica, the discourse around democratic exceptionalism has been at once
more self-referential, more diverse and more fraught. Between celebratory essentialism and
wholesale rejection of “bourgeois democracy” is a tradition of nuanced assessment and critique.
In this section I draw on critical thought about democracy in Costa Rica while maintaining a
comparative framework in order to situate and contextualize the NO in the panorama of Latin
American democratic projects.

A Latin American Democracy
Costa Rica’s record as a social democracy is less often commented upon but is at least as
exceptional (Sandbrook at al. 2007). A country whose principal exports at mid-century were
coffee and bananas built a welfare state with standards of health and education that rivaled, and
often surpassed, the richest countries in the hemisphere (Edelman 1999:2, 60-3; Sandbrook et
al. 2007:93-4). By the turn of the 21st century, in the wake of liberalization and privatization
throughout the Americas, Costa Rica was a statist anomaly with idiosyncratic institutions that
stubbornly refused to conform to the Washington Consensus cookie-cutter. Paradoxically,
however, it is also this social state that connects Costa Rica with the traditions of social
democracy and democratic socialism that moved Latin Americans throughout the 20th century
and which were once again in ascendance at the turn of the 21st. Costa Rica’s achievements in
human welfare reveal some of the potential within the frustrated hopes and struggles of the
region’s troubled history—something of what, in many other cases, could have been.
In the summer of 2007, the Costa Rican state was deeply involved in providing goods
and services. “The Caja” (Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social or CCSS, the Costa Rican Social
Security Fund) provided nearly universal access to high quality medical care and pensions
7

through broad-based social insurance, public hospitals and clinics. The public sector also ran the
Atlantic port, refined oil, and provided universal access to potable water and electricity.
More anomalously, public institutions dominated three of the most dynamic sectors of
contemporary capital accumulation: banking, insurance and telecommunications. The four
largest commercial banks in Costa Rica were owned by the state, while both insurance and
telecommunications were public sector monopolies. In the case of telecommunications, the ICE
(Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Costa Rican Electricity Institute) was the last wholly
publically-owned monopoly in the hemisphere (including Cuba), and the only firm to combine
telecommunications and electricity in a single institution (Fumero 2005). Perhaps more
surprisingly, this government monopoly provided widespread coverage to modern
telecommunications services, giving Costa Rica some of the best indicators for telephone and
internet access in Latin America (Fumero 2005; see also, ITU 2013). Finally, the Costa Rican
state was exceptional for one thing that it did not do, having been the first modern state to
abolish its military, in 1949.3 Taken together, this record even challenges some assumptions
about what a state is, or can be.
But Costa Rican social democracy was also in many ways characteristic of the democratic
movements that emerged throughout Latin America in the first half of the twentieth century.
The broader global movement to regulate or embed markets had a particular trajectory in Latin
America, which developed a variety of homespun democratic socialisms around programs for
land reform, cooperativism, and a robust public sector, and which enshrined the state’s
responsibility for guaranteeing the satisfaction of human needs in constitutional law (see
Grandin 2011; also Holston 2008:264-7).4 Costa Rican social democracy is one representative
There are currently more than 20 states which have either abolished their militaries or do not maintain
standing armies, including Panama, Haiti, and Iceland.
4 I refer very broadly to the programs of various actors in the Mexican revolution, Augusto Sandino in
Nicaragua, Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala, APRA in Peru, ADE in Ecuador in 1945, and the Socialist Party
of Chile--among others—as well as, in Costa Rica, the Communist Party’s “Socialismo a la Tica” (Costa
3
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of this tradition. Its socially-oriented constitution echoes that established by the revolution in
Mexico and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, written with Latin American
influence (Grandin 20011:6); its core social welfare and labor laws were based on models from
Chile and Mexico (Molina 2008); its reliance on the public sector and promotion of
cooperativism were characteristic of many socially and developmentally oriented political
projects in the region.
What is exceptional about Costa Rica in Latin America, then, is not that a sociallyoriented democratic project emerged in the twentieth century but that it survived the century
intact. Its proponents were not incarcerated or shot by the tens of thousands; its core
institutions were not honed down to a small group of privileged beneficiaries, robbed blind, left
to wither from neglect, or sold for a quick dose of foreign exchange. In Costa Rica, a version of
the social democratic project that was extinguished elsewhere continued to survive, and in many
ways thrive, into the 21st century.5
For a variety of reasons, Costa Rica provided a relatively propitious environment for the
survival of social democracy. It is a story that has been told in different ways, but whose broad
outlines are generally agreed upon: In the central plateau where most Costa Rican national
institutions developed, widespread land ownership led to relatively “soft” class conflict between
merchant capital and coffee producers of varying sizes, which contrasted with the “hard”
conflicts between landlords and landless (or land-poor) laborers, or racist forced labor regimes
that prevailed in much of the rest of Central (and Latin) America. A large agricultural frontier
and endemic labor shortages raised the floor for workers’ wages and probably encouraged elite
Rican-style socialism) and José Figueres’s “democratic socialism.” While there is much diversity between
these movements there are common themes and mutual influences. José Figueres, for example, claimed
to be influenced by APRA (Pakkasvirta 1997). Of course, these were regional variants on global currents
that included European socialism and social democracy, the Soviet Union, and reformist experiments in
the US. José Figueres’s founding of the ICE in Costa Rica owed much to the example of the Tennessee
Valley Authority.
5 The closest parallel to Costa Rica in this is Uruguay (see e.g. Martínez 2008). Notably, the period of
military rule was comparatively brief (Sandbrook et al. 2007).
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interest in public health (as did a racist concern for preservation of the white race in the face of
Chinese and West Indian immigration; Palmer 2003). Physical isolation helped to keep the
country out of the destructive internecine warfare that wracked Central America (see e.g. Paige
1997; Williams 1994).
There is a recognizable trajectory of electoral democracy and state initiatives to promote
health and welfare from the end of the 19th century. By then elections had been established as
the normal means of political succession, but voting for public offices had been a regular (even
annual) practice since the 1830s (Vargas González 2005). Early investments in basic education
made literacy widespread (Molina and Palmer 2007:69-70). Major public health initiatives at
the turn of the century began a cultural and political dynamic Steven Palmer (2003) calls
“medical populism” and presaged the development of welfare state institutions. And already in
the early 20th century there were attempts to address inequality in landholdings through land
reform (Edelman 1992:167-74, 1999:49).
Nevertheless, that social democracy survived in Costa Rica more than elsewhere can also
be seen as a contingent outcome of events in the middle of the 20th century. There were social
and democratic traditions and strong movements for revolution and reform even in the most
oppressive Central American polities (see e.g., Acuña Ortega 1994, 2004; Bulmer-Thomas 1987;
Forster 1998; Gould 1990; Gould and Lauria-Santiago 2004; Lauria-Santiago 1999; Grandin
2011). At the same time, the domestic reaction and US intervention that quashed social
democracy elsewhere were not absent in Costa Rica, and uncovering the forms that they took is
important for understanding this particular experience of democracy. By emphasizing
contingency, I hope to direct attention to the continuities between the Costa Rican experience
and that of the rest of Latin America and away from more essentialist cultural narratives.
The global crises and instability between the first and second world wars provoked
intellectual ferment and popular movements in Costa Rica as elsewhere (Bulmer-Thomas 1987;
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Molina 2002). Despite a brief reactionary military dictatorship (1917 to 1919), reformist
politicians and trade union activism achieved an impressive series of reforms between 1914 and
1930, which included founding a public sector bank and the state insurance monopoly, and
passing legislation for compensation of injuries and an eight-hour day for urban workers
(Edelman 1999:50-1).
In the 1930s a robust Communist Party emerged in the workshops of the capital and the
banana plantations of the coasts, building off prior decades of organizing by workers and
artisans (De la Cruz 2004; Oliva Medina 1985). Communists led some ten thousand workers in a
successful strike against United Fruit in 1934. Communists and other left intellectuals left a deep
mark on Costa Rican culture in this period, particularly in its literature. Carlos Luis Fallas, a
leader of the strike in 1934, would become Costa Rica’s most famous literary figure, placing his
anti-imperialist account of United Fruit’s banana plantations, Mamita Yunai, at the heart of the
national cultural canon.
The Communist Party soon began to compete successfully in elections and became a
significant presence in the national legislature (Molina 2007). In the early 1940s, the
Communist Party reorganized as the Popular Vanguard to enter into an alliance with the
reformist president Dr. Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia and the newly installed Catholic
archbishop. This coalition promoted a far-reaching Reforma Social which incorporated a
chapter on Garantías Sociales (social guarantees) in the constitution, including rights for
workers, and founded the healthcare and pension system, which was expanded over time to
provide universal coverage today (Molina 2007, 2008; Sandbrook et al. 2007).6 Calderón’s
successor, Teodoro Picado Michalski won an apparent landslide victory in 1944, but the
legitimacy of the vote was challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. Political polarization
The reasons behind this remarkable coalition and its pursuit of social reform are disputed (see Molina
2007, 2008; Rayner 2010; Rojas 1989). Regardless of the reasons for this coalition, however, the broader
regional movement towards social and democratic reform should not be missed.
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increased until an opposition-organized lockout and strike ended with violent clashes in the
streets.
The following year the Legislative Assembly annulled the results of the 1948 presidential
election between Calderón Guardia and the newspaper magnate, Otilio Ulate, alleging fraud by
Ulate’s supporters. José Figueres Ferrer, a longstanding critic of the government, returned from
exile to lead the “National Liberation Army” (trained on his rural estate) in an uprising with the
alleged aim of restoring democracy. Figueres’s insurgents soon overpowered the small national
army and the “mariachis,” Vanguard’s partisan militias. The brief but consequential war left
some 2,000 dead and resulted in the founding of a “Second Republic,” which meant a new
constitution, new institutions, and new people in charge of the state—as well as a remarkable
degree of continuity with Calderón’s social reform.
Figueres’ “revolution” was part of a broader regional and global context. This was the
same year as the Berlin Airlift, the conventional beginning of the Cold War. In Latin America,
the United States pivoted from the “good neighbor” policy to a policy of opposing “Communism”
at any cost. Coups against elected governments in Venezuela and Peru in 1947 and the
assassination of Jorge Gaitán in Colombia in 1948 heralded the reactionary tide that ended the
brief “Latin American Spring” and returned most of the region to dictatorship by 1954 (Grandin
2011:8). The United States’ Cold War priorities contributed to Figueres’ victory, as the US
abandoned its erstwhile allies for their communist ties, blocking arms shipments to the Costa
Rican government even as they allowed the arming of Figueres (Longley 1997:73-4).7 Once in
power Figueres persecuted communists and trade unionists (Schifter 1985).

The alliances at this moment were still in flux. While the US moved aggressively to block aid to Costa
Rica from their ally, Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, it was the democratic government of Juan
José Arévalo in Guatemala that provided arms to Figueres with tacit US consent (Longley 1997: 73-4). The
US would soon, however, sponsor a coup against Jose Arévolo’s successor Jacobo Árbenz, bringing a
tragic end to the Guatemalan Spring. At this time, Figueres was a member of the Caribbean Legion,
another prominent member of which was Fidel Castro.
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The more-or-less-official narrative that Figueres acted to restore legitimate presidential
succession has long been challenged (e.g. by Schifter 1985), but has become more difficult to
sustain. Close examination of the electoral returns suggest that the greater fraud was committed
by Ulate’s campaign and that Calderón was probably the legitimate victor after all (Lehoucq and
Molina 2002; Molina 2005). Figueres’s rebellion interrupted ongoing negotiations between
Ulate and Calderón (Molina 2005:419), and Figueres used force of arms to achieve a year and a
half of rule by decree, which he used to persecute his enemies and institute major reforms—
before restoring the “rightful” president. Even the abolition of the army that has inspired so
many conveniently left Figueres’s supporters holding the guns.8
In emphatic exception to a regional narrative of reform and reaction, however, Figueres
and his successors extended the social democratic gains of the 1940s while using the state to
catalyze an economic transformation in a manner reminiscent of the program of the Communist
Party, and far beyond Calderón’s paternal reformism (see Communist Party of Costa Rica 1989
[1932]; Edelman 1999; Schifter 1985; Solís 2006). The Junta de Gobierno that ruled by decree
for eighteen months nationalized the banking system, placed taxes on capital including US
banana exporters, founded a public sector electricity company (the ICE), abolished the army,
created a fourth branch of government (the Supreme Electoral Tribunal) to regulate elections,
and presided over a convention to write a new constitution—among other measures—all while
maintaining the social reforms established by the coalition he deposed. And despite rule by
decree and selective political persecutions, democratic rights were expanded in major ways, as
the franchise was extended to women and persons of Afro-Caribbean descent (Molina and
Palmer 2007:116). At the end of the eighteen month period, Figueres fulfilled his promise to
surrender power to Ulate and political competition returned to a cycle of regular elections.
8Tellingly,

Vanguardia’s underground newspaper Adelante ran a headline in 1957 that read “the private
armies are the greatest threat to our democracy” (arguably, however, Vanguardia had once had its own:
“the Mariachis”).
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Costa Rican scholars continue to debate the nuances and contradictions of this moment.
It is probable that Figueres’ project was both a sincere effort to tackle the country’s problems,
end the dominance of the coffee oligarchy, and open up new areas of economic activity to some
of the aspiring entrepreneurs that supported him (Edelman 1999:56; Rovira 1982). Certainly,
this project had enough ambiguities and contradictory impulses that its democratic resolution
appears contingent, if not improbable.
The US diplomatic corps was also conflicted about these developments. They were
particularly concerned about Figueres’s nationalizations and taxes on US-based banana
producers. But instead of undermining Figueres the United States went so far as to threaten
military intervention to forestall an invasion of Costa Rica by the US-allied Nicaraguan dictator
Anastasio Somoza in 1954 and again 1955 (Longley 1997:139-42). Reviewing US diplomatic
archives, Kyle Longley (1997) attributes US tolerance of Costa Rican economic nationalism and
social democracy to able and pragmatic Costa Rican diplomacy (which includes Figueres’s
anticommunist posture), abetted by a historically positive view of Costa Rica in the United
States (a disposition itself built on narratives featuring themes of whiteness and democracy).9
But this, too, could easily have gone differently—just like Guatemalans’ dreams of democracy
and social justice in 1954.

The Consolidation of Social Democracy
Despite its contingency at midcentury, electoral democracy was firmly established in the
following decades as an encompassing institutional and cultural order of values and

Ana María Alonso (2008) observes that US conceptions of sovereignty have always been racialized;
Costa Rica’s white and European representation has doubtless helped it maintain credibility as a
sovereign nation state with the US foreign policy establishment.
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expectations.10 Broad-based improvement in the quality of life and extensive upward mobility
created deep respect for the institutional order (Molina 2002; Sandbrook et al. 2007).
Meanwhile, the regulations propagated by Picado and then by Figueres made elections a
credible means of political competition (Lehoucq 1996, 1999; Lehoucq and Molina 2002). The
abolition of the military effectively eliminated the possibility of a coup, but also gave the cultural
process of Costa Rican state formation a more civil cast; the model citizen was a civil engineer,
teacher or doctor, not a soldier (cf. Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Brown 1995). Thus established,
Costa Rican social democracy also survived and thrived through the second, more widespread
and more violent wave of reaction in Latin America, from the Brazilian coup in the mid 1960s to
the end of the Central American civil wars in the early 1990s (see Grandin 2006, 2011).
The social democratic project that was stamped out in so many other places, then,
continued to flourish in Costa Rica, albeit in a form redrawn by the new relations of force
established in the conflict of 1948—the limits of which have been the subject of ongoing critical
reflection. The post 1948 democracy had a universal adult franchise and remarkably reliable
balloting (Lehoucq and Molina 2002). But at the same time, the loss of the ideological diversity
and autonomous working-class organization of the 1930s and 40s created a more restricted
political field.11 During the period of rule by decree, people associated with the former
government, communists, and trade union activists were exiled, dismissed from their jobs,
subjected to special investigative tribunals, and, in some cases, murdered (Shifter 1985:111-6).
The most vital political parties in the country were scattered or driven underground. Although it
was eventually legalized in the 1970s, neither the Popular Vanguard nor the labor movement

Paige (1997) in a comparative study of Central America’s “coffee elite” found a much fuller support for
democracy among Costa Rican elites, and the LAPOP public opinion survey has regularly found very high
indices of “system support” for democracy in Costa Rica. The importance of elections for legitimacy was
also an accepted truism during the period of my fieldwork.
11It probably also contributed to the conformism that is now a recognized part of official national
character, just as the US continues to feel the legacy of McCarthyism (Robin 2004). At the least, the
“golden age” of Costa Rican literature, whose leading lights were from the left, came to an end.
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that it helped to lead recovered. A more civil form of repression of worker organizing through
employer sanctions, beginning with a decree in 1948 authorizing the dismissal of “politically
dangerous” persons (Shifter 1985:111-2), and persisting into the next century in the guise of
company unions known as “solidarity associations” (Abdallah n.d.; Aguilar 2004:47-50; Trejos
1999). Legal protection for free speech (outside of the workplace) coexisted with a highly
concentrated and oligarchic media (Rockwell and Janus 2003; see also González Dobles 1981).
Employer control of the workplace, the Solidarity Associations, and media concentration would
all play important roles in the referendum on CAFTA.
Public financing of elections, an electoral system based on party lists, and strict term
limits, have in theory encouraged the authority and autonomy of political parties. Nevertheless,
parties have tended to be dominated by a few leading figures (most paradigmatically, by
Figueres and Calderón) and to varying degrees by wealthy landowners and capitalists. In one
academically influential interpretation, the first decades of postwar democracy amounted to a
contest between the “petit-bourgeois” PLN and the large landed interests represented by their
opposition (Rovira 1982).
By defeating and scattering Calderón’s supporters and Vanguardia Popular, Figueres
cleared the field for his newly founded National Liberation Party (PLN, for Partido Liberacíon
Nacional—Molina 2005: 420). While the core of the PLN was a tightly-knit cohort of young,
avowedly social democratic intellectuals who had participated in the uprising of 1948, the party
was built by recruiting a national network of mostly middle-class cadres, many of whom had
little political experience or ideological commitment (English 1971). The result was a distinctly
pragmatic party organization that continued to dominate electoral politics at the beginning of
the 21st century, and which also exercised a broad cultural influence.
The PLN’s competition was a protean coalition, often united by opposition more than
anything else. It included a large group of “Calderonistas,” who now allied themselves with
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traditional oligarchic interests in a more liberal counterweight to the PLN (Rovira 1982). In the
1980s this opposition coalesced into the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC, Partido Unidad
Social Cristiana), inaugurating a two-party system (“el bipartidismo”) that endured until the late
1990s.
The democracy that coalesced in the 1960s was fiercely partisan and intensely electoral.
While a consensus was established over core welfare and developmental institutions, there was
enough scope for disagreement about the size and role of the state, as well opportunities to
benefit from it, to give tangible consequences to political participation (just as a visible ink stain
marked the performance of this civic duty). The antagonisms unleashed by civil war also
contributed to partisan passions (Solís 2006:494-518). Roughly eight out of ten adult citizens
voted in each presidential election between 1962 and 1994 (see Raventós et al. 2005:2-3).
Although ballots were secret, elections were profoundly social, rather than individual acts—a
“fiesta cívica” in which one displayed one’s allegiance through flags, umbrellas, donning t-shirts,
dressing, or even painting one’s house in party colors. Men, women and children celebrated
partisan victories in the streets.
This passionate electoralism has fed on, and fed into, the tendency to identify the Costa
Rican nation with democracy and civility. The trope of Costa Rica as a country distinguished
from its neighbors (especially Nicaragua) by democracy and peace has a long history in which it
has taken historicist, culturalist, and racist forms (e.g., Edelman 1998, Molina 2002, Sandoval
2008): as president Laura Chinchilla declared in the context of a heated border dispute with
Nicaragua, “the vocation for peace, which is something almost genetic, is in the DNA of our
people” (Murillo and Villalobos 2010:4A).12 This trope appears in the ubiquitous
characterization of the national “idiosincracia” as easy-going (sometimes to a fault), pacific,
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“..la vocación de paz, que es algo casi genético, está en el ADN de nuestro pueblo.”
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disposed to compromise and the “middle” of everything, conformist—although also, in more
vernacular versions, prone to sarcasm and leveling mockery.
Of course, representations of “the national idiosyncrasy” are politically potent. And as
Julia Paley’s (2001) study of post-Pinochet Chile shows, a discourse that opposes democracy to
protest can effectively serve purposes of control. Manuel Solís Avendaño argues that the
discourse of democratic pacifism in Costa Rica constrains the use of violence by the state, but is
also used to cast protest (especially by workers) as immoral and anti-national, and to bolster a
“civil authoritarianism” that encourages deference to figures of authority, especially those
claiming legitimacy from the past (2002:43-7, 2006:37-39, 217-25). Notably, for Solís the
master exponent of this discourse is the Nobel Peace Laureate, sugar magnate, and scion of the
traditional coffee elite, Oscar Arias Sánchez—who, as president and principal advocate of
CAFTA, features prominently in the processes of contention over the treaty.13
Reducing democracy to elections was always an incomplete project, but in the
consolidation of the post 1948 political order, electoral politics steadily colonized political
practice, particularly among the urban working class. With workplace organizing stymied after
1948, efforts were redirected to the popular neighborhoods, where protests over transportation,
water, and electricity flourished (Alvarenga 2005; Cayetano 1992). At the center of these
protests was a network of Juntas Progresistas (Progressive Committees). While actions were
often localized, the Juntas Progresistas sometimes organized on a large scale, including
organized resistance to electricity price increases throughout the 1950s and a campaign for the

Since, as the postmodern truism goes, resistance often makes power visible, it is worth noting the
tradition of packaging social and political critique in the subversion of democracy’s status “as a passive
object of veneration and contemplation,” to use the words of Manuel Solís (2002:47). Mario Sancho’s
(1936) sarcastically-titled essay “Costa Rica, Central America’s Switzerland” critiqued his compatriots’
complacency in the face of poverty, inequality, and capitalists’ domination of the political system—as well
as the habit of comparing Costa Rica to the Alpine nation. Yolanda Oreamundo (1938) similarly mocked
the pretense of a “demoperfectocracía,” where the frivolity and passivity of the citizens made Costa Rican
democracy “bien distinta de la democracia en sí” [very different from democracy itself] (Solís 2006:114).
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nationalization of electricity distribution that and brought thousands into the streets in 1958
(Alvarenga 2005:132-45).
Beginning in the 1960s, however, these independent organizations were gradually
displaced by “Development Associations” financed in part by the United States and controlled
by the dominant parties through local and national organization (Mora 1989; Palma 1989). The
last large-scale movement based in low income urban neighborhoods was the protests and road
blockades in opposition to an electricity rate hike in 1983. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that the marginalization of autonomous movements occurred in the context of a state
that really was providing for the health and livelihood of its citizens (Edelman 1999:29).
Whatever the state of autonomous popular organizing might have been, Costa Rican social
democracy was working in this fundamental sense.
As in much of the rest of the world, the 1970s brought a renewal of contentious politics,
spearheaded by a wave of graduates from the rapidly expanding university system radicalized by
the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, some of whom dedicated themselves to organizing
inadequately housed urban populations (Dobles and Leandro 2005). By the late 1980s, however,
the Arias administration had incorporated what remained of the housing movement into the
PLN’s electoral machinery (se e.g., Molina Alfaro 1990). Members of this generation also
participated in massive protests against US minerals giant ALCOA’s proposed mine in 1970—a
campaign that was often cited as a precedent for the wave of protests that began in the 1990s; it
was in the struggle against ALCOA that many of those that I came to know in the movement of
the NO got their first tastes of contentious politics.
The crisis of the early 1980s hit Costa Rica hard (see e.g. Edelman 1999; Morgan 1987).
The retrenchment and liberalization that followed provoked new contention, in the 1980s by
agriculturalists confronting cuts in state support and protective tariffs (Edelman 1999), and
after 1995 by public sector workers and students protesting pension reforms and privatization
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(see e.g., Almeida and Walker 2006; Segura 2005). These two streams of discontent—swollen by
outrage over corruption scandals—converged in opposition to the “modernization” of electricity
and telecommunications in 2000, and again in the movement against CAFTA after 2003. On the
other hand, the PLN divided between an ascendant, more neoliberal faction associated with
Oscar Arias and traditionalists loyal to the party’s social democratic heritage.
I will take up the story of Costa Rica’s limited liberalization and the emergence of
opposition movements in chapters one and two. For now it is enough to note that these
movements were largely successful in restraining liberalization and privatization, while Costa
Ricans were showing increasing signs of frustration with the workings of their representative
democracy.

New Democracies, New Contexts
While Costa Rica adapted the social democratic project of the 1940s through this
contentious process of resistance and accommodation (Sandbrook et al. 2007), the rest of the
region was swept by liberalization and privatization. By the first decade of the 21st century,
however, a new generation of democratic socialist and social democratic governments had been
elected into office throughout Latin America, changing the context of Costa Rican
exceptionalism yet again.
For the most part, the expansion of state institutions and functions has been limited and
piecemeal in the countries governed by the resurgent Latin American lefts (Sandbrook et al.
2007; Webber 2011). As a result, the scope of Costa Rica’s developmental and welfare state
continued to surpass even the most ambitious of Latin America’s new socialist projects in
important ways; despite significant renationalization, even Hugo Chávez’s “21st-century
socialism” had not ventured to make telecommunications a monopoly of the state, to take one
example. Similarly, the effective universality of Costa Rica’s health and pension system still
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permitted few rivals. At the same time, however, the Costa Rican social state consisted of
institutions held over from a prior era, and those committed to it had spent decades on the
defensive. By some measures, inequality was growing at a faster rate there than anywhere else in
Latin America at the turn of the 21st century (), while indices of poverty remained stubbornly
fixed (see Estado de la Nación 2007:115-121; Martínez 2007; Leitón 2006a, 2006b; Sojo
2010:88-90).
Costa Ricans adapted longstanding discourses of exceptionalism to this complex and
contradictory situation, creating narratives which became central to the contention over CAFTA.
In one common refrain, Costa Rica was exceptionally stuck in an outdated statist model; it was
“slow,” lagging behind the rest of the region on the unilineal path of market driven progress,
held back by public sector unions and obstructionist parliamentary procedure. On the left, some
similarly saw Costa Rica left behind by the process of “revolutionary” social transformation
whose pace was being set in Venezuela and Bolivia, with Cuban socialism as inspiration.
Opposition to CAFTA was for them often as much about a pan-Latin Americanist, “Bolivarian”
geopolitical vision as it was about Costa Rican institutions per se.
More often, however, opponents of CAFTA celebrated the institutions of the social state
as part and parcel of a valued national “idiosyncrasy.” Because they articulated a positive vision
of Costa Rican exceptionalism, theirs was a profoundly national discourse with substantial
rhetorical and affective power. And because it was rooted in the defense of existing institutions it
could also be “conservative,” benefitting from affective attachments to the past and the present—
even when it was articulated with a transformative vision for popular democracy. The proCAFTA SI campaign did not however entirely cede the ground of Costa Rican idiosyncrasy: they
argued that Costa Rica’s valued welfare state institutions could adapt to or even needed
CAFTA—the real threat to their viability was anti-democratic “pressure groups” and foreignsponsored subversion.
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The evolving substance and meaning of democracy in Latin America have further
transformed the context of Costa Rican exceptionalism. The re-establishment of electoral
regimes throughout the region made Costa Rica’s less exceptional, even as Costa Ricans’
increasing disaffection more nearly echoed widespread frustrations with the quality of
representation.
At the same time, movements and communities throughout Latin America were acting
on their frustration with elite-dominated democracies by consciously creating new participatory
forms (e.g. Alvarez et al. 1998b, Dagnino 1998, Santos 2007, Paley 2008c). Arising in the wake
of the democratization of military regimes, these movements have pushed beyond “transition”—
understood as a movement to a democratic order whose outlines are specified in advance—to a
process of revival, renewal and reinvention marked by creativity, diversity and grassroots
protagonism.14 They have created innovative forms of participatory and direct democracy that
have pushed the boundaries of the politically thinkable and inspired people around the world.
These Latin American democratic projects are diverse, including the grassroots Zapatista
democracy in Chiapas’s Mayan communities (e.g. Nash 2001); the more state-centered
Bolivarian experiments in direct democracy in Venezuela (e.g. Fernandes 2011, Smilde and
Hellinger 2011); participatory budgeting in Brazil (e.g. Abers 1999) and Ecuador (Paley 2008c);
and the diverse forms of “horizontalism” in Bolivia and Argentina (e.g. Sitrin 2006, 2012; Lazar
2008; Zibechi 2010)—to name just a few of those that have garnered the most international
attention. Moreover, in part inspired by Latin American examples, movements in the
Mediterranean, Europe and the United States have also taken up experiments in practices of
“direct” or “horizontal” democracy (e.g., Gessen and Tayler 2011; Graeber 2009; Juris 2012;
Razsa and Kurnik 2012).

See Verdery (1996) for a parallel critique of the concept of “transition” in the post socialist context in
Central and Eastern Europe.
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Costa Ricans also worked to reshape the meaning and possibilities of democracy, both
despite and because of the discourse that defined their democracy as exceptional (cf. Solís
2006). The usual spatiotemporal reference employed by the NO was national: it was a
“patriotic” struggle that was “historic” within a national narrative marked by figures like Juanito
Mora and Juan Santamaría (see also, Rayner 2008). With a few notable exceptions, I found the
protagonists of the NO creating new forms of participation without invoking other Latin
American experiences. The most notable of these democratic projects, the Comités Patrióticos,
emerged mostly spontaneously within an urgent practical situation, and their conception was
more utilitarian than ideological.15
These projects were however shaped by aspirations, as well as expectations and habits of
sociality, carried by the movement’s protagonists (a theme I take up in chapter six). And locally
articulated traditions as well as currents from the world beyond, both in the past and the
present, influenced these expectations and aspirations. There are parallels to the Comités in the
Costa Rican past (such as the Juntas Progresistas mentioned above) as well as in both
contemporary and historical movements elsewhere in Latin America and beyond (e.g. Nugent
2008). Latin America’s distinctive democratic traditions have produced diverse forms of
participation, with a notable undercurrent of direct democracy, but which are also very specific
to the particularities of nation and region.
Just as Costa Rica’s 20th century exceptionalism is best understood in the context of a
broader regional project for social democracy, the democratic project advanced by protagonists
of the NO should be understood in terms of the widespread frustration with elite-dominated
partisan electoral politics at the turn of the 21st—as well as the alternatives to that order being
advanced elsewhere in Latin America. It is the intersection of these two democratic projects—
and their conflict with an expansive neoliberal hegemony propagated by the United States—that
15

Sitrin (2012) makes a similar point about horizontal movements in Argentina.
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make the movement of the NO particularly interesting. By struggling to defend a “social state”
with tremendous legitimacy while creating a new—more egalitarian and participatory—“way of
doing politics,” the protagonists of this movement articulated one set of political possibilities in
the face of common challenges.

2. Concepts and Terms
Protagonists of the NO were concerned by the threat that CAFTA posed for the wellbeing of their country, their families, and themselves. They were also inspired by desires for a
collective life embodying values of “solidarity,” “participation” and “respect for nature”—desires
often developed and deepened by participation in the movement itself. My account however
places more emphasis on how protagonists of this movement used their social and symbolic
creativity to defend a national territory where such values could survive and thrive, both during
and after the struggle against CAFTA—as well as the obstacles they faced in doing so. In my
conclusion, I will highlight what I believe to be some potential lessons for other movements.
The thesis I argue here is that protagonists of the NO gave new life to “the people” as an
identity and “democracy” as a practice. In doing so they articulated a common project—despite
their diversity—for “popular democracy” and against a neoliberal project that pretended to
hegemony over them. In this section, I will prepare the ground for this argument by introducing
a few key terms and explaining how I will use them. I will dispense with most discussion of the
genealogies of the terms and the current state of debates concerning their use.
Democracy
I start from the assumption that democracy is a contested ideal rather than a particular
institutional arrangement. Although the term democracy has increasingly come to be identified
with multiparty elections through secret ballots in a context of certain guarantees for civil
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liberties (Coles 2007; Paley 2008a), this globally-circulating “normative democracy” does not
encompass the democratic imagination, historically or today (Nugent 2008; Pateman 1970). The
democratic ideal of broad and equal participation in collective decision making continues to be
raised as a critical concept and a rallying cry for oppositional movements (including within
“democracies”)—whether or not the term “democracy” is used to refer to this ideal. “Democracy”
in this sense is not the either-or condition or possession of a polity (something a country “has”
or “is”)—it is a starting point for critical assessment of political institutions. The leveling of
existing inequalities implied in democratic ideals of equal participation mean that democracy
was originally—and is always potentially—an insurgent demand from below (see Rueschmeyer
et al. 1992; Holston 2008; Nimtz 2000).
Even within the more normative electoral tradition, there are important disagreements.
To Costa Rican eyes, the US electoral system that produced the election of 2000 was puzzling at
best and more likely fraudulent. In the referendum on CAFTA, longstanding traditions that
regulated elections in the interest of democracy were steamrolled by a US-style big money
campaign, which was cheerfully declared a model election by authoritative international
observers. Nor is voting the only or even the most effective means of practicing democracy.
Forums for collective decision making (like assemblies) are one way. Anything that gives people
a consequential say in the decisions that affect the collectivity, including strikes, boycotts, road
blockades, are democratic when they empower people who are otherwise marginalized or
excluded. Contentious movements from below are then a necessary part of democracy, despite
the fact that a discourse of “democracy” is often invoked to undermine them (Paley 2001,
2008b; Piven and Cloward 1979).
The ability to use democracy in undemocratic ways has a lot to do with the fraught
relationship between democracy and liberalism, a tension at the center of the narrative I present
here. Democracy in its modern incarnation has developed in a contradictory but mutually25

constitutive relationship with liberalism (Gould 1990; Held 2006; Mouffe 2009). While
democracy needs liberalism’s safeguards of dissent, the emphasis on individualism and free
contract is contradicted by the antagonistic process by which a demos forms and claims the right
to rule (see Mouffe 2009). Relatedly, Carol Gould (1990) points out that the individualism of the
liberal tradition has been difficult to reconcile with the obligation to accept majority rule. As we
shall see, both of these contradictions played significant roles in the process of contention over
CAFTA.
For Karl Polanyi, the liberal tradition of “private property” developed as a restriction on
democracy. Legal guarantees to protect “property” against “the people” became salient in
England in the face of the Chartist movement for working-class suffrage, but were most
developed in the United States, where "the American Constitution…isolated the economic
sphere entirely from the jurisdiction of the Constitution, [and] put private property thereby
under the highest conceivable protection,” with the result that, “in spite of universal suffrage,
American voters were powerless against owners" (2001:233-4). CAFTA, I will argue, is an
example of a US-led effort to install this model of “reactive” law as a “global constitution”
(Mattei and Nader 2008:137-141).
Property Regimes
I will argue that CAFTA was a renewal of this project to protect “owners” from “the
people.” And just as importantly, it challenged the ability of “the people” to act as owners.
Property claims were thus central to the controversy over CAFTA, which sought to impose a
neoliberal property regime on a more social democratic one.
I employ an understanding of “property” as an inherently political process of making
claims to values (see Hann 1998; Verdery 2003).16 Although who can claim what and how is
To be more precise I would say “objectified values.” I prefer values to “things” for two reasons: as
Verdery and Humphrey (2004) point out, not everything claimed as property is unambiguously a “thing”
16
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decided in culturally and historically particular property regimes, the term property has
become very difficult to extract from the liberal tradition that elevates it as a special kind of
exclusive “right” of dominion exercised by individuals over things (Rose 2004; Verdery and
Humphrey 2004). Claims for the precedence of “private property” have developed alongside
arguments for a self-regulating (“free”) market. They are, after all, two sides of the same coin, as
the free market implies the widespread exercise of a very strong property claim: the discretion to
alienate, exchange and acquire.
However, market and property discourses are differently positioned in the liberal
tradition. Market discourse belongs to the art of government; it is dedicated to the “conduct of
conduct” in order to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources and maximize “utility”
(Gordon 1991). This is the technocratic liberalism of economists, “third way” politicians, and the
World Bank. Private property here is a means to the general welfare (Gordon 1991; see e.g.
North 1990). More populist strands of liberalism, however, make property a fundamental
“right” prior to whatever governmental rationality it might serve: what is mine is mine because I
earned it, I built it, I inherited it, and therefore no one else can have a legitimate claim to it (see
e.g., Nozick 1974). These two discourses sometimes contradict but often bolster each other.17
The converse of the interdependence between the free market and private property is
that the post-war regulation or “embedding” of the market by social democrats, pragmatic
liberals, and developmental states was accomplished through the broadening of claims to
“private property” in the form of taxes, regulations, and labor codes, as well as through
expansion of public ownership. Costa Rican social democracy was one particular version of such
(think of organ trafficking, intellectual property rights, or slavery). Secondly, as Verdery (2003) shows,the
wider social and economic context that gives something value is what makes it worth claiming. I would
however suggest that the process of claiming something involves a process of objectification even if that
process is contested or contestable, see Callon and Muniesa 2005).
17 There cases of contradiction are interesting. In the US, the interpenetration of law and economics has
made it possible to make governmental arguments for the expropriation of one private property claim in
favor of another, based on projections of the economic growth that may result (Mattei and Nader 2008).
This very much rankles liberals who elevate the right to property over the market.
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an embedded property regime, in which “the people” made important claims as citizens through
the system of electoral representation and sometimes through protest (Alvarenga 2005).
The State, “Social” and Otherwise
The NO was quite vocal about defending “the State” (el Estado). This might seem strange
to many from more authoritarian or more liberal milieus. But when Costa Ricans talked about
defending the state they had in mind a particular institutional order that should not be
misrecognized. As anthropologists and others have taken pains to demonstrate, the state does
not have an essence (see e.g., Abrams 1988; Coronil 1997; Gupta and Sharma 2006; Hibou
2004; Mitchell 1999; Trouillot 2001)—although there are some essential tasks for the
maintenance of a capitalist society that are usually performed by states. The category is based on
family resemblance together with claims made in a discursive field that includes recognition by
other states as well as by citizens. While the overlap between states is often enough to “know it
when you see it,” the functions of the state have sprawled over the course of the 20th century,
and there is almost no function, purpose or practice that is either always or never carried out by
states (see e.g. Nugent 2007). Finally, the actual integration of any state is a matter to be
investigated, not assumed: “the state” is rarely a unified actor.
The Costa Rican state is interesting as a state in part because its capacity for violence,
which is often used to define what a state is, is minimal. In order to distinguish institutions that
operate as “civilians,” that is, that do not participate in Max Weber’s famous monopoly of the
legitimate use of violence, I employ a term sometimes used in Costa Rica: “social state” (Estado
Social).
This social state was also interesting for the way it was organized and related to both
governments and citizens. Distinctions between “public” and “private” are often blurry (think of
a “public” university that receives most of its funding from tuition and donations). In fact, this
dichotomy, which developed along with liberal concepts of property, is a “discursive distinction”
28

rather than an essential one, and either term can be applied to nearly any “social fact” as part of
the political process of making claims (Gal and Kligman 2000:37-62). The assertion that
something is private has long been a way of resisting others’ claims to it. But public property can
also be used for private ends (for one notorious case, see Knut 2003), while sometimes
regulation and other public claims have turned private corporations into quasi-public entities
(e.g., Cohen 1992; Schmidt 2003). Private corporations, in fact, potentially suffer from the same
principal-agent dilemma (the division between owners and managers) as public sector firms
(Shirley and Walsh 2000).
The more important distinction is really what kind of claims can be made and by whom
(see Feigenbaum et al 1999, Hibou 2004, MacLeod 2004; Pitcher 2002). As a result, the
question of public and private, state and not state is ultimately also a question of the potentials
and limits for the exercise of democratic decision making. The liberal discourse of private
property tends to foreclose this discussion, subsuming the diversity of experiences of public
property within a single simplistic rubric (Hann 1998). In Costa Rica at the turn of the 21st
century, however, most people were still not prepared to renounce their ability as a democracy
to manage a social state.
Neoliberalism
As elsewhere in Latin America, Costa Rican activists frequently used “neoliberalismo” to
describe the policies and the persons (“los neoliberales”) against which they were struggling. I
too find neoliberalism to be a necessary, if complicated, term. I hope that my account of
struggles over CAFTA will contribute to discussion of how this term can be productively used
(Boas and Gans-Morse 2009).
Like that of the protagonists of the NO, my use of neoliberalism draws on a critical
tradition that began under the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, where dissidents took up a littleused name for postwar German liberalism (Neoliberalismus) and used it to describe the
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application of economic liberalization by the illiberal means of state terror (Boas and GansMorse 2009:139).18 Even if the inspiration for the Chilean dissidents’ use of “neo” was the
juxtaposition of economic liberalism and political authoritarianism, neoliberalism became a
very useful handle for the kind of economic liberalization that the Pinochet dictatorship
pioneered (see Lüders 2000; Winn 2004)—reforms that were eventually applied to varying
degrees by governments all over the world, and with particular force in Latin America (e.g.,
Dasgupta 1998; Harvey 2005; Gill 2000; Nellis and Birdsall 2005; Orhanganzi 2002; Pitcher
2002; Sheahan 1987; Smith 1998; Wade 2001, 2003).
I consider neoliberalism to be this movement to restore the self-regulating market and
the priority of private property claims, a movement that began as a reaction to the mid-century
“embedding” of the market. That this project by necessity led to the emergence of new
institutions of economic governance does not negate its fundamentally liberal aim of freeing
owners from the wider social claims that had been placed on them. I thus prefer to situate
neoliberalism as a project that pursued enduring aims in a particular historical moment (Peck
and Tickell 2003), rather than treat it as either an abstract doctrine or “mobile technology” of
government (cf. Ong 2007). For the more abstract ideological systems and enduring discursive
moves there are other terms (beginning, of course, with liberalism). Neoliberalism might then
be reserved for a particular, and particularly significant, political project that needs to be
named.19
As it happens, neoliberalism is the best name—indeed, the only name—for a movement
to “free” markets and private property that had become global by the end of the 20th century

18Notably—beginning

the tradition whereby neoliberalism would be a term used exclusively by its critics,
Pinochet preferred another German phrase for his regime, “Social Market Economy” (Boas and GansMorse 2009:152).
19 It needs to be named in part because it refuses to name itself. The tendency for “neoliberalism” to be
used almost exclusively by the movement’s critics (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009) reflects not so much the
shortcomings of the concept as ahistorical habits of thought and an ideological affirmation of the
naturalness and self-evident truth of their positions.
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(which does not mean it was either universal or homogenous). Anthropologists are rightly
sensitive to the variety of forms liberalization has taken in particular contexts, but that attention
to particularity should not come at the expense of the recognition of phenomena operating at
regional and global scales (Robotham 2005; Trouillot 2001; Wolf 1982; see also, Smith 1984).
And as Eric Wolf (1982) helped to demonstrate, among the most global of processes is
capitalism itself. The crisis of the 1930s and the subsequent move to embed the market were
both global phenomena. Likewise, the neoliberal challenge to this embedded regime responded
to transformations in the global economy. Neoliberalism properly belongs to the history of
capitalism as a global system, in which periodic crises have led to the organization of new
institutions and the rise of new global hegemons (see Aglietti 1979; Arrighi 1994; Arrighi and
Silver 1999; Harvey 1990; Jessop 1995; Polanyi 2001).
By the 1970s, the institutions that had organized the long postwar expansion were under
strain, including the Bretton Woods system of global financial regulation. The spread of the
Fordist model of mass production had led to increased competition in core industries and
created a situation in which capital was locked up in unprofitable investments, contributing to a
global recession and a “wealth crash” in the United States. Among the means of restoring
accumulation were: (1) to branch out into new areas of economic activity and develop new
markets; (2) to remove rigidities and flexibilize production; (3) to reduce the burdens of welfare
states and trade unions and reduce costs of production (see Arrighi 1994; Brenner 2002;
Dumenil and Levy 2004; Harvey 2003, 2005).
Each of these solutions made owners and managers of capital more insistent on their
freedom of action and more assertive in their property claims. The first solution led to insistence
on extending “intellectual property rights,” privatization, the opening of protected markets and
financial deregulation; the second and third to attacks on the claims of welfare states, labor and
environmental laws and other kinds of regulations, as well as offshoring and the
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transnationalization of production chains (see Dicken 2011; Dumenil and Levy 2004; Harvey
2003, 2005). The drive to transnationalize encouraged the relaxation of protectionism in the
global North, as well as complementary moves to facilitate foreign direct investment for export
assembly in the South. The latter in turn included obvious measures such as the relaxation of
restrictions of foreign investment, and less obvious ones like the liberalization of land markets
(Hall 2013).
Further encouraging the growth of a neoliberal project was the discrediting of the state
as an economic actor (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). By the 1970s centrally planned economies
were stagnating, while Keynesian demand-management was producing stagflation instead of
growth.20 The discrediting of government was even more significant for the global South, where
the state had been widely employed to “jump-start” economic growth, to incubate
industrialization, to provide infrastructure and services, to foster agricultural production and
subsidize the consumption of basic goods like food and fuel. In Latin America, developmental
states—including Costa Rica—were confronted by the beginning of the 1980s with unsustainable
deficits and mushrooming debt, caught between unfavorable terms of trade and the “Volcker
shock” that raised interest rates on dollar-denominated liabilities and created a desperate need
for hard currency.
The crisis of the developmental state laid the groundwork for the arrival of neoliberalism
as development policy (Sheahan 1980, 1987; Smith 1998). The free movement of resources to
whoever would most efficiently employ them would allegedly produce development in the
periphery. This argument was usually made without recognition of the history of protection in
the developed world and with a simplistic “free market” interpretation of East Asian experience
that excluded crucial state interventions (Chang 2002, 2010; Dasgupta 1998; Evans 1995; Smith
20Contemporary

Keynesians argue that the failure of these measures was probably due to the inflationary
pressures of high oil prices more than anything else. They observe that Reagan followed a “military
Keynesianism” with some success at reviving economic activity in the US in the 1980s.
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1998). Abstract neoclassical theory was also ill-equipped to recognize the importance of fixed
capital, oligopolies and agglomeration economies in shaping comparative advantage and the
geography of uneven development (see Harvey 1999; Krugman and Livas 1996). As Sandbrook
et al. (2007) argue, a successful social democratic project in the periphery needs an active
developmental state. The free-market alternative is the low road of cost-cutting comparative
advantage.
However, crisis-ridden developing countries badly needed foreign exchange. The IMF,
the World Bank and other international institutions provided loans in exchange for “structural
adjustment” packages that included trade liberalization, investment guarantees, privatization,
state retrenchment, and export promotion. By the end of the century even Koreans were
sporting t-shirts that read “I.M.Fired” (Ong 2007:4).
In addition to the structural adjustment promoted by the IMF, the World Bank, USAID
and others are the sweeping commitments in the GATT-WTO and subsidiary multilateral
treaties that nearly every country on earth had signed on to by the end of the century, as well as
the proliferation of bilateral agreements with similar liberalization measures, such as NAFTA
and CAFTA. Together these are creating what Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader (2008) call a “new
global constitution” that has subordinated national law.
The implications for democracy are potentially enormous. Like the liberal
constitutionalism of the 19th century, this global constitution protects “owners” from “the
people,” constraining democratic claims. Moreover, the means have been highly undemocratic:
one-sided negotiations, high pressure ratifications without debate (Nader and Mattei 2008;
Raventós 1995). Under these circumstances, Nader and Mattei conclude that the “rule of law is
illegal,” which resonated very much with the complaints by Costa Rican activists that “los
neoliberales” had “hijacked (secuestrado) the institutionality.” This possibility of illegality
within the rule of law is one of the more fraught contradictions for a liberal democratic subject.
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That it has become an important part of the implementation of neoliberalism may go a long way
towards explaining the exasperation with representative democracy in much of the world at the
beginning of the 21st century.
Despite the bluntness of the phrase, neoliberalism through the “illegal rule of law” is the
result of a multifaceted exercise of power. In Latin America, the use of terror to promote
liberalization pioneered by Pinochet is an important part of the story—if military regimes did
not implement the policies they weakened the movements that could oppose them. As we have
seen, that Costa Rica was among the least privatized countries in the hemisphere at the turn of
the century had much to do with the absence of state terror. But “the illegal rule of law” also had
to do with more civil processes: economic pressures, exacting loans; closed-door, high-pressure
negotiations; transnational elite cultures; and highly managed electoral processes (Mattei and
Nader 2008). And behind all of these forms of establishing the “illegal rule of law,” whether
more violent or more civil, was an aggressive hegemonic project by the United States to remake
the hemisphere (see also Grandin 2006).
The strength of neoliberalism was that it appealed to intellectuals and technocrats
convinced of the need for more market rationality (e.g., Bockman 2007), as well as owners of
capital, particularly in the Anglophone North Atlantic, looking to defend, restore and
accumulate wealth (Dumenil and Levy 2004; Harvey 2003, 2005). Despite the intellectual
commitment to abstract neoclassical theory, it is notable that neoliberal projects have tended to
foster the claims of transnational capital, including in relatively little noticed areas like
technology transfer (see e.g., Chang 2010; Gallagher 2010). Where there is a conflict between
free market principles and capitalist property claims, the latter often seem to win—as is the case
with patent and copyright, which are after all forms of state-sanctioned monopoly. The result
was that a host of more particular property claims were ensconced within general appeals to the
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free market, which gave them a universalizing rationale—a good example of which is the term
“free trade agreements.”
The emphasis on “the market” is ideological insofar as it serves to repackage particular
interests as universal goods. But it is difficult to sort out claims to values from claims about the
market in our complexly interdependent world capitalist system, particularly in the midst of
changes introduced by privatization, liberalization, and the emergence of new objects of
property associated with the “knowledge economy” (Verdery and Humphrey 2004a, 2004b).
During moments of change to the property regime (such as CAFTA) people attempt to stake out
property claims within the ambiguities of a changing order of relations and values, proliferating
property discourses while using old words (like “property”) in new ways (Verdery and
Humphrey 2004b:8-10).
As public claims receded in favor of private ones, many people have been dispossessed of
goods, services, and market protections, contributing to inequality, downward mobility, and
subsistence crises (e.g., Auyero 1999, 2003; Edelman 1999; Gill 2000; González de la Rocha
1995; Hellman 1994; Safa 1995; Verdery 2003; Walton 2001). But the public claims that many
people relied on were often ensconced in complex relations of state and market; there was
usually nothing equivalent to a title of ownership, much less a fence and a sign saying “keep
out!” 21 Making such claims “visible” then, presents a particular challenge (cf. Rose 1994:26597). Katherine Alexander (2004) shows how Kazakh workers characterized the shedding of
(unprofitable) social services by their employer during privatization as a “theft” arranged by
shadowy figures. Similarly, critiques of neoliberalism have employed a vivid language of
illegitimate acquisition, as with Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader’s (2008) “plunder.” As I will show,
There was an interesting attempt by US anti-poverty activists in the 1970s to define welfare benefits as
“property.” I am intrigued by the possibility of challenging the exclusivity and singularity that attach to
the term property in the liberal tradition: instead of “disappearing property,” as Marilyn Strathern has
suggested, to proliferate it, rendering the essentially political nature of overlapping claims visible by
putting them on the same plane as “private property” (see Verdery and Humphrey 2004).
21
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the movement against CAFTA in Costa Rica also used a language spiked with claims of
ownership and images of alienation. I will argue that this language served to make visible claims
to values that existed in complex articulations of state and market, and revealed fundamental
aspects of the treaty which were disguised by the language of free trade.
A language of theft has also been used to assert the privacy of property against attempts
to “embed” it in broader social claims. Taxation is an obvious example, but “gold bugs” in the US
argue that the Federal Reserve confiscates their savings through money creation. Radical
property claims by capitalists are a hard sell in most of the world, however. It is more common
for the claims of transnational capital to be presented as market rationality. The doctrine of
“regulatory takings,” which argues that profits lost due to regulation should be compensated, is a
pertinent example. Gaining little traction in the US courts, a provision to compensate investors
for regulatory losses was nevertheless incorporated into NAFTA’s “Chapter 11,” and then, in a
somewhat softened version, Chapter Ten of CAFTA. Regulatory takings were repackaged as “free
trade” and development.
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi argued that attempts to create a self-regulating
market were doomed to failure because they depended on the fiction that land, labor and money
are commodities in the same way as things that are made to be sold. Insofar as they are
successful, attempts to act on this fiction are disastrous because they subject human lives and
livelihoods, relations to nature, and the coordination of economic activity to the vicissitudes of
the market (or as Marx put it, social relations take “the fantastic form of a relation between
things”, 1976:165). The disastrous attempts to create such a society result in a “double
movement,” the reaction of “society” to protect itself by de-commodifying labor, land and the
means of exchange in a matrix of social claims. The opposition to CAFTA can be seen as a
(preemptive) reaction of this kind, part of a wave of movements that have arisen in Latin
America in reaction to neoliberalism. Even if some reaction is inevitable, however, the form that
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it takes is a political question—as Polanyi, writing in the midst of the Second World War, was
very well aware.
Populism and Popular Democracy
I describe the project that animated the NO as “popular democracy.” Although the NO
usually called itself “the Patriotic Movement” (el Movimiento Patriótico), “democracy” and even
more so “popular” and “the people” (el pueblo) were key terms that protagonists used to
describe what (and whom) their movement was for. The NO was a movement against CAFTA
but it was also a project to catalyze the protagonism of the people against the powerful.
I argue that the use of this opposition makes the movement “populist” as the term is
used by Ernesto Laclau (2007). In this schema, an “empty” or “floating” signifier is used to
enable the “articulation” of political coalitions under an expandable popular identity (e.g., “the
people”) that is distinguished against an external antagonist (e.g., “the oligarchy”).
I find that this use of populism provides a powerful conceptual tool for interpreting the
NO, as I will argue in chapter 4. It is beyond the scope of this work to address whether it is more
or less useful than other approaches for interpreting other movements and regimes that have
been called “populist,” whether in Latin America, Europe or the United States (where the term
originated). It is my considered opinion, however, that the use of “the people” (and analogous
terms) in an antagonistic way to create transformative coalitions and new political subjects is
fundamental to modern politics, and that accordingly this generalized schema provides a useful
rubric for comparison—without denying the value of other, more historically particular
definitions of “populism.”
Despite the abstraction and formalism of Laclau’s argument I also see potential for
integrating the grassroots protagonism and sense of personal empowerment that often
accompanies movements labeled populist (see e.g., James 2000), because it draws attention to
the processes through which new symbols are created and new identities formed (see e.g.,
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Karush and Chamosa 2010; Plotkin 2003). ‘NO’ was a contentiously unifying symbol and
popular identity created through grassroots protagonism. At the same time the NO was a
decentralized, horizontal, networked movement. I argue accordingly that the NO presents a
“horizontal populism,” which would be an impossible paradox for those that define populism
partially or wholly in terms of charismatic leadership (e.g. de la Torre 2010), but which for my
purposes is not paradoxical at all.22
The ability to articulate an insurgent popular was one reason why the NO was as
successful as it was. But I will also argue that there are potential dangers to movements of using
the politics of the popular—besides the obvious possibility of exclusionary or racist articulations
of “the people.” One problem which emerged in this case is that by presenting themselves as a
movement of the people, the NO participated in the fiction of a unitary popular will (Paley
2008b), which was then used to silence dissent when the government could more persuasively
claim to represent “the voice of the people.”23

22In

Laclau’s schema, the charismatic leader is one among a variety of potential signifiers that could be
used to define the popular. In fact—without denying the agency of political leaders—charisma itself could
be understood as a property of the signifier as much as the person, an approach that I find compatible
with a tradition of anthropological theory on charisma (Geertz 1983) and value (Graeber 2001). I hope to
develop this argument further in forthcoming work.
23It is for related reasons that I have opted to use popular democracy rather than popular sovereignty.
The NO was certainly struggling for the sovereignty of the nation over transnational capital and of the
people over the national state. But the idea of a unitary will usually associated with the concept of
sovereignty does not well express the participatory democratic project to encourage a multitude and
diversity of voices, which was such an important part of the movement as I experienced it. Of course the
meaning of “sovereignty” in any context is an ethnographic question that cannot be reduced to ahistorical
reflection (Jennings 2011; see also Humphrey 2007). As I saw it, the struggle for Costa Rican sovereignty
by the NO was a struggle to protect the national space for democratic practice, to create a society based on
values of solidarity, equality and “participation”—not entirely unlike what some contemporary
movements mean by “autonomy.” This included the independence granted by the ability to feed itself, or
“food sovereignty” (Carazo Vargas 2004; Pearson 2009, 2012). In any case, for whatever reason I did not
find that sovereignty was used with anywhere near the frequency of “democracy,” “patriotism” or “the
people/popular”—even if through claims to represent the people and the nation the NO did implicitly
invoke traditions of popular sovereignty. On balance, then, I think that popular democracy better
expresses the complex and ambivalent relationship between the popular and the democratic. Relatedly, I
view the fiction of a unitary will as similar to the fiction of private property. Just as no single “he” ever
really does “decide the exception” (pace Schmitt 2010) no social being (much less a wage worker) can ever
be the king or queen of his or her own castle.
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3. The Research
I arrived in August of 2007 with plans to study the decade long process of contention
over telecommunications liberalization. Instead I found myself in the midst of the heated
referendum campaign over CAFTA, which was much bigger than telecommunications (although
this was part of it). Fortunately, activists with the NO generously took me in, found me an
apartment, and helped me to find my way in the movement.
I was soon swept up in the frantic pace of organizing. My apartment was in a building
jokingly referred to as “the headquarters of the NO” for the signs against CAFTA that filled the
windows. That building, and seemingly everywhere else I went, was consumed with
conversation and activity relating to the referendum. I travelled back and forth by bus to attend
the weekly meetings of five Comités Patrióticos spread between Montes de Oca, South San José,
and the far suburbs of Heredia. I accompanied activists of the NO to debates and marches, in
door-knocking expeditions, out leafleting, and on “caravans” (like marches for motorists). On
the day of the vote I served as an “accredited electoral observer” in La Cruz, a rural district on
the Nicaraguan border. This brought me into contact with activists from Comités in the
province of Guanacaste who kept me involved or up to date on events there.
I continued to participate in movement activities and events for nearly a year and a half
after the referendum. Immediately after the vote I visited the same Comités in which I had
participated before the referendum, in San José, Montes de Oca, Heredia and occasionally
Guanacaste. As the pace of movement activity slackened and some Comités ceased to meet as
such, I settled into a routine of regular weekly participation in three Comités that continued
actively, each within an hour’s commute from my home—a schedule which I maintained until I
returned to New York in the summer of 2009. The Comité Juanito Mora with whom I spent the
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most time was located in a mixed low and middle-income “popular” neighborhood in historically
working-class South San José, which I will refer to simply as “Barrio Sur.” “Comité Iglesias”
was located in an area demographically similar to Barrio Sur, but closer to the center of San
José. The third Comité was located in a more professional neighborhood in the municipality of
Montes de Oca that houses the University of Costa Rica, which I will refer to as “Lomas de Oca.”
I also subscribed to movement list serves, which provided an invaluable running commentary on
activities and opinions beyond the scope of my immediate circle, although always skewed
towards people who had internet access and used email as a regular means of communication—
at that time nearly 30 percent of the population (ITU 2013) and disproportionality (but not
exclusively) urban, educated and well-off.
My plans to balance urban biases with rural research were interrupted by an armed
robbery that made it difficult for me to follow up with my contacts in Guanacaste. On the other
hand, that experience, which included being tied to a tree for several hours by armed and
masked men, also helped me to connect with activists who felt that their country was being
“hijacked” or “kidnapped” (secuestrado) and for whom lives and livelihoods were often
precarious despite the security provided by the welfare state. I did continue occasional visits to
Guanacaste where I participated in events organized by activists from the NO, including a
campaign of protests to defend the access to water in the community of Sardinal. I
supplemented this limited exposure with two extended interviews with representatives of the
small agriculturalists’ organization UPANACIONAL, as well as bits and pieces of information
gleaned from other sources, and some interviews and observations conducted by my assistant
Adriana in Guanacaste.
Nevertheless my account has a heavily urban bias and misses most of the dynamic of
organizing that allowed the NO campaign to win the more rural provinces of Guanacaste,
Puntarenas and San Ramon. I caution the reader to keep this in mind when I speak of the
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movement of the NO, although when I do refer to the movement in these general terms I am
being as representative as possible. It is also the case that the experience of the NO was by its
very nature diverse and fragmented, and all views were partial as a result: There was no central
authority coordinating or tracking activities, and no representative surveys were ever
successfully carried out.
Much more than formal interviews, I relied on notes taken during and after meetings
and assemblies, as well as informal conversations that were often carried during the course of
protests or other activities. My vigorous note-taking at meetings was a source of amusement,
and perhaps exasperation; it was some time before I felt ready to contribute to discussions and
my participation remained largely passive throughout. Where I draw on observations and
informal conversations, I use pseudonyms to protect privacy. My first use of a pseudonym will
be indicated with an asterisk. Where those interviewed more formally have expressed the desire
to speak for attribution I include their real names. All my research was carried out in Spanish. I
sometimes provide quotations from conversation and written sources only in translation. Unless
otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
In addition to participant listening-and-observation, I conducted some formal interviews
with persons who had had prominent roles in the process of contention around the ICE or that
could lend me expert insight on the issue. I attended workshops at the institution and, with the
help of my assistant Valeria, combed through archives of the ICE, of newspapers, and the
legislative assembly. We also carried out limited oral historical research on the Juntas
Progresistas and community organization in San José. While little of the fruits of those efforts
appear directly here, they provided important context to situate the movement of the NO.
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4. Organization and Summary of the Chapters
I begin with an explanation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement, the catalyst
for the movement of the NO and the Comités Patrióticos. I emphasize what CAFTA meant for
Costa Ricans who valued their social democratic institutions. The particularities of Costa Rica’s
relationship to CAFTA throw into sharp relief the manner in which the globalizing neoliberal
property regime favors transnational capital to the detriment of democracy.
In the second chapter I show how contention over CAFTA intersected with an ongoing
process of contention over liberalization and political representation. Drawing on interviews and
published accounts, I discuss the contention that preceded CAFTA and shaped reaction to the
treaty. I show that the decision to decide CAFTA in a referendum was the outcome of a dynamic
of increasing frustration with political representation and the search for alternative means of
participation, meaning that the conflict over the future of the Estado Social was also a dispute
about the meaning of democracy. The referendum presented an alternative that substituted a
“direct” election for the direct democracy of protest—even as it was organized in such a way to
provide the maximum possible leverage for the government and the ruling party.
The third and fourth chapters explore the evolution of this contest over liberalization and
democracy in the course of the referendum campaign. I juxtapose the material and discursive
mobilization by both campaigns over CAFTA as well as the larger question of what kind of
democracy Costa Rica would be. The third chapter examines the SI campaign, and particularly
that part of it which came to be known as the “campaign of fear.” I show how the discourse of
democracy advanced by the SI contrasted with that of the NO, as well as the asymmetries of
power which characterized the referendum as an exercise in “direct democracy.” which raises
questions about the degree to which contemporary electoral regimes approach democratic
ideals, as well as of the standards that confirmed it as a democratic process. In the fourth
chapter I address the political processes and signifying practices that mobilized the NO as a
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powerful grassroots movement in a remarkably brief period of time, while forging new identities
and imbuing its supporters with a renewed sense of political possibility.
In chapter five I consider reactions to the approval of CAFTA in the referendum on
October 7th; reactions which ranged from allegations of “fraud” to claims of a broad popular
mandate for “implementation.” I draw on my experience as an election observer as well as
participant observation in the post-referendum context to explore how the legitimacy of the
referendum was wrapped up with questions about what makes an election democratic, and what
the responsibilities of a democratic subject are—dilemmas which were debated in the
particularly fraught post-referendum context and the fragmentation of the NO coalition.
In the sixth chapter, I take up more closely the question of organization, and how the
movement of the NO, particularly the Comités Patrióticos, went about creating “a new way of
doing politics” that would be more participatory and egalitarian. Drawing on the many hours I
spent participating in meetings and assemblies, I consider the practices of sociality as well as the
more formal aspects of organization that shaped the Comités’ particular form of direct
democracy. By contrasting the attempts to organize after the referendum with the more
spontaneous process of coordination that preceded it, I argue that negation plays an important
role in facilitating networked or “horizontal” movements. By contrast, creating a proactive
political project demands more complex decision-making than coming together to say “no” to
someone else’s initiative. I show how activists struggled to find a balance between the autonomy
of the Comités that they valued so highly and the desire to coordinate common initiatives.
Altogether, I hope to show how a project for popular democracy was articulated by a
horizontal, decentralized, networked movement organized according to a populist logic and for
the defense of the social state. Opposition to CAFTA provided one key moment in the formation
of this movement, but because it put forth an alternative vision of a collectivity based on
principals of solidarity, its significance is greater than the results of that struggle.
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Chapter 1

Neither Free nor Trade
CAFTA and the Social State

The State will assure the greatest good of all the inhabitants of the country, organizing
and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth.
Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. To this
end, it is legitimate to denounce those acts which infringe on this right and to demand
repair of damage caused.
The State will guarantee, defend and preserve this right.
Article 50 of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Title 5 on “Rights and Social Guarantees,” as
amended in 1994

Opponents of the Free Trade Agreement sometimes joked that it was “ni libre, ni
comercio” (neither free, nor trade). 24 The phrase very effectively points out that the very name
of the Central American Free Trade Agreement is ideological. It says, “If you think this so-called
Free Trade Agreement is about ‘freedom,’ or mutually beneficial exchange, think again.”
“Ni comercio” highlights the fact that the FTA’s do much more than open doors to
imports and exports; because they change rules on property, investment, and regulation, they
involve potentially profound transformations in how production, exchange, ecological relations,
natural resources, and public services are organized and governed. And among the FTA’s, “ni
comercio” is particularly appropriate for CAFTA, which was placed on top of an already highly

The precise translation of the Spanish would be Free Trade Treaty (Tratado de Libre Comercio). Much
was made by opponents of CAFTA about the difference between the Spanish “treaty” and the English
“agreement,” which was held, probably erroneously, to mean that the FTA was more binding to Costa Rica
than to the United States. The salience of this concern reveals the sense of being manipulated by and
subordinated to the United States that many Costa Ricans shared.
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liberalized trade regime between Central America and the United States. CAFTA didn’t bring
“free trade,” it was already there.
“Ni libre” expresses an even more important truth about the Free Trade Agreement: that
it was more constraining than liberating. Insofar as the treaty created “freedoms,” they were
freedoms for transnational capital, and from the nation state. This meant less freedom for Costa
Ricans to use the state to shape their society, economy and ecology through the exercise of
democracy (Polanyi 2001:265): because of the power of money to order our relations to other
human beings and to nature, the freedoms given to the owners of capital are also restrictions on
the rest of us. The “freedoms” of CAFTA add up to a further tightening of the scope for collective
decision-making by existing multilateral “trade” agreements such as the WTO (see e.g., Chang
2002, 2010; Gallagher 2005). This uneven dialectic of freedom and constraint was vividly
captured in the stark and oft-quoted phrase tigre suelto, burro amarrado (free tiger, tied-up
donkey); the implication is that CAFTA would tie up Costa Rica like a donkey, perhaps even
leaving it at the mercy of the tiger.25 To oppose CAFTA was to preserve the freedom of the
nation, including its ability to protect itself.
A language of property claims also featured prominently in the discourse of the
opposition to CAFTA in Costa Rica. The opponents of CAFTA claimed to defend lo nuestro
(what is ours) and the patrimonio nacional (national patrimony) from the vendepatrias
(literally, fatherland-sellers) that promoted the treaty. They denounced CAFTA as the sale of the
nation’s collective possessions, even the nation itself: el ICE no se vende (the ICE is not for sale),
el agua no se vende (water is not for sale), la patria no se vende (the fatherland is not for sale).

As with any complex metaphor, this one can provoke a variety of interpretations. One opponent of
CAFTA I asked to interpret the phrase said, “Think of what kind of animal the tiger is; it’s a carnivore that
preys on other animals. The donkey is a hard working animal, an animal of the common people, the
pueblo.” The usage of burro to mean “dumb ass” is also common in Spanish (a usage my consultant,
interestingly, vehemently rejected). According to this reading, the burro might bear some culpability for
its state. This interpretation would be consonant with the FTA as manipulation by the gringos and the
political elite, which was also a common interpretative framework.
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Like the phrase “ni libre, ni comercio,” this language of property and dispossession reveals some
fundamental truths about FTAs that are elided when they are discussed as “trade agreements.”
In particular, CAFTA altered the property regime by enhancing and expanding the ability of
capitalists to make property claims while diminishing the ability of governments to make claims
on behalf of citizens. The change in property regime promoted by CAFTA is at the core of the
challenge it posed for substantive democracy.
In this chapter I consider the stakes of CAFTA and how those stakes were understood by
the actors involved. Given the complexity of both the treaty and the debate over it, my account of
it must necessarily be partial. My understanding of the controversy is no doubt influenced by the
mostly urban and middle-class opponents of the treaty with whom I worked. Likewise, my
discussion of the debate on the treaty is synthetic; out of the maelstrom of arguments and
opinions that surrounded CAFTA, I piece together “pro” and “con” positions that I think would
be recognizable to those involved (cf. Gutmann 2002:77; Stark and Bruzt 1998).
My principal contention is that CAFTA threatened a social-democratic property regime
in which collective claims often took precedence over individual ones by imposing a more liberal
regime that privileged and protected the claims of private owners, transnational capital above
all. This was sometimes described as a transition from an “Estado Social de Derecho” (a social
state of law or right) to “neoliberalismo.” These broad terms of opposition were meaningful even
though most activists had more particular priorities, and hence specific objections to CAFTA.
There was a widely shared sense among opponents of the treaty that big changes were afoot,
changes which threatened to upend the country as they knew it.
I begin the chapter with a brief account of the “social state” that opponents of CAFTA
defended so passionately. I develop a processual and relational understanding of both state and
property which helps to identify what is particular and interesting about the Costa Rican state,
as well as clarify the stakes of CAFTA for that state and the movement that defended it. (In order
47

to maintain focus on the movement of the NO, however, I will generally reduce these processes
to more abstract schema rather than allowing them the historical dynamism they deserve).26 I
then briefly characterize some of the cultural and economic changes created by previous rounds
of liberalization, which are important for understanding the significance of CAFTA for Costa
Ricans.
In the second half of the chapter I turn to CAFTA itself. I begin with the fundamental
question of why anyone with global geopolitical projects would be interested in the treaty at all;
provide an interpretation of the content and significance of the treaty; and then turn to the
debate in Costa Rica. Although many of the objections to CAFTA presented here might seem to
be particular to the national context in which they were posed, Costa Rican concerns about the
possibilities of popular democracy and welfare have global resonance.

1. El Estado Social
At the time of the referendum on CAFTA in October of 2007, Costa Rica had an
economically-active public sector with few parallels (see the introduction for an overview). In
this section I will characterize this “social state” as a distinctive property regime at the heart of
Costa Rican social democracy. I then briefly characterize the limited liberalization in the 1980s
and 1990s that preceded CAFTA—but which largely left the social state untouched.
Public Property, Social State
The Instituciones Autónomas (autonomous institutions) were at the core of the Costa
Rican developmental and welfare state. These were institutions dedicated to the promotion of
specific ends (such as healthcare or electrification), which belonged to the nation as a whole, but
26I

will provide a very reduced account of Costa Rica’s 20th Century political economy; readers in search of
a fuller account might consult Bulmer-Thomas (1987), Clarke (2001), Edelman (1992, 1999), Hidalgo
Capitán (2003), Martínez (2007), Raventós (1995), Robinson (2003), Rovira Mas (1982), Sandbrook et al.
(2007), Segovia (2004).
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which managed their income, expenditures, and activities independently of the central
government—although just how independently was always a matter of contention. The most
important of these were the ICE (electricity and telecommunications), INS (national insurance
institute), CCSS or “Caja” (healthcare and pensions), and AyA (water and sewage).
Together with the educational system and a patchwork of social welfare institutions,
these autonomous institutions made up what we might call the “state with qualifiers:” terms
attached to the word “state” that signaled the purpose of promoting the collective welfare. In
2007, these qualifiers included “Estado Bienestar” (Welfare State), “Estado Solidario” (Solidary
State), “Estado Social de Derecho” (social state of law/right), or, most commonly, “Estado
Social” (Social State).27 In fact, qualifiers were often not necessary at all; it was often enough to
say “el Estado” to connote this range of social purposes. However, these terms work to specify
the meaning of “state” that was at stake here, particularly for people who might are used to a
different representation of the state. For our purposes, I will use the qualifier I heard most
commonly, “social state.”
The term social state does important conceptual work of disaggregating the conceptual
monolith of “the State” by reminding us that states and state institutions pursue multiple ends.
And social state tells us much about how Costa Rica’s public institutions were valued. Social, of
course, has a complex genealogy with diverse connotations and is among the most general of all
terms in the “social sciences.” Here the term was used in a familiar way to emphasize a state
that promoted the conditions of collective responsibility for the common good (like “social
security”), whose ethical counterpart was the oft-invoked “solidaridad” (solidarity), and had
broadly a positive connotation (cf. Rose 1999). Of course, providing security of health and
livelihood and universalizing access to power and communications are not the only goals that
Previous incarnations attached to more specific development models include “estado gestor” (roughly,
managerial state) and “estado empresario” (entrepreneurial state)—or, in the words of one libertarian
columnist, “el estado atunero” (the tuna fishing state). These were no longer current in 2007.
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49

the public institutions—much less the Costa Rican state as a whole—have pursued. The language
of a “social state” was accordingly a partial and potentially ideological representation of a more
complex set of social relations (cf. Abrams 1988). But it was also a term that used to claim
collectively-provided livelihood guarantees (see Roseberry [1994] on the role of such contested
terms in hegemonic struggle). Here social together with state were salient terms of the language
used to resist liberalization.
Positive feelings about the social state and even “affection” (cariño) had a lot to do with
the simple fact that it delivered—by achieving a high degree of universality and quality in access
to the fundamentals of modern life: healthcare, education, potable water, electricity and
telephony. The results were measurable: life expectancy that rivaled or exceeded that of the US;
drinkable tap water, even in rural areas; power lines and pay phones in tiny mountain hamlets;
indices of telephone and internet connectivity at the top of the Latin American rankings
(Fumero 2005:22-35).28 Rather than a drain on the central government, they were efficient
enough to be self-sustaining and produce a surplus for reinvestment (or even for the central
government’s coffers, when they were—controversially—required to do so; see Fumero 2005,
Haglund 2006). The achievements of the autonomous institutions became important sources of
national identification and pride. The ICE, in particular, was valued by many as a demonstration
of what the nation was collectively capable of, through its ambitious dam construction projects
and the successful modernization of the antiquated communications system left by US corporate
capital (Amador 1991, 2002; Sojo 2004). Finally, because services were universalized, most
people that relied on public institutions and had a stake in them.
The effectiveness of Costa Rica’s autonomous institutions at universalizing access to
services was a product of the property regime in which they were embedded and the claims to

Interestingly, the principal rival to Costa Rica in the indices of connectivity was Chile, whose telephone
market was among the most privatized (Lüders 2000; MacLeod 2004).
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which they were subject. The social democratic state provided a particular property regime that
governed who could make claims and how (see introduction). The development of social state
institutions in Costa Rica was shaped by the particular arrangement of claims made on the
autonomous institutions by the government, party and elite networks, employees, movements
and interested publics.
A broad range of actors were able to take advantage of a variety of mechanisms to make
claims on the government and the institutions of the social state, including via elections and
protests that operated in an environment relatively respectful of political freedoms for most of
the 20th century (Alvarenga 2005; Molina 2007).29 Over time, additional watchdogs and
regulators were established, which by the end of the 1990s included a powerful comptroller, an
ombudsman, an independent regulator (ARESEP), and a constitutional court that regularly
decided on issues of access to constitutionally-guaranteed services (see e.g. Wilson and
Rodríguez 2006). At the same time, the significant autonomy granted to key public institutions
possibly reduced the impact of partisan meddling and clientelism on institutional functioning,
even as the institutions’ goals were set by a relatively democratic political process that also
included avenues for initiative from below (cf. Evans 1995).30
The activities of the civil state have also been central themes in public culture. It is often
claimed that the management of public sector firms inevitably suffers from the “principal-agent”
problem: the firm’s owners—the citizens in general—are not interested enough to closely
monitor the firm’s performance. I found, however, that the Costa Rican public seemed highly
interested (in both senses of the term) in the operation of these institutions. Our review of
newspaper archives suggests that this has been true for some time. News about the ICE in
Another autonomous institution, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (Supreme Electoral Tribunal,
TSE), was central to preventing electoral fraud and encouraging political actors to trust in the electoral
system (Lehoucq 1996, 1999; Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Molina 2005).
30 Although as I was constantly reminded reforms in the 1970s, particularly the infamous “law 7-3”
institutionalizing partisan influence, reduced this autonomy (for another perspective, see Bulmer-Thomas
1987; as well as MacLeod 2004 on Mexico). It was still a hugely contentious issue in 2007.
29
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particular—such as investments and outages—was regularly featured on the front pages of the
papers and through televised newscasts, and the details of investments and payrolls were
reported at length. A surprising number of opinion pieces were published on the theme of public
administration, with titles like, “Dictatorship of the Middle Managers” (Hernández Valle 2008).
Corruption scandals involving public institutions—of which there have been several very major
ones in recent decades—were major news items, covered in intricate detail (see Gonzalez and
Solís 2001). Information from the media was supplemented by a flow of information through
informal discussion, rumor and gossip, facilitated by the fact that Costa Rica is a small country
where everyone seems to have some personal or familial connection on the inside of the larger
public institutions.
This kind of engagement and interest helped to ensure that Costa Rican public
institutions worked well—the autonomous institutions acted as an effective social (or civil) state
in part because they were actively claimed by civil society while also maintaining an important
degree of operational autonomy (cf. Evans 1995). The discursive and practical involvement of
the public with these institutions created an active sense of ownership that worked against
privatization. Historian Patricia Alvarenga (2005) argues that a consciousness of the ability to
influence the prices of services by political means became an important source of opposition to
privatization in the controversy over the reform of the ICE in 2000. Whether or not a culture of
public ownership developed in exactly this way with exactly these manifestations, I certainly
encountered a widespread sentiment that institutions such as the ICE and the Caja were
emphatically “nuestros” (ours).
The dedication to public service of many of those that worked in the public sector also
contributed to these institutions’ successes. Employees of the ICE often referred to their
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“mística;” their devotion to the institution and its goals.31 The ICE even had its own hymn,
which exalted the worker’s “casco y coraje” (helmet and courage). Working at the ICE was a
common childhood dream and a source of public status and personal pride in adulthood
(although this began to change at the end of the 1990s, for reasons discussed below). In
addition, the employees of the public institutions developed their own rhetorical and practical
claims to them. Lifetime employment, on-the-job training, and institutional pensions created
strong identifications. On more than one occasion I heard employees refer to the ICE as “mi
casa” or “nuestra casa” (my home/our home) in explaining their concerns about the effects of
privatization on the institution. In 2007, employees’ claims on the institution—particularly the
working conditions they demanded and struggled for—were widely denounced as threats to the
claims of the broader public for affordable, efficiently-delivered services.32 Certainly there was a
potential for the interest of the public and the public-sector workers to contradict, and some
argue that the PLN cultivated public sector workers as clients, at least before its neoliberal turn
in the 1990s (Molina Jiménez and Palmer 2007).33 However, the same sense of identification
with the ICE that made it possible to refer to the institution as “mi casa”—identification
buttressed by relatively good wages and working conditions and low turnover—could also mean
strong commitments to the ICE’s goals of providing electricity and communications.

The etymology of this word is an interesting puzzle. I have found it used in this same sense in other
Central American countries, and I have been told it is used in Brazilian Portuguese. Its meaning is close to
some uses of mystique, although espirit de corps gets closer to the sense that I heard. The Royal Academy
of Spanish defines mística essentially the same way as “mystical” is understood in English: 1. f. Parte de la
teología que trata de la vida espiritual y contemplativa y del conocimiento y dirección de los espíritus.2. f.
Experiencia de lo divino.3. f. Expresión literaria de esta experiencia.
32One of the best examples of this is an online survey that I came across early in my research. The survey
asked, pointedly, “Who is the real owner of the ICE?” The reader was invited to choose among answers
which included: “the government,” “the people” and the “unions.” The trade unions were declared the real
owners by a majority of the participants who had also presumably just read an accompanying polemic on
how the institution should be made to belong to “the people” as it should. Unfortunately I did not have the
foresight to record the web address at the time and have not been able to find it since.
33 My view, in brief, is that the whole question of public sector “privileges” is a misrecognition of, and
ideologically-driven distraction from, the real problems of inequality and enduring poverty.
31
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The quasi-military language of the ICE’s hymn is no accident. In a largely civilian state
without armed forces, workers of institutions like the ICE—perhaps particularly the ICE—took
on some of the role of ideal (male) citizen attributed to soldiers elsewhere (Brown 1995). José
Figueres Ferrer, the principal architect of this post-1948 order, characterized public sector
employment as a means of producing ethical subjects:
…the principal advantage of the social institution over private enterprise is precisely
the type of man that it tends to produce. The profit motive foments selfishness,
smallness of soul. The spirit of service raises man above himself, it ennobles him and it
gives to his soul the dimension of the whole society. The spirit of service is for the
economy what Christianity is for ethics. [1986:264-265, cited in ICE 2006:13]
This “spirit of service” became part of the identity, prestige, and expectations of the
social state. Figueres’ elevation of the “spirit of service” is part of the process through which a
degree of consensus on the importance of welfare-enhancing development emerged out of
diverse intellectual traditions and political and social projects—including (but not limited to),
racial hygiene, “petit bourgeois” developmentalism, and revolutionary socialism (Molina
Jiménez 2002, 2007, 2008; Palmer 2003; Rovira 1982; Sandbrook, et al. 2007). This consensus
helped to orient and drive the expansion of the autonomous institutions, and remained as a
reservoir of resistance to privatization.

Liberalization before CAFTA
Liberalization in Costa Rica was directed much more at the trade regime governing
exports and imports than at privatization; while Costa Rica was one of the first Latin American
countries to make the switch from import substitution to export promotion, it has also been
among the slowest to privatize. Indeed, Sandbrook et al. (2007) use Costa Rica as an example of
how a state-centered “classic social democracy” is not incompatible with extensive participation
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in the global market. The opening of the export-import market in the 1980s and 1990s did
transform work, consumption, class relations, even the landscape; disrupt establish ways of life
and contribute to marked cultural changes. But it did not make Costa Rica a “neoliberal society”
(if such a thing is even possible). This complicated (and conflictive) coexistence of “free trade”
with the social state is the context in which CAFTA was debated and struggled over.
Crisis and Adjustment
By the early 1980s the spike in oil prices, the Volker interest rate shock, and the
disintegration of the Central American export market in war and economic crisis made the
regional import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy unsustainable. While the first set of
challenges to ISI in the early 1970s had been met, as in many other Latin American countries, by
an increase in state involvement and the expansion of the public sector into new areas of
production, by the end of the decade the combination of rising external debt and trade
imbalances became untenable, leading Costa Rica to default on its foreign obligations in 1982
(Bulmer-Thomas 1987; Edelman 1999).
In exchange for much needed loans, the IMF, World Bank, and USAID pushed for
structural adjustment, often through high-pressure negotiations with the executive in which the
legislature, not to mention the public, were effectively shut out (Conroy et al. 1996; Honey 1994;
Raventós 1995). Adjustment included privatization of the loss-making public-sector enterprises
(mostly those created in the 1970s), de-monopolization of commercial banking, reductions on
social welfare expenditures, lowering of tariffs and the development of new exports, including
garment assembly, new agricultural products (melons, houseplants, flowers), and tourism.
While the broad outlines of this story were repeated throughout the hemisphere,
adjustment in Costa Rica was carried out in the midst of a complex relationship of tutelage,
domination, and facilitation by the United States and the multilateral agencies which made it in
many ways unique—a reflection of the strategic importance of Costa Rica as a base for counter55

insurgency in Nicaragua, point of pressure on Panama (with its all-important canal), and
example of successful capitalist development in Central America. On the one hand, the United
States influenced the multilateral institutions to soften loan conditions for Costa Rica, opened
up the US market to Costa Rican exports through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and flooded the
country with aid. On the other hand, the United States demanded specific reforms such as the
de-monopolization of commercial banking, and insisted on controlling the disbursement of aid,
going around the Costa Rican public sector to create a network of institutions denounced by
many Costa Ricans as a “parallel state” that duplicated and undermined their own, while
promoting some environmentally and economically questionable development projects (Conroy,
et al. 1996; Honey 1994). The restructuring of agriculture in particular, as the combination of
cutbacks to state support and liberalization of imports devastated domestic maize cultivation, a
staple of smallholder agriculture since pre-Columbian times (Edelman 1999).
By the mid-2000s, Costa Rica had the most export-intensive economy in Latin America
(albeit with tourism counted as an export). Although the United States was by far its largest
export market, Costa Rica had signed free trade agreements with Chile, Canada, Mexico, and the
rest of Central America (prior to CAFTA). The garment industry had largely moved on in search
of lower labor costs, but the maquila (export processing) sector had upgraded to more
sophisticated products like medical equipment. And Intel opened a major microchip assembly
plant at the end of the 1990s—an investment so large the government began to publish two sets
of economic statistics; with and without Intel.34 Intel also sited some R&D in the country, and a
small software industry was developing (Rodríguez-Clare 2001). The English language and
technical knowledge of Costa Rica’s generally well-educated workforce were instead largely
dedicated to call-centers, which flourished on a generation of middle-class youth with private

The contribution to Costa Rica’s economy was not as great as might seem, however, because the Intel
plant added nearly as much to imports as to exports (i.e., the value added in Costa Rica was modest).
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English-language educations; Hewlett Packard, Proctor and Gamble, as well as a host of betting
websites (known locally as “los books”), taking advantage of Costa Rica’s lax gambling
regulations (Hernández-Salazar 2003).
Costa Rica became one of the world’s principal pineapple exporters, based largely on the
super-exploitation of Nicaraguan migrants. Nicaraguan immigrants also arrived en masse to
work in the construction trades, which took off as the Pacific Coast was inundated with the
spillover of the US and European property market bubbles, leading to a boom of Spanish chain
hotels and gringo retirement communities. Besides a shared reliance on Nicaraguan migrant
labor, the pineapple and tourism/real estate expansion also had in common that they provoked
conflicts over access to land, fresh water, deforestation and contamination, and the
displacement of more impoverished and peripheral rural and coastal communities. Tourism also
brought a rise in prostitution, in central San José as much as in the touristy beach town of Jacó.
Changing Class Relations
Consumption was transformed in the decades after liberalization. People in their midtwenties could tell me in vivid terms about the globalization of their consumption within their
own lifetimes. Even as late as the early nineties, a candy bar from the US was an exotic luxury
for a child in San José, but by 2007, middle-class Costa Ricans were shopping in supermarkets
owned by Walmart, where they bought Chilean wine (instead of beer and rum), avocadoes from
Mexico, and to the bemusement of some, garlic from China. Clothes were of course imported
from China as well, albeit often through a circuitous route that brought second hand clothing as
ropa americana (American clothes). One activist of the NO made a play on the patriotic slogan,
donde hay un costarricense, hay libertad (where there is a Costa Rican, there is liberty),
confiding to me, “donde hay un costarricense, hay una ropa americana.” Probably the scandal of
ropa americana had something to do with class distinction, but it also reveals the ambivalent
feelings that many had about the globalization of consumption and the rise of the kind of
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consumismo that everyone identified with the United States (cf. Hansen 1994). Even nostalgia
for the large, soft local avocadoes (displaced by Mexican imports) could be entangled in complex
ways with ambivalence about proletarianization, anxieties about cultural imperialism and the
degradation of values, environmental despoliation, and rising inequality with persistent
poverty—not to mention the conversion of a pristine coastline to hotels full of international
pleasure-seekers.
In the years between 1990 and 2007, income inequality in Costa Rica increased more
than in any other country in Latin America (Leitón 2006a, 2006b); even if it was from a more
equal baseline, the increasing differentiation of consumption habits and residential patterns was
conspicuous. T.H. Gitling and Juan Diego Trejos (2005) argue that rising inequality was a
product of rising returns to education together with an increasing bifurcation between the
overemployed and the underemployed. The latter development is in part an outcome of
increased labor market flexibility (Trejos 1999). At the same time, a centralized corporatist-style
wage bargaining system with multiple minimum wages (a legacy of Calderón’s social reform)
seems to have worked to maintain the earnings of many job categories at a higher level than
would have been the case without intervention in the labor market (Gindling and Terrell 2007).
And it is also important to note that informalization was much more limited in Costa Rica than
in other countries of the region, which meant that substantial legal guarantees of wages and
working conditions (including paid maternity leave) continued to be widely available to workers
(Sandbrook et al. 2007:112-15; Estado de la Nación 2007:386-7).
Rising inequality was, however, accompanied by persistent poverty, with official poverty
rates stuck at a stubborn 20 percent over the preceding decade (Estado de la Nación 2007:394;
although this was an improvement over the catastrophic thirty-odd percent poverty in the worst
of the crisis of the 1980s). The homeless and destitute are a common sight in downtown San
José, often dismissed or feared as indigentes or piedreros (crack heads).
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With increasing inequality, persistent poverty, and an expanding universe of consumer
goods, it is perhaps unsurprising that there was also an alarming increase in crime: between
1988 and 2006 the rate of homicides and property crimes both nearly doubled (Estado de la
Nación 2007:97)—although far too many Costa Ricans attributed this increase (as well as many
of the shortcomings of the welfare state) to Nicaraguan (and Colombian and Dominican)
immigration, despite all evidence to the contrary (Sandoval 2008:277-81, 290-300).35 Seemingly
everyone that I knew in San José had lived through some kind of mugging or armed robbery,
sometimes several. Increasingly insecure streets and growing inequality, together with
investment in real estate, contributed to rapid suburbanization and increasingly profound
spatial differentiation within the San José metropolitan region, as those who could afford to
increasingly retreated to more isolated, or gated, communities. The prime example of these
growing communities was Escazú, with luxury homes (many occupied by gringo expatriates),
fancy clubs, cosmopolitan dining, and an upscale mall. This was a neighborhood that even the
elderly matron of a comfortably bourgeois San José family complained that she “needed a
passport” to enter. San José was less and less a city where different social classes lived in the
same neighborhoods and shared the same social spaces as well as a relatively homogenous
national culture (cf., Lungo 1997). Instead, it was a city increasingly characterized by insecurity,
exclusion and spatiotemporal disjunctions (Low 2000; Molina 2002:83-91; Sojo 2010:120-2;
cf., Caldeira 1996; Harvey 1990; Low 2006).
The highly universalized public services were also increasingly differentiated. Families
who could do so increasingly abandoned the public education system for private academies,
particularly those that provided English language instruction (or instruction in English). Older
residents of San José bemoaned the loss of inter-class understanding and “solidarity” that
A nearly parallel increase in deaths due to suicide has been much less commented upon (Sandoval
2008:278; see also Estado de la Nación 2007:97), but is perhaps even more suggestive of the psychic
dislocations accompanying recent political economic transformations (cf. Durkheim 2006).
35
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resulted from the loss of the experience of attending the same public schools. More materially,
increasing returns to education (see above) were being accompanied by increasing inequality in
access to it. Tertiary education was also increasingly privatized, but here the dynamic was
different: those who did not benefit from good private educations increasingly tried to make up
the difference by acquiring dubious degrees from the mushrooming industry of lightly-regulated
private universities, while those who attended the more elite private high schools were able to go
to the more prestigious public universities nearly free of cost (as in many other countries).
Similar forces were at work in healthcare. While nearly everyone continued to rely on the
Caja for catastrophic coverage, those who could afford to do so increasingly resorted to private
clinics for more routine care. By 2007, the ICE’s telephone and electricity services might have
been one of the only experiences that people of all social classes had in common—because there
was no other legal alternative. Essentially everyone used the same non-cutting edge handsets
with the same middling signal quality for the same rock-bottom prices (I paid between ten and
twenty dollars a month for my service, a fraction of what I would have to pay in the United
States). This anomaly of a public telecommunications and electricity monopoly was increasingly
under challenge, however, and the future of the ICE and the telecommunications market had
become the country’s most contentious political issue.
I will leave that story for the next chapter, except to mention that contention over
privatization was also bound up with changing class relations. I found extensive evidence of a
shift towards vociferous attack against public sector employees and their unions. Importantly,
these criticisms were always made from the point of view of the people as owners—public sector
workers were serving the people poorly, and needed to be disciplined. This was, however, a shift
from the attitude expressed by José Figueres and from the formerly high status accorded to
working in the public sector. Looking through old newspapers we found a photo of an electrician
working on a power line with the caption “the ICE owes its successes to the dedication of its
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workers,” which by 2007 seemed like it had come from a distant era. Employees of the ICE
recounted to me that strangers had begun to accuse them of being “vagabundos” (bums) and
even “ladrones” (thieves). Internally, the institution had also begun discursive shift from serving
“users” to serving “customers,” which some ICE workers complained signaled a shift to the logic
of privatized rather than universal services.
The campaign of criticism of public sector workers throughout public culture was
inseparable from the broader landscape of changing class relations and the values associated
with it. A new middle class, often English speaking, perhaps educated abroad, and involved
directly with international trade, tourism, or multinational corporations, was partially
displacing the “traditional” middle class that had grown up with the expansion of the public
sector and its (sometimes patronizing) ethic of “service” and “solidarity” (see also Cordero 2005;
Vega 1996). It bears pointing out, as well, that the traditional middle class were often from
worker or peasant backgrounds, the products of high levels of social mobility in the sixties and
seventies, achieved through combinations of expanding public education and expanding publicsector employment. The new middle class, on the other hand, were often their children. Despite
the general picture of rising inequality, the new middle classes did not necessarily make more
than their parents in the public sector, and when they did, it was often because they worked long
hours, sometimes as “temporary” workers, “subcontractors” or “consultants” with few
guarantees. Both old and new middle classes produced intellectuals, in a Gramscian sense, and
so were able to leave their mark on the public culture. The entrance of cable television in the
1980s and its diffusion among middle class households in the subsequent decades also brought
in additional programming, commercials, and news from the rest of Latin America and the
United States—a change which would play a surprisingly central role in contention over the
referendum (see chapter 5).
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CAFTA, then, entered into a highly globalized arena in which the United States already
had an outsized presence. The US presence, globalization more generally, and the liberalization
so strongly identified with the United States were sources of great ambivalence. Loss, desire,
fears, and hopes emerged out of increasingly varied, and always contradictory, relationships to
these processes. The balance between these had much to do with how one felt about the
proposed treaty.

2. The Central American Free Trade Agreement
In this section I turn to an analysis of the CAFTA treaty itself. I consider why the effort to
promote this “free trade” treaty in the context of already existing free trade regime, and how the
treaty fits into a broader hegemonic project led by the United States. I then turn to a schematic
account of the debate over the treaty within Costa Rica.

Why bother with CAFTA at all? Free Trade and US Hegemony
The George W. Bush administration aggressively pushed CAFTA. FTAs face strong
opposition from trade unions and environmental organizations, and are generally unpopular
with a US public fearful of losing jobs to outsourcing (that is, of course, when they are brought to
their attention at all). Bush personally engaged in last-minute, late-night lobbying to sway
wavering representatives, which allowed CAFTA—a treaty most US citizens had never heard of—
to pass in the House of Representatives by a margin of two votes (Andrews 2005). As I explain
further on, the administration would also work aggressively to convince Costa Ricans that they
had no choice but to vote for CAFTA. Trade associations, notably the powerful National
Association of Manufacturers, also lobbied hard for the treaty.
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This show of commitment presents a puzzle: why so much interest in CAFTA? It is not
immediately obvious why the Bush administration, the National Association of Manufacturers,
or anyone else with global interests would use their time, resources and political capital to
advocate a “free trade” agreement with Central America. Central America is a small market that
was already highly liberalized: with a few exceptions—mostly significant for Costa Rica’s social
state and Central America’s small farmers – a free trade and investment regime already existed
between Central America and the United States. Unless you were a garment manufacturer,
CAFTA wasn’t going to make much of a difference. Patriotic opponents of CAFTA, in love with
their country, were sure that the gringos were after all of the riches that they had to offer,
whether water, undiscovered undersea mineral riches, or the telephone company. But the reality
is that there is very little evidence of such interest. The mines are mostly run by Canadians, and
despite US insistence on opening of the telephone market, the companies interested in taking
advantage of this opening were Spanish and Mexican.36
Why the Bush administration cared about CAFTA
Given the small stakes in Central America the value of CAFTA was political and
symbolic: It was a step to, or precedent for, the regional and global expansion of the “Free
Trade” regime. CAFTA expanded on a globalizing framework of laws provided by the WTO,
which, like CAFTA, included agreements on “trade in services” (GATS), “intellectual property”
(TRIPS), and investment (TRIMS). By the end of the 1990s, however, the momentum of this
global agenda had stalled, largely due to increased opposition from governments of the global
South. In the Western hemisphere, the Bush administration’s drive for a “Free Trade Area of the
Americas” was defeated, largely due to Brazilian opposition.

At the same time, it is also the case that the Bush administration could be flexible in abandoning “free
trade” principals to defend US economic interests, particularly when necessary to shore up its political
base at home (Destler 2004).
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The defeat of the FTAA inspired a change of strategy that led to CAFTA: Instead of trying
to bring all of the Americas into a grand agreement all at once, the US would amass bilateral
agreements where they could (see e.g. Hornbeck 2004:4).37 Meanwhile, alternative Latin
American and Caribbean integration initiatives, most notably the Venezuela-centered
“Bolivarian Alliance” (ALBA), were challenging US hegemony in the region. Central America,
with its dependence on the US for trade and investment, and deep history of US influence and
intervention, was an obvious place to reassert its authority (see Grandin 2006). And Costa Rica,
with its pint sized economy but outsized international reputation for democracy and human
rights, was worth exerting some trouble to include—even after the other countries were already
on board.
CAFTA, then, was a piece of a broader agenda, which has been called “freedom,” but
which I will call neoliberalism. As I argued in the introduction, at the heart of this project was a
transformation in the property regime to the benefit of capitalist claims: to give transnational
capital a freer hand, or more complete ownership, over resources at its command, and to help
them appropriate additional technological and cultural rents by extending claims to “intellectual
property.” Proponents of CAFTA in the US equated this “freedom” with “democracy,” arguing
that the treaty would help to reinforce both (see e.g., Hornbeck 2004:6). Rather than bolster
democracy, however, the treaty constrained it in order to preserve the freedoms of a powerful
few.
The interests of Costa Rica’s elite in CAFTA
In Costa Rica, the government of Abel Pacheco, which sent representatives to negotiate
the treaty in 2003, was ambivalent about the results. Although he seems to have regarded
inclusion in CAFTA as important enough that the threat of exclusion could be used to coerce
37The

economic reforms imposed on Iraq in the early stages of the US occupation also bear a striking
resemblance to FTA’s such as CAFTA (see Grandin 2006; Harvey 2003, 2005).
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him into absurdly adding Costa Rica’s name to the “coalition of the willing” for the invasion of
Iraq, Pacheco subsequently vowed that no agreement would be negotiated that affected the
telecommunications or insurance monopolies. The negotiators, however, claimed that the US
rejected this position out of hand, and they returned with an agreement that required Costa Rica
to open both markets to foreign investors (many opponents of CAFTA, however, suspected that
Costa Rica’s representatives had volunteered these sectors because the negotiations provided an
ideal situation in which to force reforms desired by Costa Rica’s governing elite). As opposition
to the treaty mounted, Pacheco refused to submit the resulting treaty for ratification to the
Legislative Assembly. CAFTA loomed large over the subsequent presidential election in 2006,
which was narrowly won by Oscar Arias, who campaigned on a platform of restoring direction to
Costa Rican governance by passing the FTA.
I take up this narrative again in the following chapter. For now I will take a moment to
review the interests in favor of the treaty in Costa Rica. As I explain below, the gains to Costa
Rican exporters were limited, and clear-cut improvements in access to the US market would
only concretely accrue to producers of garments, canned tuna, sugar and sugar ethanol—
although there was some case to be made that other sectors might potentially be placed in
danger of losing their existing access to the US market, at some point in the future.
Costa Rica’s business associations nearly all endorsed CAFTA, the most active of which
in supporting the treaty was the Costa Rican-American Chamber of Commerce (or AmCham),
which represents US based investors in Costa Rica and others with important transnational ties.
Nevertheless, it seems that it was the Arias administration that really pushed for the treaty (see
chapter 3). Many opponents of CAFTA noted that President Arias stood to benefit personally, as
one of the principal producers of sugar and sugar-based ethanol in Costa Rica.
Another interpretation was that the treaty would accomplish the liberalization of
telecommunications and insurance which Costa Rica’s political class had been unable to achieve
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on its own, paving the way for elite participation in these lucrative areas of the economy. When I
suggested that areas like telecommunications would be dominated by transnationals, Antonio,*
a civil engineer from the Comité Iglesias, explained that Costa Rica’s elite wanted to become
junior partners of transnational investors—increasingly the direction that Central American
capitalists have taken since the abandonment of import substitution (Robinson 2003). Indeed,
opponents of the effort to liberalize telecommunications and electricity prior to CAFTA had
argued that they were attempts to create hybrid public-private firms ideally designed for
profiteering by the politically-connected (Solís 2002; see also e.g., Garnier 2000). Whatever
their own stakes, the internationally-connected Costa Rican elite had doubtless absorbed the
prevailing intellectual climate in which Costa Rica’s increasingly idiosyncratic institutions (like
monopolies in telecommunications and insurance) were anachronisms and obstacles to
progress.
Some Costa Rican business interests were also potentially adversely affected by CAFTA,
and opposed it vociferously; above all the rice growers, but also producers of pharmaceuticals
and others. Given the treaty’s asymmetrical terms, however, it is surprising that there was not
more visible opposition from businesses producing for the domestic and Central American
markets in industries such as processed foods. A fuller understanding Costa Rican businesses’
hopes for CAFTA is beyond the scope of this project, but research on this question may reveal
quite a bit about changing regimes of accumulation in Central America (cf. Robinson 2003;
Segovia 2004).

Reading CAFTA
Reading the text of CAFTA was accorded great importance by its opponents. This is not
to say that anywhere near most them actually read the gargantuan text (although some did; soon
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after I began attending Comité Lomas, Andrea*, an active participant in the Comité and a
secretary at the ICE, insisted that I really should read it, as she had found it revelatory). But the
very impossibility of reading CAFTA was important: The slowness to make translations available
was widely denounced, and even advanced as legal grounds for invalidating the treaty; an
opposition blog took the title TLC en Español (FTA in Spanish). 38 The essential illegibility of the
text also arose in widely repeated concerns about the distinct legal ramifications of “tratado”
(treaty) and “agreement” which appear in the Spanish and English versions. All of this added up
to a sense that a hidden agenda was being foisted on the country, that they were signing a pact
with the devil with no time to read the fine print.
This is essentially what they had been expected to do. In this impoverished model of
democracy, high pressure international negotiations between unequal powers create blueprints
for sweeping legal transformations that are ratified by national legislatures without further
discussion (Mattei and Nader 2008). This was Costa Rica’s experience with structural
adjustment in the 1980s (Raventós 1995), and it was the process through which the rest of
Central America ratified CAFTA. That the citizens of Costa Rica delayed this process of approval
for years and used that time to force a debate on how to read CAFTA was a democratic
achievement. Nevertheless, even with this comparatively extended and extensive process of
debate, very few people who voted in the referendum on October 7th, 2007 actually had a very
clear idea the scope and significance of the treaty. The fact that an unmediated interpretation
was impossible for most people shows that no democratic process on a decision of this
complexity is ever truly “direct.”
It was some time after I returned to the United States that I took Andrea’s advice and sat
down to read CAFTA, as well as the Caribbean Basin Initiative laws that preceded it—a project
It would seem that the limited availability of translations in Costa Rica has to have been a deliberate
decision, since the treaty was essentially the same as previous FTAs signed with Spanish speaking
countries (especially the FTA with Chile).
38
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that took me the better part of a summer. In this section I present my interpretation of this most
complex treaty and the changes it promised.
CAFTA as a Trade Agreement
One of the most fundamental questions of the CAFTA debate was the effect it would have
on trade between Costa Rican and the United States.39 The United States was by far Costa Rica’s
largest trading partner, accounting for 36 percent of exports and 38 percent of imports in 2006
(WTO 2007:43).40 Anything that would appreciably improve—or worsen—Costa Rica’s access to
this market would have enormous consequences for the quantity and quality of employment and
business opportunities. At the same time, the US was also a feared competitor, particularly in
agriculture, making reduced barriers to imports potentially ruinous for Costa Rican farmers.
The answer to this question was inherently complex and ambiguous. Predicting the
impacts of trade liberalization is difficult anyway. But CAFTA did not open up closed economies;
it replaced one liberalized trade regime with another, the Caribbean Basin Initiative with
CAFTA. So the question was really about the difference between the two regimes, which was
another complex political and economic question. Because of the complexity of the question,
even a well-educated and highly interested public could be swayed by a partial representation,
particularly when one had most of the media, the US and Costa Rican governments on your side,
as the proponents of CAFTA did (see chapter 3).
The Caribbean Basin Initiative vs. CAFTA
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) that preceded CAFTA was intended to foster export
led development in participating countries. It gave Costa Rica largely unfettered access to the

Any change in trade relations with the US would also indirectly affect trade relations between Costa
Rica and the rest of Central America, because some products exported to the US were made in more than
one Central American country.
40 Five years after the passage of CAFTA, the corresponding figures were 38 percent (exports) and 52
percent (imports)—which would seem to confirm the asymmetrical nature of the treaty (WTO 2013).
39
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US market while leaving Costa Rica free to restrict imports from the United States. As we have
seen, however, the US together with the World Bank and IMF pressured Costa Rica to lower its
tariffs as part of structural adjustment. Those tariffs that remained mainly protected domestic
production of a few agricultural products (rice, poultry, meat, and dairy), and, in a minor way,
manufactured consumer goods. In other words, with a few exceptions, before the Free Trade
Agreement there was free trade.
To the extent that CAFTA was a “free trade agreement,” however, it was quite one-sided:
Costa Rica surrendered some significant tariff protection, and gained very little in return.
CAFTA would improve Costa Rica’s access to the US market in three areas that the US had
continued to protect to some significant degree: sugar and sugar-based ethanol, canned tuna,
and garments. In return, Costa Rica would surrender its ability to protect its domestic
agriculture and industry from US exports (remember, we are discussing the treaty only as a
trade agreement—other kinds of concessions will be discussed below).41 For the most
committed devotees of comparative advantage, this might be all well and good, but these are a
relatively rare breed.
What made the trade issue potentially persuasive for the Costa Rican public as a whole
was the possibility that the existing access to the US market was in jeopardy. For the garment
industry, and only the garment industry, this was probably true—but the proponents of the
treaty in the Arias and Bush administrations, and their allies in big business and the media,
worked very hard to give the impression that all exports and employment were at risk—a
deliberate strategy to instill “fear of unemployment,” described in chapter 3.

For simplicity’s sake I do not discuss “non-tariff” barriers to trade. This was a complex issue that
involved sanitary, health and safety regulations (etc.). Many of the observations made about the Chapter
Ten provisions apply to these measures as well: international tribunals, rather than voters and their
representatives, were empowered to decide what constitutes a non-tariff barrier to trade and what
constitutes a legitimate health and safety regulation.
41
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The argument over CAFTA’s impact on trade ultimately boiled down to a dispute over
the status of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The 1983 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
(CBERA) provided duty free access to nearly all exports from Central American and Caribbean
countries not under governments deemed “Communist” (i.e., Sandinista Nicaragua and Cuba).
A few products were excluded: watches, canned tuna, and petroleum. Sugar and beef were
subject to specific quotas and a process supposedly designed to prevent undermining the food
security of the exporting country. An even more complicated set of regulations was placed on
garments that excluded some products while mandating extensive use of inputs from the US and
CBI countries.
Despite these limitations, CBERA provided very broad access to the US market without
the demands for “reciprocity” that would later characterize the FTAs. It permitted the
development of new export products throughout Central America, including fresh fruits
(particularly melons), winter vegetables, ornamental plants, and garments—and in theory could
have allowed for much more sophisticated and high value manufactures, if the Central American
countries had been in the position to produce them.42 Costa Rica has been the most successful of
the Central American countries in developing higher value-added industrial exports, some of
them under the rubric of the CBI—but many others entering under a generalized US open
market regime that provided low tariffs or even duty free access to the US market for many
goods, as was the case with Intel’s microprocessors (see Silvestri 1995).
The initial CBERA provisions were gradually broadened over time to admit more
categories of exports from the region under more liberal conditions. In 1990 the expiration date
was repealed, making access to the US market indefinite. In 2000, the Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act (CBTPA) further broadened access to the US market to compensate for
The fact that they weren’t in such a position doubtless contributed to the US government’s willingness
to provide this degree of openness. Notably, the restrictions and controls in the CBI laws are most
stringent in sectors where competition from producers located in Central America was most probable—
sugar and garments.
42
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comparative advantage lost to Mexico after the signing of NAFTA. Notably for Costa Rica and
other Central American countries, CBTPA improved access for canned tuna, sugar and
garments. The “content requirements” that tied Central American garment manufacturers to
US-made textiles were relaxed (USTR 2009:4). Unlike the CBERA, however, the CBTPA was set
to expire, in 2008 (later extended to September, 2010). The language of the bill indicates that
the additional opening was justified as a bridge to the either bilateral FTAs or a hemispherical
FTAA (see also USTR 2009:1).
Through the CBTPA and CBERA, then, Central American countries already had more or
less the same access to the US market that Mexico had through NAFTA—without having to make
any of the concessions forced on Mexico. CAFTA simply added to the CBTPA a few minor
improvements for Central American exporters of canned tuna, sugar, and garments. The most
important thing CAFTA did, in fact, was to prevent the expiration of the openings already
provided by the CBTPA for exporters of these products, which applied to 15 percent of Costa
Rica’s exports to the United States (8 percent of its total exports; Castro and Martínez
2004:148). The very open regime provided by CBERA was itself indefinite.
CAFTA would, accordingly, bring no benefits at all for the 21 percent of Costa Rican
exports to the United States entering duty-free under CBERA, or the 64 percent on which the
United States simply did not place tariffs at all (including bananas, coffee, and microprocessors;
Castro and Martínez 2004:148-9).
All that would have been true unless Costa Rica was in danger of losing its (indefinite)
CBERA status. Proponents of CAFTA in Costa Rica, including the Bush administration, argued
that the Caribbean Basin Initiative could not be counted on for the future, and CAFTA was
necessary to secure Costa Rica’s access to the US market. This argument carried great weight for
those paying close attention to the debate, and the last minute public intervention by the US

71

trade representative Susan Schwab to insist that the Caribbean Basin Initiative faced an
uncertain future may have been decisive in swinging educated urban middle classes to voting sí.
This argument was however very—and no doubt deliberately—misleading. In the first
place, by lumping CBERA and CBTPA together as the “Caribbean Basin Initiative,” CAFTA’s
proponents were able to imply that all of CBERA’s benefits were due to expire, when it was only
the much more limited, supplemental CBTPA that faced a time limit. In my experience, even
well-educated and informed opponents of CAFTA were confused by this.
Secondly, although CAFTA’s proponents suggested that without the treaty Costa Rica
could lose access to the US market on a whim, it was highly unlikely that the CBERA would be
repealed or that Costa Rica would be removed from the list of the law’s beneficiaries. CBERA
does give the president the right to remove any single country,43 but she is directed to publically
explain this decision to congress, taking into account the same set of considerations that were
originally used to evaluate the country’s candidacy for the CBI—an absurd argument to make in
this case. It also would have meant publically breaking with one of the United States’ oldest and
most respected allies, at a time when the US government had fewer and fewer friends in the
region—all in the name of a treaty that was hardly popular at home.
In theory, the US Congress could have repealed CBERA as a whole. This was again an
unlikely scenario, however. The Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, wrote a public letter to the
Costa Rican people pledging to respect the referendum vote and pointing out that the CBERA
was in no danger of repeal. Perhaps more convincingly, the trend of US policy of the last several
decades has been to lower tariff barriers, and the CBI has been consistently expanded over its
history, reflecting this tendency. After all, low tariffs are favored by US-based transnationals.
Many Costa Rican exports are produced by such politically-powerful corporations (such as

Less drastically, it also provides more freedom of maneuver to intervene to preserve particular
industries deemed in urgent need of protection than CAFTA does.
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Intel), or are not produced in the US and therefore face no protectionist pressure. Finally,
CAFTA, too, is subject to repeal—and unlike CBERA, has a well-organized, broad-based,
bipartisan opposition that includes trade unions, environmentalists and US economic
nationalists.
CAFTA did however significantly improve access to Central American markets for the
United States. As I’ve pointed out, Costa Rica already had a liberal import regime, having
reduced tariffs from an average of 56 percent in 1985 to an average of 3 percent in 2000
(Jaramillo and Lederman 2006:19). Like other Central American countries, however, Costa Rica
retained substantial levels of protection for some agricultural products. Most domestic staples,
with the exception of maize, were under tariff rates of 30-65 percent (150 percent in the case of
chicken), which CAFTA would gradually reduce to zero over the following decades (Fernández
2004:242; Jaramillo and Lederman 2006:155). In industry, Costa Rica gave up more than it
gained through CBTPA or even CBERA (see e.g., Castro and Martínez 2004). Most final
consumer goods—the area in which Costa Rican production for the domestic and Central
American markets is concentrated—had a tariff ranging from 10 to 15 percent (WTO 2010).44
CAFTA, however, committed all Central American countries, including Costa Rica, to reduce
these tariffs to zero.

The Impact of Trade Liberalization
While arguing for the benefits of CAFTA, World Bank economists Carlos Felipe Jaramillo
and David Lederman observe that predicting the effects of trade liberalization is more of an “art
than a science.” They acknowledge that their “partial equilibrium” methodology simply
extrapolates changes in supply and demand curves from the removal of tariffs, and does not take
Primary and capital goods, such as machinery and raw materials generally had a nominal rate of 1
percent.
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into account the dynamic effects of changes in production (2006:73-6). Here I will venture a few
suppositions about these dynamic effects.
As we have seen, CAFTA opened doors for potential exporters of canned tuna, sugar,
leather goods and garments.45 Even within these sectors, additional gains over the existing
situation were minimal, and CAFTA basically sustained the trade regime that had been in place
since 2000. This is important because it means that for Costa Rican exporters essentially
nothing at all would change. Despite the exaggerated promises of its proponents, CAFTA was
not going to stimulate a boom in export production for the US market if that had not already
occurred. Production of sugar (and sugar-based fuel) might be expected to grow up to the new
quota limit provided by the treaty, since the US pays twice world market rates for sugar
(Jaramillo and Lederman 2006:46), although the effect on total sugar production is modest.46
The case of the garment industry is more complex. CBERA and the CBTPA had
contributed to a rapid growth of garment export assembly in Central America. However, the
industry was facing a sudden swell of Chinese competition unleashed by the expiration of the
Multifiber Agreement’s quotas in 2005. Certainly, the industry was better off with CAFTA and in
some of the other countries of Central America (particularly Honduras) might be expected to
continue to flourish (although that might depend on changes in transportation prices, Chinese
currency policy, etc.). The Costa Rican situation was distinct, however. Perhaps because of
higher labor costs or the physical isolation of the population centers in the Central Valley, the
Costa Rican garment industry had stagnated since the mid-1990s, and even the openings
provided by the CBTPA could not reverse its decline. There was accordingly little basis to

Some minor additional issues, such as technical assistance with US phitosanitary standards, are not
included here (see e.g. Jaramillo and Lederman 2006).
46 Jaramillo and Lederman predict only a 4 percent increase in exports from their partial equilibrium
methodology (2006:138), as well as a doubling of the percentage of the sugar crop destine for export from
4 to 8 percent for Central America as a whole (46). However, they seem to be unaware of the role of sugar
based fuels, which are not mentioned in their study.
45
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assume that CAFTA would turn the situation around, although it probably slowed further
decline.
What was to be expected from the opening of Central American markets to imports from
the United States? In industry, consumer goods from the United States might be expected to
become more competitive, potentially displacing production of consumer goods for the domestic
and Central American markets (e.g., processed foods, notebooks, mattresses, refrigerators), and
producing unemployment in these areas (Castro and Martínez 2004).
Based on their partial equilibrium analysis, Jaramillo and Lederman (2006) argue that
Central American “consumers” will gain from lower prices, particularly for food. They point out
that most of the region’s poor are net consumers, rather than producers, of food. The high
degree of monopoly in the transnational and domestic commercialization of food, however,
raises doubts about how much of the savings from tariffs will be passed along to consumers. The
supermarkets in Costa Rica are already highly monopolized, with the most important chains
partially or wholly owned by Walmart.
At the same time, tens of thousands of Costa Ricans producing agricultural products for
the domestic market see their livelihoods, lifeways and identities, threatened. Even with the
protective tariffs before CAFTA, production of staple goods such as rice was declining, and
increasing quantities were imported (Carazo Vargas 2004; Fernández 2004). The formerly
extensive program of government support and subsidies to domestically-oriented agriculture
had dramatically decreased since the 1980s (Edelman 1999) even as the United States continued
to massively subsidize its own agricultural producers. The commitment to lower tariffs in all
agricultural goods to zero will probably provide the coup de grace to an already struggling
domestic rice industry, while presenting significant challenges to Costa Rican producers of other
foodstuffs, notably meat, poultry and dairy (see Carazo Vargas 2004; Fernández 2004).
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For promoters of agricultural opening, this is fine. Liberalization of trade encourages a
shift towards the most efficient use of resources and the development of comparative
advantages. The liberalization of the market for maize in Costa Rica in the 1980s was intended
to facilitate the switch to export-oriented agriculture (Edelman 1999; Raventós 1995). That
“comparative advantage” is in this case largely defined by who is comparatively more subsidized
by their government complicates this argument. More pragmatically, growing for export to the
US market is not a simple matter, and many of the products in which Costa Rica is said to have
comparative advantage require large capital outlays and extensive transportation infrastructure
(Conroy et al. 1996). Many of those currently producing for the domestic market may only be
able to continue as hired hands for Costa Rican or transnational (often US-based) agricultural
capital. As Don Moises*, a small dairy farmer from the mountains of Turrialba told me,
explaining why he was against CAFTA: “they want us to be a nation of employees” (empleados).
The arguments surrounding the elimination of tariffs protecting domestically-oriented
industry are similar. Again, the classical liberal theory of comparative advantage argues that
removing such “distortions” will allow a more efficient allocation of resources.47 Proponents of
free trade as a development strategy however naturalize comparative advantage and assume that
liberalized markets produce even development. The advantages of the capitalist core are
products of histories of capital accumulation, built environments, technological and institutional
infrastructure, and agglomeration economies around sunk costs (e.g., Harvey 1999). Moreover,
these comparative advantages have been deliberately fostered by a variety of tools of industrial
policy, including but not limited to tariffs—whether in the United States, Europe or East Asia
(Chang 2002, 2010; Dasgupta 1998; Kay and Gwinn 2000). As I explain briefly in the next
section, CAFTA restricted the ability to use most of these industrial development policies

Note that the theory argues that it is in the interests of both parties to concentrate in where they have a
comparative advantage, even if one country produces all products more efficiently than another.
47
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including technology sharing mandates, content requirements, or the credit system—as well as
eliminating tariffs. While gaining few significant new opportunities, they were surrendering
historically-important tools of industrial policy.48 Finally, critics of CAFTA pointed out that even
with the protections allowed under the CBI, Costa Rica had been running a substantial and
increasing trade deficit with the United States—a macroeconomic situation that would likely
only worsen as the existing barriers to imports from the US were lowered (as allegedly happened
in the case of Costa Rica’s free trade agreement with Canada).
Notably, even those Costa Rican sectors that did stand to benefit would not provide
expanded opportunities for most people, whether as employment or opportunities for small
producers. Instead the benefits seemed to be concentrated in a politically influential group of
sugar producers that included President Oscar Arias himself. This is a pattern we see
throughout; liberalization is embraced to the extent that it furthers the accumulation projects of
politically powerful capitalist interests.

CAFTA as a property regime:
But CAFTA wasn’t really about trade. The fact that Free Trade Agreements go far beyond
what is commonly understood as “free trade” is particularly clear in this case, because CAFTA
just replaced one free trade regime with another. CAFTA was in fact mostly an investment
agreement. And investment is not just another form of trade; it is the social organization of
economic activity, the coordination of our working lives—what Eric Wolf called structural power
(2001:384-5). That is a much bigger thing than selling goods produced in one place somewhere

48Jaramillo

and Lederman (2006) conclude that in the absence of a plan to facilitate the adjustment of
domestic producers (particularly small farmers), CAFTA is unlikely to make a positive contribution to
poverty reduction. As it happens there was no such plan, and it is probable that the terms of the treaty
itself preclude many of the tools that might form an important part of one.
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else. In addition to these rules governing investment, the FTAs also work directly against “free
trade” by extending the legally-sanctioned monopolies known as “intellectual property rights.”
The common agenda underlying investment and intellectual property rights measures is
an agenda to create a property regime more amenable to the claims capitalists. The FTAs extend
the property claims of capitalists—transnational capital and some well-positioned Costa
Ricans—against claims by governments, public institutions, and others, from student
photocopiers to small farmers. It reinforced the property claims of capital by (1) prohibiting
controls on investment, the movement of capital, and the repatriation of profits; (2) by
restricting permissible regulation of productive activity, including by allowing investors to
defend claims to their projected profits; (3) by opening up natural resources and the provision of
“public goods” to transnational capital; and (4) by reinforcing and extending the monopolies
associated with “intellectual property.”
These claims were at the core of the CAFTA project. This project was not new, not even
to Costa Rica with its social democratic property regime: CAFTA mostly builds on the Uruguay
round of the GATT that created the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and to which
Costa Rica was a signatory. But CAFTA represented a deepening of many of the Uruguay round
commitments, as well as introducing some novelties such as the expansion of capital’s property
claims through a thing called “regulatory expropriation.”
CAFTA also enhances investors’ ability to make claims by transforming the legal regime
governing how claims are made (see also Mattei and Nader 2008). CAFTA allows transnational
investors to bypass national court-systems and make claims against governments in an
arbitration process controlled by the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). 49 Arbiters of the ICSID are thereby empowered to decide whether national laws

49Notably,

workers organizations are not given this power, but are rather required to work through their
respective governments to make claims concerning the violation of the treaty’s limited labor standards.
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impacting investors are justifiable according to standards of the public good and environmental
protection. In all of these ways, CAFTA protects capitalists from democracy.

“Trade in services”:
In Costa Rica, CAFTA’s stipulations on “trade in services” were among the most
contentious. Trade in services is a misnomer. Measures permitting the exchange of professional
services across borders did resemble “trade” as it is conventionally understood. But the mores
significant measures allow transnationals to invest in areas from which they had previously been
excluded, and they limit the ability of governments to regulate, control, or prohibit such
investment in the future. For Costa Rica this meant opening monopolies of telecommunications
and insurance. But the treaty seems to open the potential for demands by transnationals to
participate in the provision of a host of other vital services, from water to healthcare to waste
collection, including by opening up international bids. This is particularly significant because
many of these “services” have historically been defined as “public goods” whose allocation
should not be determined by the market. The stipulations about trade in services therefore
potentially challenge ideas of moral economy and conceptions of “public goods.” In Costa Rica,
these terms were denounced as “privatization” measures against the spirit or letter of the
constitutionally-defined Social State.
The stipulations of CAFTA regarding “trade in services” build on the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiated at the Uruguay round of the GATT, which went into
effect in 1995. This treaty broadly meant to open up “service” sectors to competition from
private investors. GATS, however, does allow signatory countries to choose the services that
were to be included in the agreement, and to later withdraw services from the list (albeit with

79

penalties).50 CAFTA moves significantly beyond the GATS agreement. It locks-in the
liberalization in “services” forever; no changes can be made once the treaty is signed. Secondly,
it expands the range of services liberalized indefinitely. Whereas the GATS treaty confines
liberalization to relatively specific categories (such as “hospital services,” “waste collection,”
“hotels and restaurants,” or “commercial banking”), CAFTA begins with an across-the board
commitment to provide both “market access” (11.4) and “national treatment” (11.2) to
transnational investors interested in providing “services.” Nowhere in the treaty does it define
what “services” are, much less provide a list of activities that might be subject to an investors’
claim to “market access.”
The treaty does carve out both generalized and country-specific exceptions to the
commitment to liberalize service provision, while two particular areas, “telecommunications”
and “financial services” are each afforded a full chapter, in which more specific demands for
liberalization are made while the limits of liberalization are also more clearly spelled out. While
liberalization of financial services might well have the greatest economic impact down the line, it
was the liberalization of telecommunications that was the most contentious in Costa Rica.
Expanding and Protecting the Claims of Investors:
Chapter Ten of CAFTA, a slightly altered version of NAFTA’s highly controversial
Chapter 11, is concerned with reinforcing and extending the claims of capital vis-à-vis
governments. Because CAFTA’s chapters on “Cross Border Trade in Services,”
Telecommunications, and “Financial Services” are in fact investment agreements, CAFTA’s
investment chapter is directly pertinent to understanding the impacts of CAFTA’s liberalization
of services and redefinition of public goods. But Chapter Ten also applies more broadly to

A compensatory liberalization is to be made to the benefit of those countries that could demonstrate
harm to their economic interests from their exclusion from an area of service provision.
50
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transnational investors in every sector of the economy, curtailing the ability of governments to
make claims on capital.
Chapter Ten contains a list of things that governments cannot require of investors:
mandate technology transfers; impose local content or export performance requirements;
restrict the remission of profits; or mandate a percentage of domestic capital or the employment
of nationals. Again, these measures built on, but significantly extended, liberalization measures
contained in the Uruguay round of the GATT. Each of these measures restricts practices that
had been common development policies in the post-War era, many of which had been used by
the more successful developmental states (see e.g. Chang 2002, 2010; Dasgupta 1998; Gallagher
2005; Joshi 2012). They constrain the ability of governments to engage in what used to be called
“industrial policy” (which some now prefer to call “technology policy”): that process of building
domestic productive capacities that is very much at the heart of most understandings of
development. All of these practices are forms of public claims on capital and are forbidden by
the treaty.
In a move with perhaps even greater implications, Chapter Ten introduces the concept of
“indirect expropriation.” This concept defines governmental actions that reduce the expected
profitability of investments as a form of expropriation, and allows investors to sue governments
for redress. Effectively it extends the scope of property claims to include expectations of
profitability (although only when claims are made against governments). The equivalent chapter
of NAFTA provoked outcry that defining expropriation this way could potentially undo the
entire regulatory regime of the signatory states—particularly after a series of high profile cases
challenged the validity of environmental laws (Edsall 2006). Critics pointed out that the
definition of expropriation in Chapter 11 seemed consonant with the radical liberal project to
establish a constitutionally-grounded doctrine of “regulatory takings” that would compel the US
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government to compensate whoever saw their profits adversely affected by regulation (Aisbett et
al. 2010; Edsall 2006; Greider 2001; Huffman 2001; Warner 2009; see also, Epstein 1985).
In response to this outcry, CAFTA’s Chapter Ten somewhat weakened indirect
expropriations claims: It prohibits claims against existing legislation, and, more importantly,
explicitly states in Annex 10-C that, “except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives,
such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”
Even as this “softer” version of regulatory takings allows for some regulatory ends,
however, it excludes others. The developmental objective of fostering national capacities would
presumably be inherently discriminatory and hence ruled out of court from the start. But more
fundamentally, who defines what is “a legitimate public welfare objective”—and isn’t that what
“democracy” is supposed to do? The answer is that it is the tribunal of the ICSID, not any
democratic process at all, which decides whether a law is reasonable, justified by the public good
or the environment, and non-discriminatory. Finally, the phrase “in rare circumstances” would
seem to leave room for overriding even “legitimate” public ends.
Aisbett et al (2010) report that “as of mid-2010 a total of 337 investor claims brought
using bilateral investment treaties or NAFTA’s Chapter 11 had been publicly registered. Of the
registered claims, 58 had been awarded in favor of the investor, 75 in favor of the host, 63
settled and the majority of the remainder are pending.” They add that, “the cost of using formal
arbitration means that the vast bulk of claims are settled before they reach such a stage.” Even if
the host governments win more claims than the investors, this is a rather astounding challenge
to the ability of “sovereign” national states to make regulatory claims. Settlements mean
significant expenses for the national states. Moreover, one also has to take account of the
chilling effect on regulation that the mere possibility of an expensive and drawn-out investor
challenge presents, especially for a revenue-starved Central American government.
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Intellectual Property Rights:
CAFTA stipulated major extensions of “intellectual property rights” by extending the
length of monopoly protections for patent and copyright; subjecting more things to patent; and
demanding more stringent enforcement. These measures included obliging signatories to sign
onto international treaties, of which UPOV, which permits certain forms of “breeders’ rights” in
plan varieties, was particularly contentious. CAFTA would restrict the ability of Costa Rica to
produce generic medicines by extending the duration of patents (and other related measures) as
well as introducing patents into surgical procedures. The rules regarding copyright were little
commented upon until after the ratification of the treaty, when laws were passed criminalized
the universal process of photocopying books and obliged radio stations to pay royalties which
they had not before.
The extension of patent and copyright exports reflects an ongoing agenda pursued
through law and precedent in the United States (Lessig 2001). Broadening claims to “intellectual
property rights” is important for capitalist accumulation increasingly centered on extracting
monopoly rents from technological innovations and cultural products.

Debating CAFTA
In this section I present “synthetic” versions of the arguments for and against CAFTA.
These arguments are composites of the dominant themes in the debate on the treaty.
‘Sí’ on CAFTA
The proponents of CAFTA emphasized the importance of the US market and the danger
of losing access to it. Although they rightly pointed to dangers to the garment industry, they
misleading suggested that the CBI as a whole (and not just the CBTPA) would soon expire. They
implied that without the guarantee provided by CAFTA, all Costa Rican exports would be in
83

danger. They suggested that without CAFTA, the US could easily revoke Costa Rica’s trade
preferences at any time, and that the United States would be “offended” and take retaliatory
action. The aggressive “with-us-or-against-us” posture of the Bush administration made this
more credible than it otherwise might have been—as did the fact that the administration
misleadingly implied that it could easily make such a decision without the support of congress.
Despite the fact that CAFTA did very little to improve existing Costa Rican access to the
US market, the SI also talked in general terms about the “new opportunities” that CAFTA would
open up for Costa Rican entrepreneurs and small producers. Advocates of CAFTA sometimes
went so far as to present the treaty as the gateway to a qualitatively different future of economic
dynamism and growth. An oft-cited example comes from a speech by President Arias at an
inauguration ceremony for the expansion of an industrial park in Cartago. Workers whose time
in the bathroom is strictly rationed left their posts to hear the president speak, and appeared
with signs saying Sí al TLC. Arias promised the assembled workers that “those who come [today]
on a bicycle, will come on a BMW motorcycle with the FTA, and those who arrive in a Hyundai,
will come in a Mercedes Benz” (Mata 2007).51 This message of sudden prosperity was
particularly ridiculous when directed at an audience of people who were already working in
export industries. Less often commented upon is that he followed these promises with dire
warnings that without the FTA there would be no jobs for the workers’ children.
Importantly, the proponents of CAFTA argued that public institutions were not
threatened, and would even be strengthened by (or needed) the treaty. The ICE would rise to the
challenge and be improved by competition from transnational firms. Both the ICE and the Caja
would be buoyed by the economic growth allegedly to be unleashed by the treaty, whereas the
inevitable economic decline that would follow a rejection of CAFTA would undermine the social

"[Los] que vienen en bicicleta, con el TLC vendrán en motocicleta BMW, y los que vienen en un
Hyundai, vendrán en un Mercedes Benz"
51
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state. Notably, this discourse was liberal only in a very qualified way. The SI did not argue
against any of the institutions of the social state, rather it presented CAFTA as a way of
strengthening the social democratic project.
‘No’ on CAFTA
The opposition to CAFTA argued that the treaty violated both the letter and the spirit of
Costa Rica’s social democratic constitution. The University of Costa Rica’s commission
summarized its findings on the constitutionality of the treaty in the following:
At the dawn of the 21st century, the normative development of international economic
relations is implemented through asymmetrical free trade treaties, in which investment
and commerce, which should be instruments in service to humanity, are on the contrary
converted into the center of gravity of society and politics, in absolute contradiction to
the values and purpose of our Social State of Law/Right [Estado Social de Derecho],
which privileges social rights and benefits.
That is what is happening with this proposed FTA… [which] disproportionately benefits
the commercial interests of foreign businesses, in absolute contradiction to the common
good stipulated in article 50 of the constitution. (UCR, n.d.:6)
The commission named the following as violations of national sovereignty and of the
inalienable power given by the constitution to the Legislative Assembly to make the laws: The
investor-government dispute resolution process contained in Chapter Ten; the obligations to
sign additional treaties and to pass legislation that was not included in the treaty itself
(specifically naming the law to “modernize” the ICE); the authority granted to the president of
the United States to review other countries’ laws for compliance with the treaty; the different
definitions of maritime national territory. The commission further argued that CAFTA violates
the process established by the constitution for concessions in telecommunications and
construction.
Moreover, the report argues that CAFTA is incompatible with or contradicts the social
rights guaranteed by Costa Rica’s constitution: the right to healthcare; the constitutionallyprotected labor rights; and the right to a healthy environment. Similarly, the liberalization of
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insurance is in violation of the established constitutional principle that insurance is a social
good to be managed by the state. Finally, the failure to negotiate an exception to the trade in
arms violates the constitutional abolition of the army and the commitment to neutrality.
These are essentially the themes that constituted the core of the argument made by the
NO. Opponents of CAFTA raised concerns about the ability of Costa Rica to protect and regulate
its ecology and natural resources. I found a broad concern that the treaty would allow
transnationals to freely despoil “Mother Earth” (la madre tierra), while more specific concerns
were largely directed at water. The treaty opened access to Costa Rica’s natural resources to
foreign investors; what would stop them, for example, from pumping out all of Costa Rica’s fresh
water to sell bottled to an increasingly water-poor United States?
A more far-fetched but prominent argument held that the CAFTA would dramatically
reduce the total surface area of sovereign Costa Rica, because “Costa Rica” as defined in the
treaty did not include all of its substantial maritime claims (due to Costa Rica’s possession of the
remote Pacific island, Isla del Coco). Accordingly, the argument went, transnationals could mine
undersea resources that properly belonged to Costa Rica. Opponents of CAFTA also claimed,
incorrectly, that the treaty mandated allowing the sale of human organs, because it assigned
them a tariff value of zero. In addition, Costa Rica would no longer be able to prohibit the
manufacture of armaments in its export processing zones, making it complicit in US militarism
(perhaps even nuclear weapons).
More convincing were the threats to the institutions of the social state, especially the ICE
and the Caja. New patent rules would put severe financial strains on the Caja by making it more
difficult for it to manufacture or buy generic medicine, jeopardizing the constitutionallyguaranteed right to healthcare.
The opening of the telecommunications market was incompatible with the ICE’s system
of “cross subsidies,” which took gains from more profitable telecommunications services
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(business services and long distance) and used them to maintained low prices for basic
telephone and electricity access. The need for the ICE to compete would mean that it could no
longer prioritize providing services to rural locations which had to be serviced at a loss—if it
survived at all. And according to the planned implementation laws, the mandatory contributions
to provide such services were a fraction of what the ICE devoted to them. Moreover, private
telecommunications companies would simply piggy-back on the infrastructure that had been
built by the ICE (through great national sacrifice and sweat etc.), which they would be
guaranteed access to at low prices, and would have no incentive to invest in significant
additional capacity (Fumero 2005). Or the opening would provide an opportunity for politicians
to gain from political influence at that expense of the national patrimony (see Solís 2002).
The intellectual property rules, combined with the elimination of the remaining
agricultural tariffs, presented a threat to the viability of small farmers, to sustainable
agricultural production, and to “food sovereignty”—the ability of the nation to guarantee its
ability to feed itself (Carazo Vargas 2004; Edelman 2005; Pearson 2009, 2012). It was seen as
particularly egregious that the multinationals could potentially claim for themselves the product
of thousands of years of agricultural knowledge, and then require the small farmers to pay to use
the seeds developed from their own ancestral strains.
Finally, the opponents of CAFTA contested claims about the effects of the treaty on Costa
Rica’s exports. They pointed out that Costa Rica’s access to the US market was not in danger.
Ottón Solís, one of the leading figures in the NO, invited Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont and
Congressman Mike Michaud of Maine to visit Costa Rica in order to spread the message that
congress was not going to deprive Costa Rica of access to the US market, followed by the letter
from Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi mentioned above. Solís, however, seemed to believe
that some kind of FTA would be beneficial for Costa Rica, arguing that CAFTA could and should
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be re-negotiated (this was not a popular view among activists of the NO, and was possibly
directed at those convinced by the arguments of the SI).
As for the garment industry, the opponents of CAFTA tended to argue that it was
doomed by Chinese (and Central American) competition, and that it didn’t provide good jobs in
any case. Both were problematical arguments. There were certainly producers that planned to
continue in Costa Rica (labor costs are not the only factor, even in garment assembly;
Sandbrook et al. 2007). At the time of the referendum the industry employed approximately
20,000 people, or 1.2 percent of the workforce (Castro and Martinez 2004:151)—certainly not
overwhelming, but not an insignificant number.52 The observation that those were not good jobs
would not be very convincing to someone who had decided that it was their best option.
This was why the argument that the net job loss would be worse with CAFTA than
without, because of its expected effect on “micro,” small and medium firms producing for the
domestic market, was potentially so important (see e.g. Castro and Martínez 2004). As a whole,
however, the opposition to CAFTA tended to avoid the jobs argument in favor emphasizing the
future of the social state, natural resources and ecology, and domestically-oriented agriculture.
The lack of attention to employment made it very difficult for the opponents of CAFTA to
convince proletarians in the private sector, whether they were the new middle classes or bluecollar urban or rural wage workers. These two groups were decisive to the passage of CAFTA in
the referendum.

By 2011, despite the passage of CAFTA, employment in this sector seems to have declined (and has
certainly not increased). Data compiled from the website of the Costa Rican Chamber of Industry puts
total employment in garment assembly, textiles, and leatherworking altogether at 14,686 persons (CICR
2013).
52
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The “natural constituencies” of SI and NO
From the arguments made by the SI and the NO (as opposed to the actual content, which
very few people had unmediated access to), one can sketch out probable constituencies for each
based on economic interests (with the caveat that both campaigns claimed to represent the
national interest as a whole). On the one hand, we can expect the following groups to be most
receptive to the message of the SI:




Those who exported or who worked for an exporter, since the SI implied that all exports
were in danger—but especially those whose livelihoods depended on garment assembly,
the industry with most to lose, as well as those in other sectors actually directed affected
by the treaty (tuna and sugar).
Anyone who thought that their prospects would be improved by more foreign
investment, since the SI also communicated the idea that investment depended on the
treaty. This meant much of the workforce of the private sector, but especially those
involved with transnationals.

On the other hand, we might expect the following groups to be inclined to oppose the treaty:





Those whose livelihood depended on the “social state,” especially public sector workers.
Among these, particularly those who employed by the monopolies, the ICE and the INS.
Agriculturalists producing for the domestic market, particularly those due to lose tariff
protection. In principle, anyone in an industry scheduled to lose protection might be
opposed to CAFTA, although there was little evidence of this outside of agriculture.
Producers of generic drugs and others that would suffer from increased “intellectual
property rights.”

These “natural constituencies” correspond fairly closely to the observable bases of support for
the two campaigns, as well as the patterns of voting in the referendum. But that should not
distract from the fact that these natural constituencies were produced politically—the SI created
the narrative that exports and investment were in danger, and pushed it through all the means
at its disposal. The NO similarly worked very hard to convince the public at large that the social
state they valued, the country’s natural resources, and environment were under threat. This
political work will be the subject chapters 3 and 4. Finally, protagonists of both campaigns
sincerely believed that they were working in the national interest; their social position and
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working lives provided the context and a lens through which they interpreted the meaning of the
common good.

3. Conclusion
CAFTA was about much more than trade. It was a struggle over the future of a distinct
social democratic property regime that intersected with an ongoing conflict over the meaning of
democracy in a context of globalizing neoliberalism. Some of the flash points of this conflict had
been the quality of political representation and the role of the public sector. In the next chapter
we take a closer look at how the conflict over CAFTA emerged from previous rounds of
contention over liberalization, and how that contention ended up in a referendum.
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Chapter 2

“Direct Democracy” from the Street to the Ballot Box
The Contentious Path to a Referendum

Opponents of CAFTA reacted to the treaty’s approval in the October 7, 2007, referendum
with a mixture of grief and outrage. “I’m ready to throw rocks,” said Karla*, a costume and set
designer in her early thirties. Karla was usually too busy pursuing contracts with television and
movie producers, or furiously sewing to meet a deadline, to involve herself with politics—but she
had thrown herself wholeheartedly into the campaign against CAFTA, and had just spent the day
of the vote ferrying voters around in the stylish old Mercedes she shared with her boyfriend.
Rock-throwing, in fact, was a common refrain in those days after October 7th.
Although people stopped talking about “throwing rocks,” from the moment the
referendum results were announced, and throughout the following months, CAFTA’s opponents
discussed, debated, and organized around the possibility of opposing CAFTA’s implementation
“in the streets.” The example they invoked most often—and which lurked between the lines in
political speech and news reporting—was the wave of protests that had overturned the
“modernization” of the telecommunications and electricity sectors in 2000, an event that came
to be known as the “Combo.”.
In this chapter I explain how conflicting political projects came together to produce the
unprecedented referendum on CAFTA. The referendum substituted a more “peaceful” direct
democracy for the democracy of protest, in the context of widespread frustration with
institutions of political representation and mounting opposition to CAFTA.
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1. The Combo
The Combo was about more than telecommunications and electricity. Whether the
protests proved that the people could defend law and patrimony against the depredations of the
políticos, or raised a specter of ungovernability and the imposition of “grupos de presión”
(pressure groups) over democratic process, the events of the Combo were the most visible
indication that the practices, relations and representations that had sustained the stability and
predictability of the partisan-electoral order could no longer be counted on.
For Karla, who had been a university student at the time at the time of the Combo, the
protests had been a singular and deeply affecting experience. She had a vivid memory of events
and recounted with pride their determination and courage in facing down teargas and police
batons. For those who supported and sympathized with the protests, they showed that
representative institutions were not enough to guarantee democracy or justice in political
systems dominated by the rich and powerful. Protests were not only necessary, they could work.
For political elites and advocates of liberalization it was a major challenge. As Nelly
Vargas, a lawyer who worked to develop Combo law put it: “The Combo was very hard—we
weren’t accustomed to these social confrontations. It was really traumatic for what we might call
the political class of the time.” She went on to add that “they weren’t even that many people, but
they were so well organized. They blocked the streets and frightened everyone. People couldn’t
get to their houses, they closed the Assembly.” (Interview, March 16, 2009)
Vargas emphatically agreed that the possibility that these events might be repeated
shaped the political calculations of both opponents and proponents of CAFTA before, during
and after the referendum. The discussion of the Combo in the wake of the October 7th vote was
in many ways a return to the situation before the announcement of the referendum, when the
opponents and proponents of CAFTA alike had expected a confrontation “in the streets.” But no
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historical event is ever repeated in exactly the same form, and the referendum, precisely because
it was an exercise in so-called “direct democracy,” was probably the ideal vehicle to render a
repetition of the Combo impossible, a proposition I will consider in more detail in chapter 5. The
referendum, as much by accident as design, ended up as a “do-over” of the Combo, one in which
the government emerged victorious and the political and economic elite recuperated its
dominant position.
The Combo was of course not the first eruption of popular discontent and direct action in
Costa Rica. While the contentious tradition is muted in comparison to many other Latin
American countries, there is a long history of grassroots struggle punctuated by periodic
explosions charged with anti-imperialist sentiment—back to the gigantic strike against United
Fruit that mobilized some 10,000 workers in 1934. The ICE itself was largely a product of
decades of struggle against US corporate domination of electricity (Alvarenga 2005; De la Cruz
2004; Flores 1993). While these struggles were mostly long forgotten by 2007, the contentious
movement against the US multinational ALCOA’s plans to open a mine in Costa Rica in the
1970s, and, to a lesser extent, the electricity rate strike of 1983 were invoked as part of a
genealogy—or for many, biography—of protest. The Combo was also preceded and followed by
contentious protests over liberalization and state retrenchment, some of which I cover briefly in
this chapter.
I will, however, focus on the Combo in framing the context of contention over CAFTA. It
involved more people than other recent protests, including many who had not yet been born
during struggles over ALCOA or even the rate strike of 1983. It was dramatically successful in a
way no other mobilization had ever been, reversing a major legislative initiative in a matter of
weeks—as such it was an unprecedented victory for some and a defeat for others. And it
occurred as part of a broader crisis of representation and conflict over liberalization that was
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ongoing during the CAFTA debate. No doubt for all of these reasons, it was by far the most
frequently cited example of the possibilities of popular protest.
Moreover, there are important continuities between the Combo and CAFTA. CAFTA
brought many of the same reforms attempted by the law of the Combo-ICE, most directly the
liberalization of telecommunications—some even went so far as to argue that this was the
government’s main interest in pushing CAFTA. Other common concerns included the loss of
control over investment and resource (especially water) use. Further, many of the questions
about the character of Costa Rica’s political institutions that animated contention over the
Combo continued as central themes throughout the process of contention over CAFTA, and in
both cases, the traditional forms of representative democracy were sidelined in favor of more
“direct” forms of participation. The Combo and CAFTA were both struggles over the meaning of
democracy in the context of widespread discontent with the existing forms of political
representation and contention over the future of Costa Rica’s “social state.”

A River Winding through the Mountains
In 1995 some strange guests arrived at the hotel where Pilar Ureña and her husband
lived and worked. 53 Tucked away in the mountains of Pérez Zeledón, a rural canton half a day’s
drive south of San José, the hotel was visited by bird watchers and others attracted to the
serenity of the forests and the beautiful, pristine river that bordered the property. But these
guests, a group of Spaniards, were not bird-watching. They were measuring the land. The next
day, the Spaniards were joined by a group of Costa Ricans. One of these knew a cousin of Pilar,
as it turned out, and tipped her off to the “secret” that they had other intentions and she should

The following is based on an interview with the author conducted in 2009 as well as a published
account by (Ureña 2001).
53
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watch out. When Pilar and her husband confronted the guests over breakfast, they were told that
they were going to build a (private) dam there, and that if they refused to sell, they would be
expropriated. Although convinced that no private investor could expropriate her, she set out to
investigate.
In fact, the Legislative Assembly had recently passed Law 7200 to encourage private
investment in electricity generation. Although the law limited the size of private dams, there
were plans to construct a series of four dams for the river—three private and one public.
Suspiciously, each one of the private dams had filed the same paperwork in the same way, with
the same spelling errors, albeit under different names. The projects would have confined the
river to tubes, rerouting it to run a series of turbines. It was particularly outrageous that all this
would be done to generate a small amount of energy, which, moreover, would only add to the
ICE’s reserves during the rainy season, when electricity was most plentiful. Pilar was not
opposed to dams as such—in fact her father had been in charge of some of the ICE’s most
important early hydroelectric projects. But this project threatened to destroy the river, damage
the watershed, expropriate families, and all for a negligible amount of electricity and the
enrichment of a few private persons. In fact the Law 7200, which mandated the ICE to buy
electricity at inflated prices, seems to have been written expressly to benefit the operators of
private dams, who, unsurprisingly, included some of the most powerful people in the country,
not least of them the former presidents José Maria Figueres Olsen and Oscar Arias.
Together with some seventy families who had also received threats of expropriation—
many of them campesinos subsisting on their plots—they began a five-year odyssey through the
courts, the universities, and the Ministry of the Environment and Mines (MINAE). By 1999,
pressure from the government and the developers had led all but seven families to agree to sell.
But just when things began to seem hopeless, two legal challenges, filed with the support of the
Bishop, Monsignor Trejos, were taken up by the constitutional court. All private electricity
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generation was put on hold while the court considered the case. Some of the country’s most
powerful persons—including Oscar Arias—to file briefs on behalf of law 7200 and the dams.
Just at this moment, members of the community found out that the Legislative Assembly
was debating a law—the Combo—that would encourage the construction of more and bigger
dams by private investors and facilitate expropriations in order to build them. With the
exception of José Merino from the small left party Fuerza Democrática, the legislators all went
back on their promises to change these aspects of the bill. Pilar and the seven families—with
substantial help from local Catholic clergy—had begun to organize committees against the dams
in their communities, and now they reached out to establish links with people and organizations
in other parts of the country who were opposed to the pending reforms.
By the day of the vote on the Combo, they had already begun organizing protests in San
Isidro in Pérez Zeledón. They took over a bridge and blocked the highway—the only route
connecting the south, with its pineapple and other export crops, to San José and the rest of the
world. One blockade became dozens, as other communities heard about the protests and began
blocking roads on their own. Trucks with pineapple and sugar cane were backed up along the
highway for days. When the police finally cleared the blockades, one of these trucks emptied out
his pineapples in solidarity, saying “you’ve kept us here this long, don’t stop now.” When this
was cleared, another followed with his load of sugar cane, which he lit on fire. The highways
remained blocked, the pineapple rotting.

Flood
This was not an isolated incident. During the course of the two weeks after the Combo
was passed on the first vote, there were at least 103 road blockades (Menjívar 2013:12), in a
country where transport between the frontiers and the two principle ports is effectively confined
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to a handful of highways running north-south and east-west. The electricity and
telecommunications workers’ unions joined the strike, with the unions chaining the gates of the
plants to prevent workers from entering the buildings, while encouraging workers to join them
in the streets (some did, others stayed home).
While road blockades popped up in provincial towns from Pérez Zeledón to Cañas, and
Puntarenas to Limón, giant rallies took over the streets in San José and San Pedro (the
university district), where protestors waved the national flag and donned the distinctive yellow
helmets of ICE workers. The public universities declared a “paro académico” (a work stoppage),
while high school teachers cancelled classes, releasing their students to the streets. Josefinos
often described the festive character of the protests, and older protestors stressed the novelty of
this carnivalesque, celebratory protest culture. In San Isidro in Pérez Zeledón, judicial workers
released their protestors and went on strike. Protestors from rural areas around the country
recall the community support, donated food, and fellowship that sustained the blockades. But
participants also remembered being pushed to physical extremes as they sought to maintain
blockades for days and in some cases weeks. There were eruptions of violence, mostly from the
riot police: one march and rally in San José ended with the police beating high school-aged
protestors with clubs. Some blockades in rural areas ended in confrontations with riot police,
tear gas and stone-throwing (as in Cañas, Guanacaste; Vargas 2002). An electricity tower in the
Caribbean province of Limón was reportedly bombed. Of much greater symbolic significance for
protestors, seven youths maintained a hunger strike on the steps of the ICE’s main building until
they were taken away in ambulances.
Blockades and strikes brought the circulation of people and things on which production
and profits depend slowed to a crawl. Despite the inconveniences caused by this type of protest,
a strong majority of the public supported the aims of the protestors, if not necessarily their
confrontational tactics (Bull 2005:168; Campos and Raventós 2005; Menjívar 2013; Raventós
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and Campos 2005). The last straw for the government came on April 3rd, when the workers in
the public sector ports and oil refineries went on strike. It had been about two weeks since the
first blockades. In the face of a militant opposition with the support of the public and the general
paralysis of economic activity, the bill’s sponsors in the government admitted defeat and
withdrew the law the next day. 54
The constitutional court soon voided the legislature’s vote, ruling that the accelerated
process had violated the opposition legislators’ rights to debate. It would require a lot of faith in
legal reason to argue that this decision did not respond to the crisis generated by the protests.
And shortly thereafter, the court decided in favor of the legal challenge from the families in
Pérez Zeledón, putting a halt to the law 7200 and the construction of private dams. Contentious
protest appeared necessary to achieve a democratic—even legal—outcome that the electoral and
legal infrastructure of liberal democracy was not able to provide.
The protagonism of the movement went well beyond ICE workers and their unions (cf.
Bull 2005:165-70; Rhodes 2006). In Pérez Zeledón, the church and Catholic radio played a
crucial role in bringing people together, and the protests began with community opposition to
the dams (Ureña 2002). The educational system and later much of the rest of the public sector
played a key role. Organizations of ecologists were not necessarily numerically significant but
they contributed forceful arguments to the public debate (Cartagena 2010).
And although the Combo is sometimes described as a movement against
telecommunications privatization (e.g. Hoffman 2008), the privatization and expansion of
electricity generation was the more important issue to many protestors, including the protestors
in Pérez Zeledón, whose concerns were “water, land, and electricity” (see Cartagena 2010; Ureña
2002). Benjamín*—a telecommunications technician at the ICE, was more moved by the

A number of different participants regarded the decision by the oil refinery workers to go on strike as
the last straw for the government.
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environmental concerns, despite his structural position: the moment that most incensed him
was when the President of the Legislative Assembly argued on television in a debate that
damming a river was no different than “irrigating a field of beans.”
The law known as the Combo separated the ICE into two distinct entities, ICELEC for
electricity and ICETEL for telecommunications. ICETEL would be opened to the participation of
private capital and its monopoly terminated. In electricity, reforms were made to encourage
private investment—which in Costa Rica usually means damming rivers—by raising the
permissible size of dams and facilitating expropriations. Environmental organizations such as
Fecon objected to the measures designed to encourage the construction of private dams as well
as those freeing up national parks for energy development (Cartagena 2010). The ICE unions
and the students at the University of Costa Rica argued that liberalization of
telecommunications would mean the loss of the cross-subsidies that maintained low basic rates
and provided service to unprofitable rural areas, concerns later raised over CAFTA. Others
argued that the separation of ICETEL and ICELEC would weaken both and lead to higher
electricity prices (see Fumero 2005; Haglund 2006).
Many also opposed the law as a threat to the ICE as national patrimony, an attempt to
privatize it by stealth or, worse, convert it into a hybrid public-private entity tailored for
politically-connected profiteering (Solís 2002). Much of the public framing emphasized the
threat to the institution, drawing on the deep well of legitimacy that the ICE had built up
through decades of extending telephone and electricity services. “We had to defend the ICE,” as
Raquel*, a high school student at the time of the protests, explained to me, throwing her hands
up in the air in exasperation. The slogans of the protestors referred to the defense of the
institution (even in rural areas), “ICE sí, Combo no” and “el ICE no se vende, se defiende” (the
ICE is not for sale, it is to be defended—that so many people were sure that the intent was to
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“sell” the ICE, no matter what the project’s backers said, shows the widespread lack of
confidence in politicians).
At least some of the protestors, however, seem to have been largely motivated by
concerns not related to the ICE at all. One of the first of the road blockades was organized by the
campesino organization UPANACIONAL in Cartago. Guido Vargas and Miguel Chaves, two of
the leaders of the organization, recalled that the blockade had in fact been organized around the
lack of government support for small farmers and had just happened to coincide with the first
days of opposition to the Combo. Although they were opposed to the law, that opposition had
not been their primary motivation: as Guido Vargas put it, they “joined up with each other” (“se
iba juntando,” interview, June 24, 2009). In this case protest was fed by accumulated grievances
and oppositional mobilization among rural small producers (see Edelman 1999). In other cases,
as well, the confrontation over the ICE can be interpreted as an extension of prior conflicts over
liberalization. The port workers union had been involved in a bitter struggle over the
privatization of the Atlantic port of Moín. APSE, the high school teachers union, had recently
lost a contentious strike against pension reform (see e.g. Clark 2001; Segura 2005).
This is not to say that small farmers, or port workers, or teachers were not concerned
with the future of the ICE, telecommunications or electricity, but simply that there were other
sources of discontent.55 Some of these might even have exceeded the boundaries that normally
define the political. As one participant pointed out in response to my question about the
participation of secondary school students, “the Combo was a protest against many things,
including the relationship of adults to youth, which is also a form of oppression.” Protests, after
all, are not simply calculated means to ends, but performances that express multiple different
forms of discontent from a variety of different sources all at once (Auyero 2003).
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I was also told a community in Guanacaste went out to protest the decrepit state of a local bridge.
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The Meaning of the Protests
Behind the various sources of discontent, were three unifying themes: one is that the
government was serving the narrow interests of the privileged at the expense of the patrimony of
the Costa Rican people, whether in the form of the ICE or a river. The second is that in order to
do so they were either violating the law outright or using legal means to subvert its intent. The
third, complementary theme is that the political system was closed to the initiative and priorities
of ordinary people (González and Solís 2001; Solís 2002). All of these themes would continue to
characterize the movement against CAFTA. Likewise, the argument of the Combo’s proponents
that protest was inimical to democracy would show up at the heart of the SI campaign and its
“campaign of fear.”
The opposition to the dams in Pérez Zeledón came out of a more personal encounter
with the confluence of public power and private capital than was generally the case among the
protestors, but the narrative is paradigmatic of this general perception. Accounts of the event
often emphasized that the Legislative Assembly was surrounded by riot police on the day of the
vote, an image that captures closure of the political system even more eloquently than the
televised violent arrests of uniformed students that enraged so many.
During the protests, proponents of the Combo posed their own argument that it was the
protestors who were subverting democracy. The protestors represented “grupos de presión,”
motivated by sectorial interests, who were imposing their will in violation of due democratic
process. The dominant newspaper, La Nación, was particularly vociferous in its demands that
the police forcefully end the protests in the name of democracy (Solis 2002:42-3).
But the protestors, and a good part of the public, were willing to question claims to
authority rooted in the institutionalized electoral process. The protestors challenged the Combo
in the name of democracy. They claimed that the accelerated debate that characterized the
project violated the rights of the opposition to be heard, and took this argument to the courts
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where they ultimately won.56 Beyond the critique of parliamentary procedure, the argument
appealed to the idea that the substance of democracy as a process of consultation had been
violated. Moreover, the opposition had a persuasive claim to more faithfully represent “the
people,” since polling that put the public on the side of the protestors rather than the officials
elected two years before (see Ramirez and Raventós 2005; Raventós and Ramirez 2005).57
Perhaps more profoundly still, a significant part of the discourse of the opposition
defined itself as defending the “institucionalidad” (institutional order). This claim, which is by
nature open-ended and expansive in meaning, placed the ICE on the same plane of inalienability
as the institutionalized democratic process itself. The claim to institucionalidad could be
anchored by the association of the ICE with the founder of the contemporary Second Republic,
José Figueres. At work here are distinct conceptions of what constitutes legitimacy. While these
may at time bolster forms of “civil authoritarianism” (Solís 2002), this social democratic
institucionalidad provided important resources for opposition to turn-of-the-century
neoliberalism.
The victory of the protests left a seemingly indelible mark on the country. For nearly all
of the anti-CAFTA activists with whom I spoke, participation in the Combo had been a formative
experience, and all of them evaluated the experience in positive terms. They tended to recall it as
a moment of defiant and consequential collective agency, “we went out into the street, and we
won.” A salient feature of many narratives of the Combo has been “spontaneity.” Eva Carazo,
who as a student leader had a central role in organizing the protests, felt that the narrative of

Our study of the legislative archives indicates that whatever the violations of parliamentary procedure,
in fact the accelerated debate came on top of a project that had been discussed and debated in the
assembly for a full five years, during the course of which opposition groups, including the environmental
coalition FECON as well as the ICE’s trade unions, had repeatedly testified. Nevertheless, after these years
of debate and consultation, the law that came to be known as the Combo seems to have been hastily
cobbled together and rushed through the legislature.
57 This complicates Paley’s observations concerning the polling as a technology that, in modern
democracies, tends to make its subjects complicit in their own domination (Paley 2001). In this case,
polling became part of a challenge to the existing institutionalization of power relations.
56
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spontaneity misrepresents the work that went into organizing the protests (interview, May 21,
2009; see also Ureña 2002:141). Indeed, as I will argue later on, the discourse of the spontaneity
of the opposition to the Combo led some in the opposition to CAFTA to have unrealistic
expectations about the potential for resistance to the implementation agenda.
At the same time, narratives of spontaneity also express the sense that many participants
had of opening up a space for the exercise of autonomy and agency. When I asked Eduardo,* a
university student who had been in secondary school at the time of the protests, to describe his
experience to me, he answered “what I most remember is the sense that no one was in charge,
that there was no one directing or controlling things.” Other accounts convey a sense of
inspiration from the autonomous agency of others, which is often narrated as spontaneity.
Benjamín, liked to tell the story of an elderly woman who saw the protests on her television and
went out to block the highway on her own in solidarity. Even as they stressed the importance of
recognizing organizing efforts, both Eva Carazo and Pilar Ureña both emphasized to me the fact
that people were acting on their own initiative in a decentralized way. Pilar’s narrative
emphasized moments when persons outside the process of organizing took independent
decisions to join the protests and brave the consequences—as with the truck driver and the
judicial workers described above.
Whether they found a sense of agency from the process of becoming organizers and
leaders, or from the sense that they were able to act in concert with others without coordination
or control, those who participated in the Combo found in it a sense of their potential to act
consequentially in the political field, in a moment in which the order of power, authority, and
discipline seemed to be momentarily suspended, placing the normal relationship between
politicians and “the people” on its head. At the same time, however, while the protests upended
some established disciplines of practice and challenged the relationships of political authority
associated with them, they also reaffirmed other aspects of the national state project and
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employed claims to legitimacy built up in the process of its formation and consolidation,
whether by waving the national flag or promising to defend the country’s institutions (Solís
2002).
This experience profoundly shaped the political subjectivities of those who participated
in it, as well as those of the many who watched it and contemplated its implications. During the
course of my fieldwork, I routinely asked those I met if they had participated in the Combo. For
those active in the campaign against CAFTA, in the Comités, and in the unions, the response was
almost always affirmative. In the rest of this chapter I discuss some of the ways that the
experience and memory of the Combo shaped the political praxis of the Comités. Before doing
so, however, I will close this part of the chapter by returning briefly to the question of who
participated in the Combo.
The core opposition to the Combo consisted of unionized public sector employees,
students, teachers and academics, and organized campesinos—many of the same people and
organizations that were later active in the NO. Available sources, as well as interviews with
leaders and participants in the Combo indicate the relative absence of the community
organizations and residents of the more “popular” neighborhoods, which had played such an
important role in struggles over access to electricity in the past—including the mass
mobilizations for nationalization in the late 1950s and the electricity rate strike of 1983 (cf.
Alvarenga 2005). This absence points to one weakness of the opponents of liberalization in
Costa Rica, and the importance recognizing the importance of organizing as opposed to
spontaneity in the successful opposition to the Combo. As I have argued elsewhere (2008), it is
not that the urban popular neighborhoods are disorganized, but their organizations are
subordinated to the traditional parties. This weakness would become evident in the returns from
the referendum.
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The events of the Combo facilitated the development and strengthening of relationships,
particularly between environmental activists and trade union leaders, organized around a
discourse of defense of the institutions and property claims of the nation against the
depredations of politicians aligned with transnational capital, that would form the basis of the
alternative political bloc that would come to be known as the “NO.” This bloc would continue to
be characterized by internal tensions around relationships of authority and the possibility of
organizing new forms of political practice.
The authors and proponents of the Combo were also deeply affected by the challenge to
the existing order of political representation that the victory of the protestors represented. The
referendum on CAFTA became their best hope of overcoming the defeat that they suffered in
2000. And to some significant extent it worked. As Eva Carazo said when I asked her to assess
the significance of the Combo:
“I would have said something different before the FTA…before the FTA I would have
said that it was a historic struggle that reversed a process of privatization of basic
services and defended a model, the model of a social state that was taken up by the
people…to defend the possibility of investing socially in collective goods. [But] in this
moment I see it a little differently because this blow that is the FTA hurts me very
much…I feel that it implied a set- back with respect to what we had achieved with the
Combo.” (Interview, May 21, 2009; emphasis mine)58

2. The Path to a Referendum
The Combo occurred in the context of declining identification with, and participation in,
the existing institutions of electoral democracy. A key indication of this decline, voter
participation, reached a watershed in the mid-1990s: from the 1960s to 1994, approximately 80

“Te hubiera dicho algo distinto antes del TLC…. Antes del TLC yo te hubiera dicho que fue una lucha
histórica en términos de echar atrás un proceso de privatización de servicios básicos y de defensa de un
modelo, de un modelo de Estado social que fue asumido por la gente y que nos ayudó a defenderlo como
una posibilidad de invertir socialmente en bienes colectivos… En este momento lo veo un poco distinto
porque me duele mucho el huevazo que es el TLC verdad, este, siento que eso implicó un retroceso con
respecto a lo que se había logrado con el Combo…”
58
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percent of adult citizens voted in presidential elections.59 In the four years between the
presidential elections of 1994 and 1998, however, voter participation declined by a quarter to
just over 60 percent of the electorate. In subsequent elections, voter participation oscillated
around this lower figure, indicating an enduring decline in citizen enthusiasm for the electoral
process (Raventós et al. 2005; Rovira 2007).60 The active opponents of liberalization with whom
I conducted my fieldwork were not, by and large, part of the growing number of abstainers from
the electoral arena, which belies any simple correlation between discontent with the existing
system of electoral representation, abstention from elections, and the embrace of extra-electoral
means of political participation. Rather, declining voter participation and the increasing
willingness to defy elected authority in the streets both show that many did not feel that the
existing institutions of electoral democracy provided outlets for meaningful political
participation (see Lehoucq 2005, 2006; Raventós et. al. 2005; Seligson 2002). Worse, many
were convinced that the legally-constituted institutions of government were being used in a way
that was fundamentally illegal. The referendum emerged in the context of the exhaustion of
representative government as a substitute for the “direct democracy” of the streets.

A Crisis of Representation
The general feeling among those I encountered in the movement against CAFTA was that
there were no meaningful differences between the two parties that dominated the bipartite
system from the 1980s to the 1990s, the PLN and the PUSC—often sardonically grouped
together as the “PLUSC.” In fact, the rapid rise of electoral abstention coincided with the evident

In Costa Rica, adult citizens are registered to vote at the same time that they are issued their national
identification cards (an essential item for nearly all official transactions). The constitution defines voting
as a duty of all citizens.
60 Seligson (2002) argues that the sudden decline in voter participation reflected a long term trajectory of
declining “system support” going back to 1978.
59
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rapprochement between the PLN and the PUSC, most visible in a pact signed between thenpresident José María Figueres Olsen of the PLN and his predecessor Rafael Angel Calderón
Fournier of the PUSC in 1995. The pact committed the PLN to a series of liberalization
measures, including a reform of the teachers’ pension system and the privatization of the ports,
both of which brought the PLN into highly contentious confrontations with unionized public
sector workers while providing further evidence of the PLN’s embrace of liberalization. The fact
that the pact was signed between the sons of Jóse Figueres Ferrer and Rafael Angel Calderón
Guardia, the reference points for differentiation between liberacionistas and calderonistas just
seemed to underline the point (see the introduction for an explanation of these historical
figures). Finally, it is worth noting that declining voter participation itself was taken up in public
culture as an index of a crisis of political representation, which itself contributed to the
atmosphere of uncertainty about the future of Costa Rican democracy (Seligson 2002).
Another manifestation of this crisis of the existing institutions of political representation,
of more immediate importance for the processes discussed in here, was the proliferation and
rapid rise of new parties. Many of those who participated in the Combo, and would later make
up part of the base of the opposition to CAFTA, involved themselves to one degree or another in
building new opposition parties. The left party, Fuerza Democrática, initially attracted a group
of leading figures in the Combo, including the student leader, Eva Carazo, but quickly fell apart
because of conflicts over the means of selecting candidates. For the 2006 elections, José Merino,
the representative of Fuerza Democrática and a prominent opponent of the Combo, founded a
new left party based in San José, the Frente Amplio (broad front), which succeeded in electing
him to the Legislative Assembly that year.
The Partido Acción Ciudadana (Citizen Action Party, or PAC) was more successful. The
founder and leader of the party, Ottón Solís, was a former planning minister and legislative
representative from the PLN, who left the party to found the PAC a few months after the Combo.
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With an emphasis on opposition to “corruption” and the defense of Costa Rica’s state
institutions, the PAC became an electoral conduit for much of the discontent evident in the
protests, achieving a significant number of representatives in the Legislative Assembly and
forcing a run-off in the 2002 presidential election. As CAFTA entered the public debate in 2003
and 2004, the PAC became an electoral vehicle for opposition to the treaty.
Meanwhile, discontent with corruption brought down the PUSC, Costa Rica’s second
political party. The PUSC, which won a landslide victory in the second round of the 2002
presidential elections, in 2006 got a mere 3.5 percent of the vote for president and only one
representative in the assembly (down from 19 in 2002). In 2004, two former presidents from
the PUSC, Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier and Miguel Angel Rodríguez Rodríguez, had been
arrested on bribery charges. The arrest of Rodríguez was particularly dramatic. Recently elected
to head the Organization of American States, Rodríguez was arrested while abroad and forced to
deplane in handcuffs in front of Costa Rican television crews. Significantly, both corruption
charges involved bribery over public contracts to transnational firms for important state
institutions: Calderón was accused of having accepted bribes in exchange for contracts to
provide medical equipment to the Caja, and Rodríguez was accused of taking payments in
exchange for awarding ICE contracts to the French telecommunications firm Alcatel—an ironic
turn for a president who accused protestors of breaking the law and undermining the
modernization of the ICE during the protests over the Combo. José Figueres’s son, José Figueres
Olsen, was also dogged by charges of corruption before and during his administration, including
association with drug traffickers and bribery. He was never charged, however (perhaps because
he fled to Europe), and was less damaging to his party—although certainly helped to sour people
on politicians in general and the PLN in particular.
With the PUSC suddenly irrelevant, the 2006 presidential campaign pitted the PAC’s
Ottón Solís against former PLN president, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Oscar Arias Sánchez.
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Arias ran on the promise to ratify CAFTA and restore “governability” to the country, while Solís
campaigned against corruption and the Free Trade Agreement. To the surprise of nearly
everyone the election ended in a near tie and was only decided after a contentious manual
recount. The PAC, with seventeen representatives, became the second party in the legislature,
and Solís’s authority as a leading figure in the opposition to CAFTA was consolidated.

The Tension Mounts
Meanwhile, students, public sector trade unionists, and others continued to employ “the
street” as a space of opposition on a regular basis. In 2003, ICE workers carried out a two week
strike in opposition to limits placed by the government on the ICE’s ability to acquire loans and
reinvest its profits, a movement that ended in a negotiated resolution which ceded some
additional financial autonomy to the institution. In 2004, a strike in the transport sector against
the granting of a monopoly of vehicle inspection to the Spanish firm RTV gained the support of
students, public sector unions, and others who opposed what was seen as a give-away to
transnational capital. As with the Combo, the campaign against RTV employed extensive
blockades of the nation’s principal highways, although this time the government prevailed over
the protestors. By this time, opposition to CAFTA was already being incorporated into the
demands of some of the protestors, reflecting the beginnings of organized opposition to the
treaty.
As CAFTA’s ratification began to seem more likely, so too did the prospect that it too
would be decided “in the streets.” As with the Combo, opponents of the project felt that they
were shut out of the process. A series of consultation sessions organized by the government and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, to many participants more like one-way propaganda sessions
than serious attempts to address their concerns (see e.g., Martínez 2004).
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Beginning as early as 2003, some groups of activists had begun to prepare the ground for
opposition to the treaty with organizing and educational campaigns. Ana, who at the time
worked for a Catholic Church-affiliated NGO in the capital of Guanacaste province, recalls that
“at first people thought we were crazy. We went out every week, leafleting against the TLC, and
people said, what are you going on about? But over time they began to take an interest, and
finally to come to us for information.” The Frente Cultural Contra el TLC (Cultural Front
against the FTA) outfitted an old school bus, La Cazadora contra el TLC, and travelled the
country giving talks and artistic performances against the treaty. Campesino organizations,
including UPANACIONAL, FEDEAGUA and others began to distribute information about the
dangers of the treaty for domestically-oriented agriculture. The public sector unions, including
the ICE unions and the public employees’ union, ANEP, began to distribute information on the
purported dangers of the treaty for state institutions, public services and their associated social
rights. As the treaty took its final form and ratification was on the table, organizations opposed
to the treaty formed coordinating bodies and began to plan for a general strike, road blockades,
and marches on the model of the Combo (see e.g., Segura and Coronado 2008).
The contested re-election of Arias contributed to the climate of opposition to the treaty
(and prefigured contention over the legitimacy of the referendum). Despite assurances by the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal that Arias had won the election, at least some of his opponents
retained doubts about the legitimacy of his electoral victory. Either way, the narrowness of the
victory, together with deficits in the democratic process—such as the perennial clientelism in the
use of housing grants—contributed to the conviction that Arias did not have a legitimate
mandate to push through the major changes in the country’s institutions promised by CAFTA.
Albino Vargas, president of one of the larger umbrella unions representing public sector
employees (ANEP), declared that the election had been compromised by multiple

110

“irregularities” and predicted a situation of “confrontation” including “más resistencia y más
‘calle’” (more resistance and more ‘street’, Lopes 2006).
More controversially still, Arias’s re-election had been made possible by a highly
controversial decision by the constitutional court that said that in contrast to the heretofore
prevailing interpretation of the constitution (as well as any reasonable reading of the
constitution’s text), the prohibition on re-election only applied to consecutive elections. For
many in the opposition to CAFTA, at least, this made Arias’s re-election illegal and his
presidency illegitimate from the start. Perhaps more importantly, it was taken as just another
sign that he had the constitutional court in his pocket. “Iba montando su gente” (he went about
installing his people), I was told.
This narrative of institutional capture, the illegal use of law, and “dictatorship” would
shape the opposition to CAFTA and the Arias presidency. All of this added legitimacy to a deeply
oppositional stance to the government, and, in particular, Arias’s principle initiative, the Free
Trade Agreement.

The Referendum as Resolution
At the same time, however, not all actors in the opposition to CAFTA had given up on
institutional channels. As described earlier, the election of 2006 had brought to the Legislative
Assembly seventeen representatives of the PAC. Together with the representatives of the Frente
Amplio and PASE (Access without Exclusion, which claimed to represent the elderly and
disabled), the legislative opposition to the treaty was one vote short of preventing the threefifths majority that was required by law for measures affecting state monopolies. Under the
leadership of Oscar Arias and his brother Rodrigo, however, the PLN closed ranks, and with the
support of a handful representatives elected for the liberal Partido Libertario and the one
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representative elected for the PUSC, Arias appeared to have the votes necessary to ratify and
implement the treaty. Opponents turned to constitutional challenges to the legislative process
(just as they had done with the Combo) and the treaty as a whole (the first of a series of
challenges that would continue over the following years). And at the same time as a part of the
opposition was laying the infrastructure for an opposition to the treaty “in the streets,” another
group, led by José Miguel Corrales Bolaños, a former representative from the PLN, was
petitioning the electoral tribunal for permission to conduct a referendum, a possibility only
recently introduced into Costa Rican law and one that had yet to be tested.
According to Eugenio Trejos, the rector of the Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica (Costa
Rican Institute of Technology) and principal spokesperson for the NO campaign, the
referendum initiative responded, in good measure, to concerns about the potential for a more
dramatic, possibly violent confrontation—a situation he characterized as two trains speeding
towards each other on a single track (interview April 2, 2009). I was struck by the contrast
between this concern to head off confrontation and the enthusiasm that I found among many in
the Comités for more contentious protests (indeed, often represented as a value in itself). In fact,
the coalition that would become the NO campaign was internally divided over the respective
values of protests and voting, while appeals to social peace and the electoral process had broad
appeal. Although there was opposition to the referendum as a “demobilizing” process from the
outset, some of the enthusiasm that I found for protests was probably a reaction to the conduct
and outcome of the referendum itself—several people, including Trejos himself, expressed at
least some degree of regret for their support of the referendum.
The referendum, then, emerged in part as a solution that might return politics to the
electoral arena while also allowing an apparently more direct form of participation that would
circumvent the tarnished representative system—in Trejos’s words, “the urgent necessity to
strengthen participatory democracy.” At the same time, however, some viewed the referendum
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itself as a more contentious tool. The recently-created referendum law provided two distinct
means for initiating a referendum, by petition from the citizenry or by request by the Legislative
Assembly and the president (Raventós 2008). Some advocates of the referendum hoped that the
process of gathering signatures would facilitate education and organizing, strengthening the
movement against CAFTA. Another potential result, however, would be to slow down the
process of ratification, to the point where Costa Rica would exceed the timeframe established for
ratification and be excluded from the treaty.61 Trejos explained to me that much of the Electoral
Tribunal’s hesitancy to accept the citizen referendum reflected a suspicion that this, the desire to
exceed the treaty’s legal timeframe, was the real goal of those who proposed it.
While the tribunal deliberated over the referendum, opponents of CAFTA organized
protest marches against the treaty. The largest was on February 26, 2007. Having been advised
that it would be an important event, I managed to arrange a quick trip to Costa Rica. The march
began with a rally at the ICE’s headquarters in San José, highlighting the importance of the ICE
and its trade unions to the opposition. A parallel rally at the nearby headquarters of the
television station Canal 7 protested the channel’s biased reporting on CAFTA, another theme
that would continue to be salient.
From the ICE’s headquarters the march continued along the Avenida Colón, the
principle thoroughfare of downtown San José, ending at the Plaza de la Democracia and the
Legislative Assembly. The turnout was indeed enormous. I ran back and forth between rallies
and up and down the length of the march, before scaling a pedestrian bridge over the Paseo
Colón in order to get a better view of the whole. The march flowed below, in front and behind
me, filling the four-lane highway as far as the eye could see. Protestors marched in blocs
representing organized constituencies. The trade union blocs, with flags, caps and t-shirts in
Both the opponents and proponents of CAFTA would continue to appeal to this legal timeframe in
various ways throughout the conflict, reflecting, perhaps, a particular experience of bureaucratic formality
that was, in fact, at odds with the less formalistic style of negotiation between states.
61
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their union colors, represented by far the largest organized constituency, if not the majority of
the marchers; the teachers unions, the government workers union, and the nine ICE unions (all
in the institution’s emblematic yellow). There were also marchers representing the PAC,
dissident members of the PLN, and various Marxist-Leninist and Trotskyist parties, all with
partisan flags and banners.62 There was a sizeable “green bloc,” youth playing drums and
dancing, reminiscent of participants in the recent global justice and anti-war marches and direct
actions in the United States and elsewhere. Other, smaller (or at least less organized and visible)
constituencies included indigenous groups and campesinos, complete with a traditional painted
oxcart. Besides this quintessential expression of folkloric national identity, the march was
covered with the national flag. Marchers chanted slogans against CAFTA or followed trucks
playing old movement hymns by the Argentine protest singer, Mercedes Sosa.
The protest had been surrounded by narratives of violent confrontation. A series of
articles in La Nación in leading up to the protest warned of the presence of violent groups,
which fits with their history of urging more vigorous police suppression of protestors in the
Combo (and may have been intended to dissuade protestors). Reports circulated among the
protestors that Arias had assembled a large quantity of Colombian-trained riot police armed
with teargas. Although the march was peaceful and the visible police presence minimal (and
nothing compared to the militarized intimidation that I was accustomed to the in the United
States), in the political context framed by the legacy of the Combo, the protest was a show of
force that indicated the possibility of mobilizing for more confrontational tactics. After the
march a leader of one of the ICE’s unions took me on a tour of Hatillo, a popular residential
district in South San José. As we crossed through a busy intersection, he explained that they had
In Costa Rica the political parties have associated colors and the use of partisan flags is common. The
parties are called by the names of their colors; the PLN are verdiblancos, the PAC rojiamarrillos, etc.
People often dress in the colors on voting days. This reflects a tradition of strong partisan identification,
and electoral practices that emphasize the visibility of participants. In the more partisan past, people
sometimes paintedto paint their houses in party colors.
62

114

burned tires there before (during the electricity rate strike of 1983) and were ready to do so
again.
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) authorized the collection of signatures for a
citizen’s referendum a month and a half later. The very next day, president Arias, to this point a
vocal opponent of any referendum on the FTA, submitted his own petition to the Legislative
Assembly, which was quickly ratified by the pro-CAFTA representatives together with the PAC
(Raventós 2008:16). The TSE decided to accept Arias’s petition, thereby annulling its own prior
approval of the citizen initiative, avoiding the extended process of signature gathering, and
placing the referendum on a fast track of six months.
This decision served as one more piece of evidence for CAFTA’s opponents that the
institucionalidad was in the pocket of the “Arias brothers.” There are more charitable readings
of the Tribunal’s decision to accept the presidential over the citizen referendum, however.
Eugenio Trejos thought that the officials of the TSE were genuinely concerned that that
referendum would violate its own mandate of popular consultation if it extended beyond the
time allowed for ratification and implementation of the treaty (interview, April 2, 2009), which
could explain the decision to prefer the faster, presidential route. This was also how the PAC’s
legislative caucus explained their vote to authorize the presidential referendum.
President Arias had been opposed to the very concept of a referendum on the treaty. He
argued that the 2006 election was a referendum on CAFTA, and another one was unnecessary
(Raventós 2008:17). Once the TSE approved the decision, however, Arias had reasons to prefer
the faster referendum granted by the presidential petition. The slower petition-gathering
process raised the danger of missing the “deadlines” for the treaty (although, as we shall see, the
deadline was much more flexible than CAFTA’s advocates implied). More importantly, because
they were in command of an organized partisan infrastructure and faced an opposition that was
not yet prepared to run an electoral campaign, a more accelerated process was on the side of
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CAFTA’s proponents—although the strategy was still seen as risky, and was opposed by some
advocates of the treaty (interview with Nelly Vargas, March 16, 2009). Once the ball was in that
court, Arias had every reason to try to make sure that the game went according to his rules.

3. Conclusion: Which direct democracy?
What might seem on its face to be a manifestation of “direct democracy” in fact emerged
out of a more complex process that replaced one kind of “direct” participation with another. The
referendum replaced the collective direct action that many opponents of CAFTA viewed as the
more authentic popular democracy. The presidential referendum, in turn, preempted the
organizing process that was integral to the citizens’ referendum.
Of course, no political process is truly “direct” in the sense of being unmediated by social
relations and by power. Oscar Arias’s decision to request a referendum was not motivated by
affinity for a plebiscite; it was a strategic choice to maintain control of the process. The means
employed to maintain control in turn reinforced the conviction that the institutions had been
captured by the neoliberal elite, despite the plebiscite’s purported “directness.” Nevertheless, the
referendum was direct enough to grant the victor a strong claim to represent the “voice of the
people,” making a return to the direct democracy of the streets very difficult.
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Chapter 3

SI
A Campaign of Fear in a Land of Peace

At the height of the referendum campaign, someone—nobody knows who—sent a
document to the University of Costa Rica’s newspaper, Semanario Universidad. The document
was an analysis of the predicament of the SI and a proposal for how to win the referendum, in
six pages addressed to President Oscar Arias. Among the strategies was one “to stimulate [four
types of] fear” in the voters, a proposal that provoked outrage, embarrassment and urgent
disavowals from the SI campaign and the Arias government.63 What could this mean, a proposal
for a “campaign of fear” coming from the government of a country with no military and an
established tradition of civil liberties? The answer tells us much about how fear can work
politically in a liberal democracy.
The agents of fear were not armed agents of the sovereign state, but were located in civil
society and civilian state institutions. They were owners and managers of public and private
workplaces, the media, and party bosses. As Corey Robin (2004) argues taking the example of
the United States, the workplace can be a powerful location for the political use of fear, even in a

Perhaps surprisingly, however, the documents’ authors did not disavow it. Kevin Casas surprised the
reporter from the Semanario who visited him to verify the veracity of the document (interview with
Vinicio Chacón in the documentary film, Santo Fraude, Cárdenas and Rojas 2010).
63
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liberal democracy. This helps to correct some of our theoretical oppositions between voluntary
civil society and coercive state. Unemployment, too, can be a powerful tool of coercion.64
Secondly, the object of fear was not so much violence as unemployment, chaos and
disorder, and poor governance. The campaign of fear was an appeal to order which worked
against the attempt by the NO to reorganize social relations and identities around an opposition
between the people and the powerful. In making this appeal to order, it articulates a version of
democracy very different from that expressed by the NO.
The memorandum was written by Kevin Casas, the second vice president, and Fernando
Sánchez, a representative in the Legislative Assembly and cousin of president Oscar Arias,
approximately two months before the day of the referendum vote.65 It is addressed to the
president and his brother, the Minister of the Presidency, in the familiar but respectful terms
“don Oscar and don Rodrigo.” It is a remarkable document, because of what it shows about the
organization, strategic vision, preoccupations, and assumptions of those leading the SI. It is the
product of an internal conversation, rather than an idealized representation aimed at shoring up
public legitimacy.66 In this chapter I employ a close reading of the memorandum, interpreted in
light of my observations of the campaign, information gleaned from news reports and
interviews, in order to provide an analytical account of how the SI campaign met the challenge
presented by the movement of the NO.

This is of course not to trivialize the suffering wrought by state violence, particularly in the 20 th century,
or to equate the kinds of power wielded by the wealthy in Costa Rica with those of, say, El Salvador in the
1980s, when they had the machinery of state violence at their disposal. I do however think that it is
important to pay more attention to forms of coercion in “civil society.”
65 The document is dated July 29, 2007.
66 Spokespersons for the SI, most notably Oscar Arias himself, denied that the memorandum was ever put
into practice, but the fit between the memorandum and the practices and discourses of the SI campaign
speaks for itself.
64
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1. The Context: a Popular Challenge
One of the more striking aspects of the memorandum is its tone. Casas and
Sánchez are worried: The SI campaign is disorganized and too dependent on a
government which does not have the legitimacy to push through such a controversial
project. They have no base and they are losing the battle for public opinion. “The
campaign over the FTA,” they observed,
is being converted into what we never should have allowed it to become: a
struggle between rich and poor, between the people and the government (pueblo
y gobierno). The coalition we have against us is formidable: universities, the
Church, unions, environmentalist groups, etc. And on the other hand, in favor of
the FTA, there is just the government, and, more or less (a medias), the big
businessmen (los grandes empresarios). In this situation there is no way to win.
Casas and Sánchez make clear that they view their government as confronting a popular
coalition; an aggregation of diverse constituencies that have come together as “the people”
against the powerful. Activists of the NO read and repeated these words, surprised to see their
own understanding of their movement recognized in a way it seldom was in the dominant public
culture.67 Worse, the government is facing this coalition nearly alone, with only one significant,
but undependable ally.
In order to interrupt this dynamic of the people versus the government, Casas and
Sánchez develop a strategy to generate the appearance that the SI campaign represents a broad
“social coalition” equivalent to that of the NO, while making the most of the alliances and forms
of influence commanded by the Arias government to “stimulate fear”—fear of unemployment,
terminated careers, and the politics of the popular.

Later, Benjamín* from the Comité Juanito Mora would ask me, “do you think that it was a really a
‘struggle between rich and poor’?” He was skeptical that the struggle over CAFTA had such a clear class
determinant. At the time, mindful of the election returns (see chapter three), I agreed with him. On
further reflection, however, I think that Casas and Sánchez were referring to the narrative of the NO
campaign, rather than its social base of support. What they are in fact pointing to is the narrative that the
people were in a struggle with a government beholden to moneyed elite.
67
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2. The Message
In this section I will discuss how the SI campaign sought to confront the populist appeal
of the NO. I will begin with the core of this campaign, the strategy of fear.
The Campaign of Fear
The Casas-Sánchez memorandum bluntly advocates the following media strategy:
“Stimulate fear.” They then cut right to the chase, explaining that, “this fear is of four types”:

i. Fear of the loss of employment. Here it would seem recommendable to use
the testimony of people who are very simple and in precarious situations, who might
lose their jobs or who have already lost them as a result of the failure to approve the
FTA. This is also vital in order to reinforce the idea that this is not a struggle of rich
against poor….
This is the most straightforward of the fears, in that it refers directly to the actual content of
the treaty and its possible implications for the country. This strategy was used extensively,
and may very well have been decisive. It is important to note, however, that this fear was
extended beyond the relatively limited sectors of production—notably the garment assembly
industry—that were likely to be negatively affected by the failure to approve CAFTA, or even,
in the worst case scenario, to lose the trade benefits of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (see
chapter one). It was rather promoted as a general condition, affecting all workers; without
the FTA, there will be no employment.
The three other fears are rather more surprising and less straightforwardly related to
the content of the treaty itself. In order to understand the significance of these fears, I
suggest, it is necessary to take into account the context of heightened contention,
polarization, and the crisis of legitimacy of the principal institutions of political
representation in the partisan-electoral system, whose principal reference point was the
defeat of the government in the struggle over the Combo. These three fears were:
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ii. Fear of the attack on democratic institutions. It is crucial to convert the SI
into the equivalent of democracy and institutionality…and the NO into the equivalent
of violence and disloyalty to democracy. Here there is something very important: this
campaign has already ceased to be rational, and, in consequence, about the content
of the FTA. So the argument about the defense of democracy is the only resource that
remains to us to mobilize the emotions of the people that are in favor of the FTA….It
is necessary to understand one thing: no one is ready to “die” for free trade, but they
might for democracy. It is necessary to give an ethical, and not only an instrumental,
motivation to the SI.
iii. Fear of external intervention in the NO. It is necessary to rub in
everywhere the connection of the NO to Fidel [Castro], [Hugo] Chávez and [Daniel]
Ortega, in very strident terms. It is possible that this type of campaign might make
some people uncomfortable, but it’s almost sure to have a considerable impact
among the humblest people [gente más sencilla], which is where we have the most
serious problems.
iv. Fear of the effect of a triumph of the NO on the Government. …. Many
people simply have not made the connection that a triumph of the NO in the
referendum would leave the Government in a precarious position, with its
effectiveness totally reduced, and the country in a situation of ungovernability….
There are three questions that we should plant in people’s minds, which can make
their fingers tremble if they are thinking about voting for the NO: 1. Are they ready to
put at risk the economic stability that nearly everyone recognizes is an achievement
of our Government? 2. Are they ready to return to the time of Abel [Pacheco], when
no one governed, when there was no sense of direction, and when nothing happened
in the country? 3. Have they thought who will give orders in this country if the NO
wins? (Response induced by the question: Albino, Merino, Carazo, etc.).68
These three proposals to “stimulate fear” speak to a set of dilemmas and anxieties
surrounding representative governance in Costa Rica at the turn of the 21st century. This is not a
politics of fear based on the application or suggestion of the state’s capacity for violence—if
anything, it is the violence of the market. Casas and Sánchez raise the specter of the inability of
those in control of the state to maintain order and to “govern,” to define a direction for the
country and to implement their policies.
Abel Pacheco was the president for the PUSC from 2002 to 2006. Rodrigo Carazo was president for the
coalition Unidad during the tumultuous crisis years from 1978 to 1982. Merino was the congressional
representative for the Left party Frente Amplio during the referendum, and was also a congressional
deputy at the time of the protests over the Combo. Albino Vargas was president of the trade union ANEP,
which represents government employees. All except Pacheco were high profile opponents of CAFTA.
68
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The proposal to “convert…the NO into the equivalent of violence and disloyalty to
democracy” would seem, consciously or not, to appeal to fundamental themes in the narrative of
Costa Rican national identity: that it is a country uniquely characterized by peace and
democracy. The representation of the NO as foreign would then seem a natural next link in the
chain of signification. By linking the NO specifically to Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez, and Daniel
Ortega, leading contemporary figures of the Latin American left, the SI also sought to tap
directly into a tradition of nationalist anti-Communism that predates the Cold War, was
renewed during and after the Costa Rican civil war of 1948, and renewed again during the
period of revolutionary upheavals in the Central American region in the 1970s to early 1990s. I
was indeed struck by the intensity of anti-Communist rhetoric during the campaign--coming,
from a country where the Communist enemy had for some time been superseded by the Wars on
Drugs, Crime and Terror. In a radio interview, Arias’s minister of security Fernando Berrocal
claimed that the government had considered pinning a million dollars in cash and a quantity of
cocaine captured at the Nicaraguan border on the NO campaign. Although the idea was
discussed in the presidential palace, Berrocal claims that the plan was rejected due to his own
unwillingness to cooperate (Oveido 2011).
This suggestion that the NO campaign presented an internationally-backed
revolutionary threat to Democracy, however, is evidently far-fetched, and was by Casas and
Sánchez’s own admission, both ethically questionable and designed for “the simplest people,”
presumably those who could be frightened by such a bogeyman. But this discourse of defense of
democracy against the “violent” threat from the NO presumably also has more immediate
referents. After all, while the insinuation of foreign influence is treated as an ethically dubious
tactic that “will make many uncomfortable,” the representation of the NO as a violent threat to
democracy is first proposed as a way to raise the spirits and rally the troops for the SI, to give the
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campaign an “ethical” content, something to “die for”—and presumably not just for the
“simplest people.”
I propose that what are being summoned here are actually the anxieties provoked by the
NO campaign and particularly in the context of recent challenges to political authorities and the
legitimacy of electoral representation. Returning to the events of the Combo, we will recall that
La Nación expressed its opposition to the influence of “grupos de presión”—particularly the
trade unions—and their alleged defiance of the rules of the electoral process that had
presumably given the Legislative Assembly the authority to approve the liberalization of
telecommunications and electricity. Recall as well that the approval of the demonstrators’ aims
was not matched by an equivalent level of approval of their tactics in opinion polling carried out
at the time (see Campos and Raventós 2005; Raventós and Campos 2005). Finally, even among
the opponents to CAFTA, there was, as Eugenio Trejos explained, significant concern about the
degree of polarization and potential for conflict.
The representation of a NO that is both violent and “disloyal to democracy” appeals to
this concern that the processes of electoral democracy that had, it would seem, guaranteed a
significant level of social peace and material progress, were being challenged by an insurgent
group that, allegedly, did not respect them. That this was used as an apparently cynical strategy
to discredit what was in fact an electoral campaign, and one that by all evidence was playing by
the rules of the game (rules heavily influenced, as we have seen, by the power of the president
himself), of course raises serious questions about who was really being “disloyal to democracy.”
In fact, the “democracy” that is to be defended here would seem to be little more than the power
of those who were accustomed to dominating its institutions.
The more fundamental fear was that the NO campaign threatened to up-end the
established order of political power. After all, a decentralized campaign, outside of the control of
the traditionally dominant political parties and the forms of organization to which they were
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accustomed, was threatening to beat them in their own favored arena: an election. I think that
there were two kinds of concerns here. One has to do with those who felt they had a stake in, or
identified with, the established political order. The reader will recall that Casas and Sánchez
proposed to remind PLN activists that the party would be significantly weakened by a loss in the
referendum. They reiterate this concern in the fourth fear, but, importantly, extend it to their
ability to effectively govern. This is a reflection of the sense of challenge to the traditional order
presented by the NO and the opposition to liberalization before it.
Oscar Arias had from the beginning of his election campaign defined his presidency in
terms of the ratification and implementation of CAFTA, and he actively campaigned on behalf of
the treaty throughout the referendum process. Losing the referendum would suggest that he did
not speak for the popular will, but would also be a second major defeat for the political elite
attempting liberalization after the Combo. Notably, the ones they want to “induce” the public to
think will “give orders” in the resulting political order are political figures that for one reason or
another had little appeal to the voting public at large.69 The fear to be induced here, then, is a
fear of the absence of effective governance, a projection of the authors’ own fear of being unable
to govern—but also an appeal to a desire for stability, order and good governance.
Finally, this strategy to portray the NO as “the equivalent of violence and disloyalty to
democracy” is an attempt to claim the moral high ground and particularly the defense of the
nation and its institutions, from the NO. The NO campaign, as we have seen, represented (and
understood) itself as the righteous defenders of the nation, its resources and “institutionality,”
against the “politician entrepreneurs” of the SI. By equating the NO with violence and
“disloyalty” and the SI with “democracy and institutionality” Casas and Sánchez hope to turn the
tables concerning who is defending the nation. Here they are invoking an understanding of the

They notably exclude Ottón Solís, who, as we have seen, narrowly lost the presidential election to Oscar
Arias in 2006.
69
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nation that is rooted in “democracy” rather than the public institutions of the “social state.” They
also claimed to defend the latter, but preferred the accent to be on the former. This is of course
“democracy” equated with elections.
Importantly, they have trouble presenting themselves as the ethical party within the
terms of the discussion of CAFTA itself. The traditional terms in which economic management
had been given an ethical content were through the promotion of “solidarity” via state
institutions. The most CAFTA could promise was more foreign investment and trade, which, as
Casas and Sánchez take as a given, has no appeal to the ethical imagination of the public or even
their own supporters: “no one is willing to ‘die for’ free trade.”
Echoes of these proposals could be found throughout the public culture surrounding the
referendum. Unsurprisingly, variants of these themes are regularly found in the SI’s paid
advertisements. Perhaps the clearest example is a series of full-page newspaper advertisements
that played off of the Costa Rican ballot style (see figures x-x). There is a column each for “SI”
and for “NO,” with an empty box, presumably for a vote, at the top of each column. And just as
Costa Rican ballots carry images of the presidential candidates below their parties’ logos, these
advertisements bear images of figures identified with the two campaigns. Already, we can see
aspects of the strategy proposed in the “fourth fear” at work—to suggest that the vote on CAFTA
should not be seen as a referendum on the treaty itself but rather as a kind of electoral contest in
which figures from the SI and the NO are in competition for political power. Just as is suggested
in the passage from the memorandum, as well, the SI attempts to pick its enemies in this contest
(the “candidates” of the NO). This strategy also fits, as we have seen, with the other of
representing the SI as a diverse coalition while the NO is identified with a few figures from the
trade unions and the left. One of these ads carries the image of Franklin Chang, a former NASA
astronaut and scientist who was a national hero and who had abandoned his prior opposition to
CAFTA in favor of the treaty. On the other side, an unflattering picture of José Merino, the
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representative of Frente Amplio in the Legislative Assembly, appears with the caption “José
Merino del Río, Communist leader, friend of Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro, promoter of the
NO,” neatly invoking the “second fear.” Another in the same series counterpoises “Jorge Manuel
Dengo O., founder of the ICE, Vice President of the Republic, Honored by the Fatherland, has
already said SI” with “Albino Vargas, professional trade unionist, no known job, promoter of the
NO.” The third and final in this series works more aggressively to promote the idea that it is the
SI—not the NO— that has the broad coalition, contrasting a series of professional athletes and
scientists on the SI side with a group of trade unionists, plus José Merino, on the No.
The print and television media promoted these messages as well. La Nación hammered
home the idea that failure to approve CAFTA would endanger economic growth and
employment, which it complemented by featuring human-interest style profiles of particular
firms (usually in garment assembly) that were said to be in danger of closing because the treaty
had not or might not be implemented. Beyond the explicit arguments, headlines about the NO
were consistently juxtaposed with natural disasters in an apparent attempt to create an
unconscious association (see Fournier 2009).
As for the other three fears, besides the examples we have already seen, there was a
constant discourse around violence and radicalism from the NO. Reporting on the marches and
rallies organized by the NO focused obsessively on the potential for violence (see also Mora and
García 2008). The public television station repeatedly reported on a music video promoting
“violence and insurrection” and attributing it to a group called “Los de Abajo,” despite
disavowals of the video (Cortés 2008:41). A bar fight involving Fabio Chaves, president of one of
the larger trade unions at the ICE, was reported for several days. Incidents of vandalism on the
houses of legislators, allegedly by supporters of the NO, were also widely reported. Articles and
opinion pieces appeared highlighting the lack of respect by the NO for the TSE and the
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constitutional court, and equating disagreement with the decisions of these institutions with
“disloyalty to democracy.”
These themes also emerged in encounters and conversations with supporters of the SI.
Esteban*, one of the activists from the group Students of Private Universities for the SI,
complained that the NO were “a bunch of idiots in ski masks, reading Marx or I don’t know what
sons-of-bitches [hijos de puta]” and asserted that they had committed “many acts of violence.”
While door-knocking with activists of the NO in a fishing community in the Costa de Pájaros in
Puntarenas we were confronted in the community meeting hall by the representative to the
national Legislative Assembly, which was on recess to allow representatives to proselytize (as
described below). She asked us to leave and loudly denounced us as Communists in front of the
small crowd that had gathered there. Ronald,* a college student from the Comité attempted to
argue with her, “no I’m not, I’m a liberacionista [a supporter of the PLN]! I’m the one defending
everything that Don Pepe [José Figueres] did.” “No you’re not,” she repeated, you’re a
communist!” As she angrily repeated the charge, the members of the Comité slowly moved away,
attempting to engage members of the community in conversation about what they really
represented. Antonio from the Comité proudly waved the full-sized Costa Rican flag he had
been carrying house to house.

A Social Coalition in Favor of CAFTA
Having examined the medium, now let us turn to the message. To return again to the CasasSánchez memorandum, nearly half of the document is devoted to elaborating the content of the
message with which the media should be “saturated.” It was in fact this aspect of the CasasSánchez memorandum that caused the most outrage, leading activists of the NO to dub it “the
memorandum of fear” and to describe the SI as “a campaign of fear.”
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Casas and Sánchez do indeed propose “stimulating fear” as a central plank of their
communications strategy. This proposal is, however, more fully understood in the terms of the
larger strategic vision of the memorandum as a whole. As we have seen, Casas and Sánchez are
deeply worried that the campaign has taken on the form of “rich against poor, and the people
against the government” and that such a campaign is unwinnable for the SI. The proposal to
“stimulate fear” (estimular el miedo) is in fact one of two strategies intended to alter this
dynamic, that is to counter the appropriation by the NO of the mantle of populism.
The first strategy Casas and Sánchez propose is to “displace the idea that it is a struggle
of the rich against the poor:”
This requires choosing very well the faces of the mass communication of the SI and to
use almost exclusively workers and small businessmen. At the same time, we should
greatly raise the decibels and the media and discursive presence of the government’s
social agenda.
There are of course, two distinct proposals here. The second reflects how the SI campaign
worked to convince voters that CAFTA would in no way endanger the institutions of Costa
Rica’s “social state.” Let us leave that aside for the moment and turn to the first part of this
proposal, to “use almost exclusively workers and small businessmen” as spokespersons for
the campaign. This recommendation was foreshadowed in an earlier part of the
memorandum, which we have touched on briefly. In this earlier part, Casas and Sánchez
discuss the need to “construct a social coalition in favor of the SI.” The most interesting
aspect of this proposal, however, is that they argue at once for the necessity and for the
practical impossibility of constructing such a coalition. The necessity is given by the alleged
impossibility of winning a struggle framed in terms of “rich against poor, and the people
against the government.” Citing a previous memorandum that one of them had written
during the prior presidency of Abel Pacheco, Casas and Sánchez invoke the memory of the
“‘combo’ in the year 2000, when the organization of the opposition had no more
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counterweight than the solitary voice of the government.” The cited memorandum from
2004 goes on to stress the urgency of forming a social coalition of the SI so that the public
knows that there are “two broad blocs of interests” rather than a simple opposition between
the people and the government, or the rich against the poor. They go on to note, however,
that there is now insufficient time left to form such a coalition—which, as we have seen, led
them to advocate the aggressive mobilization of the PLN. What is left, then, is the use of the
media to promote the appearance of such a coalition, by promoting working-class and small
business spokespersons.
While this strategy was not implemented in exactly the way that Casas and Sánchez
proposed, the narrative of a diverse social coalition of the SI was successfully established in
the press. No figure from the solidarity associations or small business became prominent.70
The president himself continued to be the most visible face of the NO in most public forums,
whether in visits to communities or factories or in the debates held in communities or on
television. Nevertheless, in a systematic review of reporting on the debate over CAFTA in La
Nación and Diario Extra, Sindy Mora and Anthony García conclude that the SI was
represented as a diverse movement “apparently without a clearly defined leadership.”
Although before the referendum the press normally cited figures from the government as
spokespersons in favor of CAFTA, in the period after the announcement of the referendum,
they began to characterize the SI in association with groups such as the Alianza Ciudadana
por el SI, the business chambers, or groups such as “campesinos” or “textile workers.” At the
same time, they observe that the NO campaign was reduced to the trade unions and the
leading figures of the opposition parties. Of the Comités Patrióticos there was only one
mention, by Diario Extra, and this was after the referendum (2008: 95-103).
Besides an unremarkable appearance from a small farmer in one of the debates on channel 13, I do not
remember any spokesperson for the SI from any sector besides the government or the chambers of
commerce.
70
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Although Mora and García do not relate these representations to the Casas-Sánchez
memorandum, the correspondence with the strategy proposed in that document is clear: the
SI is represented as a diverse social coalition, while the NO is exactly the opposite—a handful
of leading political actors representing parochial interests. This is in marked contrast to the
reality of the two campaigns. As we have seen, and by Casas and Sánchez’s own admission,
the SI campaign lacked a broad base or “social coalition” and was highly concentrated in the
circle of politicians closest to the president. The NO campaign, on the other hand, which
really was made up of a network of autonomous groups, was represented as a campaign
centralized in a few leading political figures. The signs of popular mobilization are here
reversed. But only to an extent, because the second move relied on a strategy of fear that
emphasized the maintenance of order and appealed to a deep-seated sense of anxiety about
the crisis of representative institutions and the “levels of confrontation that [Costa Rica] was
approaching.”

3. The Means
The SI campaign was based on the mobilization of concentrations of social power in
political parties, state institutions, private capital, and the media. It provides an important
example of how elections are shaped by these forms of social power, while also foreshadowing
the NO’s challenges to the referendum’s legitimacy.
Mobilizing the PLN
Casas and Sánchez observe that there is no time left to form a “social coalition” in favor
of CAFTA, and that they are effectively stuck with a “political coalition” (i.e., a coalition of
political parties) in which the PLN is “by far the most important actor.” However, they view the
party as affected by a “generalized attitude of indolence” and “confusion” that must be
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disciplined and set to work getting votes for the SI. They observe that there has been neither a
public official statement of the party’s support for CAFTA, nor a “clear directive to the structure
of the party,” which has resulted in “confusion among the leadership,” who, it is argued, “are
well aware…that there is a part of the party that is against the FTA.” Casas and Sánchez
recommend that the leading organizations of the party publically endorse the treaty, “with the
understanding that one of the greatest winners or losers of the referendum will be the PLN.”
This latter point raises the question of the degree to which actors on both sides of the debate
understood the legitimacy of the government to be staked on the referendum—a point to which
we will return below. But for now let us note that it is clear from Casas and Sánchez’s discussion
that the party as a whole was divided over CAFTA, and that not everyone saw their own, the
party’s, or the national interest as lying with the treaty. Some were still attached to the PLN’s
national, social-democratic roots.
This portrait of a party disorganized, divided, and ambivalent about the FTA contrasts
with my observations during the campaign. The unanimity in favor of CAFTA among the PLN
contingent in the Legislative Assembly—which, together with the president, effectively
constituted the public face of the party—was striking. Activists of the NO generally equated the
PLN with the SI, and considered the party as a whole to be either “neoliberal” or corrupt beyond
redemption. While I met one or two Liberacionistas who were opposed to the treaty, and there
were small contingents of Liberacionistas contra el TLC in the marches, those that identified
with the party were few and far between in the Comités and associated arenas (although there
were many who described themselves as former party supporters, which included such
important figures in the campaign as Ottón Solís and Eugenio Trejos).
Several high profile members of the PLN spoke out against the treaty. These included
Rolando Araya, the PLN’s presidential candidate in 2002, Luis Alberto Monge, president from
1982 to 1986, and Mariano Figueres, son of the party’s founder. Importantly, however, Araya
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and Figueres left the party soon after the referendum. I was aware of a few other figures from
the PLN in the NO. Roberto, the president of one of the unions at the ICE (the one who had told
me he was prepared to burn tires), proudly described his decades of work with the PLN in the
neighborhood where he lived (he described his job as counteracting the influence of
Communists), and recounted his personal relationship to Oscar Arias dating back to his first
presidential campaign in the 1980s. Carlos*, who was very active in the Comités described his
work to me in vague terms as a job that involved the PLN and community organizations
(another activist pointed to him as evidence that Costa Rica “still has caciques”). Oscar Campos,
president of the rice growers’ association, who became one of the higher profile spokespersons
for the NO, was also publically identified with the PLN. At the last I heard the latter two had
both left the party.
That there would be dissension over CAFTA in the ranks of a self-described social
democratic party that was deeply identified with institutions of the social state is not surprising.
More interesting is the tension between the lockstep unity of the PLN’s elected officials on the
one hand, and, on the other, public dissension among leaders together with Casas and Sanchez’s
complaints of partisan divisions and lack of enthusiasm on the ground. What it indicates clearly
is that the more neoliberal Arias faction had achieved control over the levers of power in the
party, but that some significant number of people retained a more traditional social democratic
orientation—both Roberto and Carlos complained to me of the power that the “neoliberals” had
achieved in the party.
Those who opposed the treaty publicly were those who had already passed the peak of
their careers within the party (e.g., Monge), were already identified with a counter tendency
(Rolando Araya, as well as Carlos, who was close to Araya), or who had bases of power in other
kinds of organizations (Oscar Campos, Roberto). Those with political careers before them were

132

more likely to express their antipathy or ambivalence in the form of “indolence,” or left the party
soon after.
So how was the PLN disciplined to fall into line with the Arias government and support
CAFTA? Besides the articulation of a clear message from the party’s leadership, mentioned
above, Casas and Sánchez propose sanctions for leaders and elected representatives of the party
that do not enthusiastically participate in the campaign and win votes for the SI; suggesting that
the cause of the party’s “indolence” is the perception that “the only one affected by a defeat
would be the president” and fear of the consequences of endorsing the SI in the next round of
elections, they suggest that it is necessary to “extend the circle of people that are ‘risking their
hides’ in this referendum….It is vital that they understand that it is they that will be directly and
seriously negatively affected [by a defeat].” In order to accomplish this goal, they suggest that
the mobilization of the party be backed by a program of sanctions:
It is necessary to make them [the 59 mayors of the PLN] responsible for the campaign in
each canton and to transmit to them, with all crudeness, a very simple idea: a mayor who
does not win his71 canton on the 7th of October will not receive a dime [un cinco] from the
government for the next three years. This same reasoning can be applied to the regidores
(municipal councilors), who can be made responsible for specific districts. In this latter
case it is necessary to remind them of their personal aspirations: the real possibilities of
their continuing as regidores, or ultimately becoming mayors or legislators, depend on
winning the referendum. This is not only because the performance of the PLN in the next
election will be very much affected by the results of this referendum, but rather because
this election is going to allow the highest authorities of the PLN to judge who’s made of
the right stuff to be a leader, and who isn’t. Many local leaders are not involving
themselves in the campaign in order to avoid ‘burning’ themselves before the next
election. The reasoning has to be exactly the opposite: he who does not involve himself
completely, ‘burns’ himself.
In this passage, at once sophisticated and “crude,” Casas and Sánchez suggest a strategy
based on clientelism in the distribution of public funds (mayors “will not receive a dime from the
government for the next three years”) and the exertion of control by party leaders over the
Note the Spanish su is gender neutral. I translated it as “he” because they use the masculine as the
default gender elsewhere in the passage. Also, cantón is masculine.
71
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process by which candidates are nominated and careers advanced. As I have discussed
elsewhere, protagonists of the Comités increasingly came to define their task as the
transformation of these mechanisms of partisan political control (Rayner 2008).
Most evident in the memorandum is the utilization of these strategies as mechanisms of
intra-party control in order to tame an ambivalent party (see also Martí 2008). It may be that
the problem of the Arias government in this matter was unusual, and therefore particularly
frustrating to Casas and Sánchez: apart from discontent over the nature of the FTA, the very
nature of the referendum contrasted with the normal ways of mobilizing the PLN as an electoral
party—in this case, there were none of the rewards that are normally to be had from gaining
elected offices. Accordingly, Casas and Sánchez are obliged to invoke the fate of party members,
and the party as a whole, in subsequent elections, as well as the disbursement of public moneys
in the meantime.
Finally, Casas and Sánchez recommend a more vigorous use of those parts of the PLN
most committed to the agenda of the SI. This begins, of course, with the Arias brothers
themselves, who are exhorted to take firmer control of the strategic planning of the campaign,
which they characterize as severely lacking. The highest functionaries of the government are to
travel the country campaigning for the treaty, particularly in the largest firms and those devoted
to export. As it happened, the president himself took on this role energetically, through a
program of inaugurations and visits to workplaces and communities (particularly the poorest
and most populous neighborhoods of San José; Raventós 2008:20). This complemented the
prior, more limited work that had been carried out since 2004 by governmental agencies such as
the Ministry of Commerce. Casas and Sánchez also make a high priority of “organizing a recess
in the Legislative Assembly” in order to allow the representatives of the PLN to organize the
campaign “on foot” in their communities. This, in fact, occurred when the Legislative Assembly
voted a recess at the height of the campaign. As we have seen, the unanimity of the government’s
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legislative bloc in voting on CAFTA suggests that this part of the party was firmly with the
government’s agenda, and therefore a natural basis from which to organize the campaign, even
if the PLN at the local levels remained not entirely trustworthy.

Exerting power through state institutions
Neither clientelism nor political patronage was purely internal to the party as an
electoral organization. Both also served as points of control at its margins. There was abundant
evidence of the use of public funds to induce support for the SI. In a video clip that was widely
circulated among the NO campaign, Arias is seen in a rural community saying “if you vote for
the FTA, we will build an airport.” Many reports concern the bonos de vivienda, funds to
improve substandard housing, which had long been notorious for the politically discretionary
way in which they were distributed as a matter of normal electoral practice.
Oscar from Barrio Sur recounted to me how his mother, as an activist for the PLN, was in
charge of distributing these funds after elections. Members of a Comité Patriótico told me that
they had been working with a member of the PUSC to plan electoral strategies for the NO
campaign. She had drawn a map of the neighborhood indicating the various houses and who
needed what, suggesting that the Comité would do well to offer bonos to house X or Y—they
laughed not only at the matter of fact way in which this suggestion was put, but in her
incomprehension of the fact that Comité had neither resources to offer nor electoral spoils to
promise. I had my own experience with these practices, when I accompanied some university
students door-knocking in a moderately low-income neighborhood in Pavas for the NO
campaign. This particular neighborhood was widely regarded as a bastion of clientelism, which,
almost alone among San José’s neighborhoods, had voted for Arias by a resounding margin in
the 2006 election. Sure enough, at three separate houses we were told that the family had been
135

offered bonos de vivienda in exchange for supporting the campaign. This relationship was not
uncomplicated, however. As one couple told us, “they’ve been telling us the same thing for years,
and we keep voting for them, but look at this house!” Perhaps more significant, this couple and
their adult son were both informed and interested concerning the issues involved in the treaty,
although they were struggling with competing accounts and were highly ambivalent. While it is
clear that clientelism in the distribution of public resources was an important tool of the SI
campaign, it would, I think, be a mistake to interpret the result principally in these terms, as
some in the NO campaign were wont to do.
Casas and Sánchez also make a passing reference to the use of “key” public institutions to
generate and distribute information favorable to the SI, “e.g. the ICE, CCSS, AyA, MTSS,” to
counter information being distributed by the unions “in their own installations” (emphasis
theirs). This passing suggestion towards the end of the document is more interesting than it
might seem at first glance. With the exception of the MTSS (Ministry of Labor and Social
Security), these are all autonomous institutions, theoretically independent of the direct control
of the executive branch, although since the 1970s the degree of independence had been reduced.
Indeed, Casas and Sánchez seem unsure as to which of these institutions can be counted on to
carry out this task, indicating that the administration’s ability to involve these institutions in the
campaign is far from guaranteed.
Nevertheless, the administration of these institutions did work to support CAFTA. The
head of the CCSS served as spokesperson for the SI in one of a series of highly-watched
television debates about the treaty. The administration-appointed head of the ICE, Pedro Pablo
Quirós, also spoke publically in favor of CAFTA. More subtly, perhaps, workers at all of these
institutions complained of the pressure to support the treaty. The ICE, at the center of the recent
upsurge in contention since 1995 and the most directly affected by CAFTA, was particularly
conflicted, and employees particularly at the administrative levels complained of a politicization
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of the career ladder and violations of the norms governing hiring and promotion. Certainly,
however, none of this was very effective at dampening opposition to CAFTA from the ICE’s
unions during the referendum campaign. And in contrast to the other institutions mentioned
above, the climate within the ICE was broadly and openly opposed to the treaty. (As we will see,
however, the situation after the referendum was a different matter).
Perhaps more important is the charge that the influence of the Arias government
extended into another autonomous institution, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (Supreme
Electoral Tribunal, or TSE), and another branch of government, the constitutional court. We
have already seen that the TSE decided in favor of a presidential referendum over the citizen’s
referendum that had already been set in motion. This decision, whatever its merits, was followed
by a series of others of an even more controversial nature. In April of 2007, when the TSE
received the various petitions for a referendum on CAFTA, the law of referendums had only
been in existence for one year, and the TSE had not yet defined the regulations to govern such
an election. As a result, they were left to define these regulations in the months between April
and June (Raventós 2008:16), in the context of a looming confrontation over the treaty to which
the referendum was likely to provide the resolution. Moreover, both the SI and the NO
campaigns made numerous challenges concerning the conduct of the other party during the
course of the referendum, challenges which the TSE was obliged to decide without the
guidelines of precedent. As these decisions unfolded, many within the NO became increasingly
convinced that the TSE’s decisions were systematically biased against them.
The rules governing campaign contributions were loose and subject to few of the controls
that apply during normal elections, which allowed the SI to obtain an astounding advantage in
financial resources (Cortés 2008; Martí 2008; Raventós 2008). Secondly the TSE issued rulings
that restricted the ability of both the universities and the Church to participate in the campaign,
on the one hand, while permitting president Arias to campaign for the SI, on the other. Notably,
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this latter decision violated long-standing rules prohibiting the participation of presidents in
election campaigns (Cortés 2008; Raventós 2008). Finally, the US ambassador was allowed to
freely advocate for the SI, despite a constitutional prohibition against the participation of
foreigners in domestic politics.
The effect of these decisions was to muzzle two institutions identified with the coalition
of the NO while giving free rein (contrary to all precedent) to the principle spokesperson for the
SI. The public reaction from the Church was muted, but the decision against the participation of
the universities provoked an intense reaction from the NO campaign, particularly students. For
months, a large mural depicting the muzzled visage of Rodrigo Facio Brenes, one of the founders
of the University of Costa Rica, loomed over the entranceway to the main campus. Thousands
joined a spirited march from the University of Costa Rica to the administrative headquarters of
the TSE. While these measures did not have the effect of overturning the ruling, they evidenced
the fact that the NO campaign was not simply organizing for a vote against CAFTA, but also
mobilizing against a set of state institutions that they increasingly felt to be deliberately arrayed
against them.
The constitutional court also took a number of controversial positions that favored the
SI, most notably the decision, in a closely divided vote, that CAFTA was compatible with the
Costa Rican constitution. Without taking on the variety of arguments for and against the
constitutionality of the treaty, the divided decision was taken by many in the NO, at least, as
further evidence of Arias’s influence with the courts, which, it will be recalled, had recently taken
the unprecedented decision to allow him to run for a second term. Whatever the degree of
executive influence over each particular institution, taken together the picture does suggest that
the Arias government wielded a significant amount of power within a variety of institutions that
were constitutionally supposed to be autonomous or independent of the executive, and that this
degree of influence or control had important implications for the relative power of the parties to
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the referendum. Activists of the NO campaign complained that the “institutionality” had been
“hijacked” (secuestrado).

The alliance with capital
A principal theme of the Casas and Sánchez memorandum is the fear that the Arias government
is in the struggle alone. Notably, however, they define their closest partner as big business,
“there is just the government, and, more or less (a medias), los grandes empresarios.” It is
difficult, on the face of it, to judge just how “a medias” is “a medias.” Casas and Sánchez base
their plans around the assumption of the active cooperation of the owners and managers of large
firms. Moreover, there is evidence that this cooperation was extensive. In the first place, the SI
was clearly well-financed, even if no one knows precisely how well, or by exactly whom. Los
grandes empresarios are essentially the only actors with this kind of disposable cash. The group
“por Costa Rica” (“for Costa Rica”) maintained a constant campaign of billboards and television
ads in favor of CAFTA from 2004 to 2007, with funding from unknown sources (Raventós
2008:20). During the referendum campaign, another group, “Alianza Ciudadana por el SI”
(“Citizen’s Alliance for the Yes”) brought together political and business leaders to coordinate a
large (exactly how large is unknown) quantity of private contributions (Martí 2008).
The heads of the principle business associations made repeated public pronouncements
and participated in public forums and debates in favor of the SI. Among the strongest advocates
of the treaty was the Amcham, or Costa Rican-American Chamber of Commerce. Amcham
describes itself as an organization that unites business from the US and Costa Rica to promote
bilateral trade and investment, and boasts of a membership of “400 companies and 1300
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corporate representatives divided equally between Costa Rican and US interests.”72 Many in the
NO suspected that this organization was a conduit for US-based capital to contribute to the SI—
although as we have seen, US-based capital operating in Costa Rica had remarkably little at
stake in the treaty. It is worth noting, as well, that the organizations which, it can be supposed,
served as conduits for business support for the campaign had close links to the Costa Rican
government. Por Costa Rica had among its directors the negotiators for the treaty from the
government of Abel Pacheco, while the ex-legislator Alfredo Volio—designated by President
Arias—headed the Alianza Ciudadana por el SI (Martí 2008:5).
Capitalists’ control of the workplace—and of the possibility of work itself—was at least as
significant. Casas and Sánchez advocate an aggressive plan of workplace visits by high-level
government functionaries:
In this moment, the space for proselytizing easiest to take advantage of, and the one that
offers us the most opportunities, is, by far, that of the businesses…. We should organize a
systematic effort to visit the biggest enterprises in the country, with talks in favor of the
SI given by high-level persons and with documentation in hand. No effort at
proselytizing is potentially as effective as this one….the campaign should contact the
businessmen so that they authorize the space for the talk….the business immediately
sends a letter to the Ministry of Planning asking for the government to send a
representative to talk about the National Development Plan or the vision for the future of
the country or something of that nature (this is to cover our backs with the TSE)… If 30
functionaries visit 10 businesses a week, it will be possible to cover nearly 2,500
businesses in the next 8 weeks. Emphasis should be placed on the largest and those
devoted to exports. What is important, in any case, is to ensure that the government
leaders and legislators do not travel with the President. This is an unjustifiable waste of
time and effort.
Indeed, just as Casas and Sánchez suggested, government officials, including the president
himself, toured the country campaigning in workplaces (particularly the large, export-oriented
concerns) in favor of the SI. The ability to directly engage a captive audience of workers was a
key resource provided by capital to the SI campaign that was simply not available to the NO.
http://www.amcham.co.cr/about_amcham.php (As late as 2010 Amcham still had a prominent
webpage devoted to resources in favor of the SI and a committee to monitor implementation of the
treaty).
72
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Moreover, giving the talk in the very workplaces allowed the government’s message that the
future of employment depended on a vote for CAFTA to augment more immediate threats from
employers themselves. Even without the presence of the government, owners and managers of
diverse businesses spread the message to their workers that if CAFTA did not pass, they will
have to shut their doors, leaving the workers unemployed. This campaign seems to have
extended far beyond the sectors that really faced some danger to their export markets in the
event of a failure of CAFTA to pass (essentially the garment assembly industry). On a visit to the
pineapple-exporting region of Guápiles, in the Atlantic Province of Limón, where I
unsuccessfully attempted to attend a campaign event for the SI, I happened to pass by the rear
of a supermarket. There, hung from a stairway in the area where workers unloaded deliveries,
was a large banner that read “our jobs depend on the FTA.” Of course, CAFTA would have little
to do with the jobs of these workers (although it is possible that the supermarket would benefit
from lower import duties, making the US-made goods that they sold more competitive with
domestic products sold in small neighborhood groceries and markets).
The Asociaciones Solidaristas (Solidarity Associations) also carried the SI’s message to
workplaces. The Solidarity Associations are employer-sponsored organizations that provide
services such as savings and loans to workers of a particular firm, as well as organizing joint
assemblies for employers and employees (in 1990 the International Labor Organization ruled
that laws favoring these associations constituted a violation of workers’ rights to organize
independently). In 2005 there were 1,142 Solidarity Associations workplaces throughout the
country with more than 200,000 affiliates (as opposed to 280 unions representing 160,000
workers), concentrated in the larger concerns from banana plantations to fast food restaurants
to private sector banks (Abdallah n.d.). Casas and Sánchez seem to view them as a symbolic
force, with the potential to give a more working-class face to the SI campaign, since they
advocate promoting some figure from the ranks of Solidarismo to national prominence to serve
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as a spokesperson for the campaign. Some indications of the role of the Solidarity Associations
slipped out into the public: the solidarity association for the AM/PM (a US-based convenience
store chain) hung a large banner supporting the SI in downtown San José. A communiqué from
the national Solidarista umbrella organization argued for the SI in the most strident possible
terms. The communique claims that CAFTA is necessary to build on Costa Rica’s legacy of social
welfare and to guarantee employment, and goes so far as to warn that the flow of migration from
Nicaragua to Costa Rica would reverse itself if the NO were to win (thereby playing skillfully on
national prejudices). They also work to equate the SI with the hard working majority and the NO
with a minority opposed to the progress of the nation (Movimiento Solidarista 2007).

The Media
Perhaps the greatest power of the SI, however, lay in the media. Casas and Sánchez argue that
given the urgency of the situation, “we should have no modesty (pudor) whatsoever in
saturating the communications media with publicity.” Saturation is certainly the correct term:
during the referendum campaign—and even afterwards—it was impossible to pass by a
newsstand (much less pick up a newspaper), turn on the television, or even walk down the
street, without being confronted by some aspect of the debate over CAFTA. In most—but
certainly not all—of these forums the message of the SI predominated.
The SI’s dominance in the media can be understood as another manifestation of the
influence of the Arias government in other institutions of the state and its alliance with largescale capital. The latter provided the resources necessary to saturate the media with paid
advertisements, to a degree that was simply impossible for the NO campaign; according to a
count made by Semanario Universidad, of the 1,444 television advertisements related to the
referendum, 1,319, or slightly more than 90 percent, were for the SI, while the NO was able to
place a mere 125 (Cortés 2008: 39). My own review of newspaper advertisements in the two
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most-circulated papers (La Nación and Diario Extra), reveals a less overwhelming, but still very
significant imbalance between the two campaigns (more so in La Nación).
Paid advertisements were only part of the story, however, as positions favorable to the SI
also dominated the reporting of news and opinion. This was evident to me at the time but was
also confirmed by the TSE; in a count of news items “favorable to” the SI or the NO, the TSE
found twice as many reports favorable to the SI as to the NO on two of the three principal
broadcast channels, including the transnationally-owned Repretel (channel six)73 and the stateowned Channel 13. As for the third channel, the domestically owned Teletica (channel 7), the
TSE found that slightly more than half of the news reports “favorable to” the NO—but the overall
volume of news considered by the TSE to be partial to one side or the other was much less than
its competitor, Repretel (Cortés 2008:40-1). It is worth noting that the greatest inclination
towards the SI was found on the news reporting of the public-owned television network
(SINART), which can be taken as another indication of the dominance of the Arias government
over nominally independent state institutions. Indeed, many complained about political
repression on the public airwaves, most notably the cancellation of the show Diagnostico and
the firing of its principal reporter, Alvaro Montero Mejía, early in the Arias administration.
During much of my years of fieldwork in Costa Rica, supporters of the show held a regular silent
vigil outside of Oscar Arias’s house to protest its cancellation (as well as other issues).
From 2007 through 2009, I carefully read and annotated the two principal Costa Rican
newspapers: La Nación, which has long been the dominant organ of educated public opinion,
and the upstart tabloid Diario Extra, which had experienced a steady rise in readership since
the late 1980s. These two accounted for nearly all of the readership of daily papers in Costa Rica
during the time of my fieldwork, with the rest mainly accounted for by two tabloid papers

As of the early 2000s, Repretel was owned by a transnational media conglomerate based in Mexico
(Rockwell and Janus 2003).
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established by La Nación in an attempt to compete with Diario Extra (Cortés 2008: 36). I also
consistently read El Financiero, a specialized publication of Grupo La Nación devoted to
business, and Semanario Universidad, whose minuscule circulation was somewhat
counterbalanced by occasionally hard-hitting investigative reporting and its significance for
activists of the NO, particularly those most closely affiliated with the universities. It was this
paper, for example, which acquired and leaked the Casas-Sánchez memorandum. La Nación, as
well as El Financiero, had an editorial line in favor of CAFTA and consistently presented
reporting that favored the SI in ways both more and less subtle. A few weeks after the
referendum, a reporter from La Nación recounted to me how the climate at the newspaper had
been strongly in favor of the treaty, which was assumed to be an evidently rational stance that
was simply beyond politics. The tabloid-style Diario Extra, on the other hand, had much more
balance in its editorials and reporting, including frequent extended interviews with opponents of
the treaty (particularly those representing the public sector trade unions). Taking the circulating
papers as a whole, however, the tendency for reporting was strongly in favor of the SI, with some
space opened up for perspectives from the NO in Diario Extra and Semanario Universidad.
Moreover, Diario Extra’s substantial circulation was counterbalanced by its lack of intellectual
legitimacy, since it was generally regarded as a paper devoted to the details of crime scenes and
daily features of young women in bikinis.
Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the SI’s dominance of information and
public culture was far from total. While Casas and Sánchez do not seem particularly concerned
with Extra much less Semanario, they are very concerned by the relative successes of the NO
campaign in two areas: the radio and the distribution of explanatory literature in the form of
flyers. They suggest that their “weakness in rural areas” may be principally a product of the SI’s
lack of presence in the radio. In Costa Rica, as in the other Central American countries, radio is
much more decentralized in terms of ownership and programming than television or
144

newspapers (Rockwell and Janus 2003). The relative weakness of the SI in this medium is a
reflection of the extent to which it was a campaign that worked through control and influence
over a small set of powerful organizations of great size and reach, while the NO was a far more
acephalous coalition of small-scale organizations—which could more easily gain access to a local
radio station than to a major television network or newspaper conglomerate.
This was all the more the case with the production and distribution of flyers. Casas and
Sánchez complain that the NO has “the whole country papered over with flyers.” They advocate
the generation, production and distribution of “easily-digested documentation.” They do not,
however, specify by whom the flyers should be distributed. This, I think, was the principal
problem and the reason that I rarely saw flyers for the SI during the campaign: the NO
campaign had the country “papered in flyers” because they had an activist base that spent
months doing little else but making, copying, and distributing flyers and hanging up posters.
The distribution of graffiti tells a similar story: rarely did I see graffiti for the SI, but in every
corner of the country slogans such as No al TLC (and some more creative ones, as well), were
scrawled in spray paint on walls, bus shelters and even on the outside of the Legislative
Assembly. This may or may not have helped the NO campaign electorally, but it indexes the
numbers of people they were able to mobilize to act in opposition to CAFTA—as well as the
desperation to compete with a saturated media environment with whatever means at their
disposal. Finally, it is also worth noting at this point that the quantity of the SI’s messaging was
not the only issue; as we will see in more detail below, the NO campaign mobilized a good
proportion of Costa Rica’s intelligentsia and was able to count on passionate advocacy carried to
a diversity of situations—from debates and forums in community centers to conversations with
neighbors—that may have been more persuasive to many than the centralized means of
communication employed by the SI.
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The SI at the Grassroots
Casas and Sánchez oriented their memorandum to a large degree around their concern
for the lack of a “social coalition” in support of the SI campaign. Even before I read the
memorandum, however, my attempts to observe the SI campaign in action had convinced me of
the same—aside from the ever-present discourse in favor of CAFTA in the newspapers and on
television, the SI was remarkably difficult to find in the flesh. Part of my difficulties certainly
concerned the fact that from the outset of my research most of my contacts led towards the NO
campaign and I had many fewer leads to the SI. Nevertheless, in my efforts to keep up with the
events of the NO, I easily found a website that listed a multitude of events, from leafleting to
public lectures, to rallies. The SI campaign did have a site that attempted to provide the same
information, but there were far fewer events listed and those that were present often lacked
contact information or detailed locations. In one episode, I took a bus to Guápiles in the Atlantic
province of Limón in order to attend an event billed as a “conversation” between a legislative
representative from the PLN and “workers.” I arrived an hour early at the hotel where the
conversation was going to take place, briefcase in hand. After several hours of waiting, however,
no one showed up and I returned to San José. Several months later, the representative who was
to participate in the event emailed me to explain (very amicably) that he was very sorry but the
event had been cancelled.
My attempts to accompany the SI campaign leafleting in the neighborhoods were met
with similar problems—phone numbers that were not answered or that led to uncooperative
receptionists or cancelations. The SI campaign seemed either closed or non-existent. In light of
Casas and Sánchez’s memorandum, I am inclined to think that both were to some degree true.
While the SI campaign lacked a broad “social base,” the base that they did have, was, in their
own words, stricken with “a great lack of motivation [and] disoriented by the absence of a
campaign.” And unlike the NO campaign, the mobilization that did exist for the SI did not rely
146

on recruitment through public forums and an open and diffuse network, but worked through the
parties (particularly the PLN) and the workplace. It was considered a truism among supporters
of the NO that those who did work for the SI campaign (for example, by passing out flyers) were
paid, rather than volunteers like themselves. Certainly, at least some people who were paid to
campaign for the SI, but they also had volunteers.
The “Students of Private Universities for the SI,” as they described their group to me,
gathered with a large box of flyers on the pedestrian boulevard in central San José. Both of the
young men with whom I engaged in extended conversations that day were activists in the youth
wings of the PLN and PUSC, respectively. They certainly struck me as passionate about the
importance of their cause.
Other than the “Students of Private Universities for the SI” I encountered a relatively
large group of supporters at an event in Cartago organized to commemorate independence from
Spain. The president and other representatives of the government were to speak, and a large
contingent of activists from the NO had arrived in carpools and public buses from San José to
join activists from Cartago, largely students from the local technical university. The NO crowd
was boisterous and the president could barely be heard over the chanting of “NO al TLC”—
immediately after the event the NO crowd broke off to begin an impromptu march through the
streets of Cartago. Some distance away, a group of SI supporters had been quietly watching the
speeches. They were identifiable by identical t-shirts and little else—there was no chanting, and
no handmade signs or banners. They arrived and left on what appeared to be chartered buses.
Certainly not university students, by their clothing and comportment they gave every indication
of being a working-class constituency. Most palpable, however, was the contrast with the
boisterous, passionate, insurgent style of the NO.
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4. Conclusion
The strategy to “stimulate fear” is not a mobilization of fear of the state’s capacity for
violence, although in the Costa Rican context successfully identifying the NO with communist
subversion and an attack on democracy and “institutionality” could—and did—generate fears of
more diffuse social repercussions, including in the workplace. Rather than working to make
citizens afraid of the state, Casas and Sanchez sought to make them afraid of the NO, above all
by inducing the specter of the inability of the government to maintain order and to “govern,” to
define a “sense of direction” for the country, and to implement policies favorable to “economic
stability”- that is, appealing to their desire for a state capable of maintaining order not as and
economic government. The violence to be feared is the violence of the NO, and it is to be feared
primarily as a part of the larger potential to produce disorder. In the Costa Rican context few
could realistically be made afraid of suffering bodily harm from the NO: “Violence” is rather a
metonym for disorder, whose principal referent is the contentious tactics such as road
blockades, strikes and demonstrations, which used the body to interrupt the normal course of
circulation, to such effect in the movement against the Combo in 2000. Although the connection
is left unstated, this appeal to the threat of disorder, ungovernability, and economic instability is
perfectly consonant with the first pillar of the strategy of fear: the fear of unemployment as a
consequence of the rejection of CAFTA. Together they form a narrative of disorder and
economic decline.
The appeal to the authority of those in government reiterated a longer-standing theme in
the conflict with opponents of liberalization. Typically, this authority was equated to democracy
itself. In the struggle over the Combo, the leading newspaper had opined that the
demonstrations, strikes and road blockades mounted by the opposition were anti-democratic
because they allowed “grupos de presión” to interfere with the work of the people’s elected
representatives. This logic could be extended even to the disapproval of the voicing of dissent
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from the decisions of the judiciary: the complaints from the NO about the decisions of the
constitutional court and the TSE were often labeled as anti-democratic and threats to the
institucionalidad. The attempt to equate the NO with subversion and opposition to democracy
worked by the same logic—it played not on their participation in the referendum, of course, but
on the current of antagonism to the political and economic elites that animated the opposition to
neoliberalism and to CAFTA; to convert the strength of the NO as a (rhetorical) movement of the
poor against the rich into a weakness, while shoring up respect for the authority of political
elites.
This strategy was effective, because unlike blunter appeals to the authority of the
government it touched on an area of ambiguity—if not a contradiction--in liberal democratic
thought: What is the ethical responsibility of a democratic subject vis-à-vis elected authorities
and the laws that they create and execute? Moreover, in the “campaign of fear” Casas and
Sánchez provide the seeds of a pragmatic answer to this perennial dilemma, an answer which is,
in its broad outlines, strikingly similar to the one offered by Carol Gould (1988); the authority of
the elected leaders is necessary to maintain an orderly democracy in which all can participate
(by voting), and no one will be pushed aside by the “violent” tactics of mobilized “pressure
groups.” This is not an argument for democratic authority based in some fiction of a social
contract or a doctrinaire liberalism, or even, fundamentally, in authority as its own justification
(although there is certainly some element of that): it is rather oriented to appeal to a “social
democratic” and developmental worldview and structure of feeling. While it was most likely the
argument about jobs (and the timely intervention from the Bush administration on that
question) that won the referendum, this appeal to the authority given by the electoral process
did do its work, which was particularly evident in the wake of the referendum.
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Chapter 4

NO
Populism Horizontally

It was not just CAFTA that was at stake in the referendum. Alejandra*, an open source
software activist, explained to me that “if the NO wins, Arias will have to resign and we’ll have a
constitutional convention.” 74 Victor*, claimed a few days later that “Arias will lose all legitimacy,
and Costa Rica will take a new turn towards Latin America.” The sense of political possibility
expressed by participants in the NO emerged, in part, from the apparent vulnerability of the
established order of political power, which had recently been soundly defeated in the events of
the Combo. But Alejandra, Victor and others were also moved to imagine new political
possibilities by the experience of participation in the horizontal and decentralized NO campaign,
an experience which inspired many of its participants to imagine—and feel—the possibility of a
more egalitarian, participatory political order.
Although the NO was certainly decentralized, it was much more than an aggregation of
distinct constituencies, or “multitude” of “singularities.” The NO represented and imagined itself
as the authentic political expression of the pueblo (people). It was a demos forged in antagonism
with domestic political and economic elites, the US government, and transnational capital. “The

Marc Edelman points out that a constituyente (constitutional convention) has been a regular feature of
Costa Rican political discourse for some time, perhaps influenced by the example of the events of 1948
(personal communication). It seems to me that this sense that the form of the republic is mutable implies
a much more active sense of popular sovereignty—a much more democratic imagination—than the
fetishization of the constitution as Holy Writ that characterizes so much political discourse in the United
States. Some on the contemporary right in the US like to remind us that the Founding Fathers considered
the US to be a republic but not a democracy.
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people” had “finally woken up.” This collective was at once distinguished and animated by its
patriotic corazón (heart). In this chapter I aim to show how the autonomous exercise of political
agency within a broader collectivity imagined as an “awakened” people created the possibility
for a renewal and reinvigoration of the democratic imaginary.
I think of the NO as “populist” in a delimited sense inspired mainly by Ernesto Laclau’s
(2007) analytical use of the term. Laclau characterizes populism as a process wherein
heterogeneous social actors achieve political unity by: (1) projecting their diverse aspirations
onto a shared (“empty”) signifier; and (2) using that empty signifier to create an “internal
frontier” within the social order that opposes a new unity (e.g. “the people”) from some other
that is excluded from it (e.g., “the oligarchy”; 2007:77-96).75 This may or may not be a useful
framework for interpreting other movements that have been described as populist (although I
suspect it is a useful starting point)—but I do find this concept of populism helpful in
understanding how a heterogeneous coalition provisionally created a sense of unity and shared
identity in the NO.
However, the signifier is rarely if ever empty to begin with, and its content at the outset
matters (a point acknowledged but perhaps insufficiently treated by Laclau; e.g., 107-8, 217). In
this case, it was vitally important that the signifier was a negation (“no”), and that what was
being negated was the “TLC” (CAFTA). The movement worked as a decentralized, horizontal,
and networked movement in good measure because it was saying ‘no’ to something as large,
ambiguous and consequential as the FTA. And the NO was filled with meaning and made
charismatic by the collective action of its protagonists. In these “moments of madness” when “all
is possible” (Zolberg 1972:183), social relations appear open to transformation as new political
subjects are created and historical possibilities are reimagined. It is also an opening to the
Laclau’s “empty signifier” may be a leader such as Juan Perón (2007:216-17), and Laclau in fact
suggests an inherent tendency for the “singularity” of the people to eventually find expression in the
individuality of a leader (100). The decentralized and horizontal character of the movement built around
the NO challenges this conclusion (without, of course, disproving it).
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agency of new political actors. This sense of empowered agency was notable among protagonists
of the NO.

1. Organizing the NO
Trade union, campesino, and environmental organizations, as well as students,
academics, artists and musicians, had been proselytizing and organizing in opposition to
CAFTA, in some cases since 2003. The PAC, now the second largest party in the legislature, had
made opposition to the treaty a defining issue, as had PASE and Frente Amplio, each of which
had a representative in the Legislative Assembly. So, too, had a range of left-leaning, communist
and Trotskyist parties, which claimed small but dedicated groups of supporters (typically
university students). Several informal coordinating bodies brought together leading figures in
these organizations, making for a kind of patchwork of partially-overlapping organizational
networks without much in the way of a defined, much less authoritative, centralization.
These forms of coordination built on the networks formed during and after the Combo
(interview, Eva Carazo, May 21, 2009). One of the most important was the Comité de Apoyo de
la Lucha contra el TLC (Committee to Support the Struggle against the FTA). The Comité de
Apoyo chose Eugenio Trejos, the until-then little-known rector of the National Technical
University as its spokesperson. Ottón Solís, as the almost-was president and the leader of the
largest opposition fraction, had a certain gravitas and authority that might have made him a
natural candidate for this position. In fact, when it still looked like CAFTA might not be
approved in the legislature, Solís had met with Arias in the presidential palace with purpose of
negotiating their positions on CAFTA. As a spokesperson for the movement as a whole, however,
Solís was too polarizing a figure because of his identification with one electoral party, as were
the trade union leaders. Eugenio Trejos himself told me that he was brought in to “de-unionize”
the face of the NO (interview April 2, 2009). As a mild-mannered and conciliatory academic and
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university administrator, who nonetheless was known for publically confronting advocates of
the SI, Trejos would bring intellectual prestige and allow the NO to align itself with the
universalism of a scientific and technical opposition to the treaty, as opposed to the particular
interests that were routinely attributed to the trade union leaders and politicians. He explained
to me that he was disposed to be a conciliating figure that could dialogue with all parties. For
many of the same reasons, however, Trejos was more a spokesperson than a leader of the NO.
Leadership was fragmented in a variety of distinct organizations and forms—trade unions and
political parties, priests and ministers, intellectuals and artists.

Organizing the Comités Patrióticos
Confronted with the presidential referendum, this decentralized opposition was faced
with the task of converting itself into an electoral campaign, essentially overnight. According to
Trejos, leading figures of the opposition to CAFTA concluded that the NO campaign needed
something like the territorially-based partisan committees that were used to mobilize voters for
elections (interview, April 2, 2009). These were the Comités Patrióticos.
Reflecting the multiple constituencies and decentralized leadership of the NO coalition,
the organization of the campaign consisted of the creation and interweaving of networks, rather
than the mobilization of existing large-scale organizations and concentrations of social power
that characterized the SI. The basic method employed in organizing the Comités was the phone
tree: as one activist involved in the early organizing efforts explained it to me, “We sat down in a
room together and we asked each other, ‘who do you know in this canton? Ok, call them and see
if they can organize a meeting’ ”—and so on down the line, by telephone, word of mouth, and
internet.
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The SI had organization and resources but, it would seem, little enthusiasm, while raw
zeal was the principle resource of the NO. The decentralized and volunteer driven organization
was made possible by a groundswell of popular initiative, which meant that there was a large
constituency of people looking to become involved or already acting on their own. The task was
largely to pull people together. Benjamín from Barrio Sur, explained to me that before joining
the Comité he had begun to design, print and distribute his own flyers, based largely on
information he received from the unions on the ICE’s company list-serve. Members of this same
Comité spent several nights hunting for “the guy that had put up all the posters.” Ricardo,* often
with his wife and teenage children, had dedicated his nights to printing and hanging posters for
the NO in the neighborhood. “We asked around, ‘who was this guy who was putting up all these
posters’? We found someone who had seen him, who said that he went out to walk his dog every
night over by the EBAIS [clinic].” Eventually they found him out walking his dog, and persuaded
him to come to the Comité .
But while raw enthusiasm played an important role, partisan, union and other
organizations and networks were also fundamental in the organization of the Comités . Party
militants (usually of the PAC, sometimes the Frente Amplio or a regional party) were at the
nucleus of most of the Comités that I knew best. In three cases that I know of, the Comités built
on existing partisan committees (in two cases these were committees of the PAC, in another a
municipal-level party). However, in each case the Comité broadened its membership to include
supporters of other parties, as well as persons without partisan affiliation. In rural areas,
campesino organizations, including UPANACIONAL (mainly in the Central Valley) and
FEDEAGUA (principally in Guanacaste), among others, seem to have played important roles
from very early on. Two leading figures from UPANACIONAL claimed in interviews that the
Comités of their districts were almost synonymous with the memberships of their organization.
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Other kinds of networks were important as well: much of Liberia’s Comité , for example, was
formed by the students of one particularly dedicated high school teacher.
Precisely because of the decentralized nature of the movement, no one knows exactly
how many Comités Patrióticos there were, much less how many people participated in them.
Estimates by those closest to the organizing are about 180. In my experience, the Comités had
anywhere from fifteen to forty people attending any given meeting before the referendum. On
voting day, the NO, mainly via the Comités, mobilized thousands of officially registered
observers to monitor the vote and untold other volunteers (at the commencement of voting the
NO had observers at 88 percent of the polling stations, as opposed to only 58 percent for the SI;
OAS 2007:12). Within this total was a rather smaller core of more dedicated activists that met
regularly, about ten per Comité on average, for a few thousand in the country as a whole.
Although these numbers might not seem particularly large, in a country with a population of
some four million, they constituted a significant force, particularly when their high level of
enthusiasm is taken into account.
Both the enthusiasm of opponents of CAFTA, and the density and extension of the
networks—which together enabled the organization of the Comités and the NO campaign—
reflected the recent history of organized challenges to liberalization initiatives and the political
dominance of the PLN and the PUSC. The campesino organizations that participated in the
organization of the NO campaign in rural areas included many of the same actors involved in
conflicts over liberalization of the agricultural sector in the 1980s (see Edelman 1999). More
recently, the opposition to the Combo had forged cooperative relationships between groups that
previously had not worked together, particularly trade unions and environmentalists, and had
inspired and given confidence to opponents of liberalization. Meanwhile, the rise of the PAC had
created a new partisan network that was broadly opposed to CAFTA.
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The Comités, however, represented a distinct form of organization, qualitatively different
from those that contributed to their formation. They were territorially-based, autonomous
spaces of organization, with only the most informal kinds of leadership, and they tended to
adopt decisions by processes of deliberation and consensus. To a significant degree, the
autonomy and egalitarianism of the Comités reflected the circumstances of their emergence: the
diversity of organizational affiliations (and ideological orientations) within the Comités worked
against their subordination to any single organization. Moreover, the PAC, the largest party
within the coalition of the NO, was itself a recent creation with little organizational structure of
its own, and its leadership did not possess the means to promote much partisan discipline.
Participants in the Comités were concerned to keep the peace between distinct political
orientations and affiliations—which, I think, underlay much of the tendency towards
deliberation and consensus—in order to make the Comités a workable space. Both the urgency
and the passion of the campaign to oppose CAFTA and the single and immediate focus that that
issue provided the basis for unity. This is not to say that there were no conflicts, both of a
personal and political nature. Members of the self-described revolutionary left parties (mostly
Trotskyist) tended to remain outside of the Comités. María, a militant from one such party
recounted to me that her presence at the meetings of the Comité Iglesias (which included mainly
people affiliated with the PAC and Frente Amplio) had become untenable due to what she
described as the aggressive anticommunism of one of the members, a devoted activist of the
PAC.76 By and large, however, at least in the period before the referendum, the Comités served
as spaces where people with distinct political affiliations could work together in the common
cause of opposition to the FTA. Protagonists of the movement were often more excited by the
Comités than the other organizations that they had previously worked with. The possibility of
autonomous agency was highly valued by many participants and contributed to their sense that
76

My fieldwork with this Comité occurred after María had already ceased to attend meetings.
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they were part of something historic and unprecedented. We will see how this experience
resonated after the referendum, when participants in the Comités hoped to make of this novel
organizational form a base from which to forge a “new way of doing politics.”

Composition of the Comités
Decentralization, differences between contributing organizations, networks,
neighborhoods and regions, as well as the distinct personalities of key protagonists, made for
variation in the composition and functioning of the Comités. Overall, however, there seem to
have been some notable consistencies in the make-up of the Comités across neighborhoods and
regions.77 There was a clear preponderance of current or former public sector workers, with a
large representation of unionized employees of the ICE, as well as high school teachers and
university professors. Students in public secondary schools and universities were also well
represented. A heterogeneous mix including NGO workers, liberal professionals, and small
business owners rounded out the bulk of the rest. Campesino activists were important in rural
areas. Markedly absent, however, were employees of larger private-sector firms, particularly
those involved in export industries.
This was a movement, then, largely composed of educated professionals and students,
with many ties to the public institutions within which members of the Comités were very likely
to work or to study. This pattern tended to hold regardless of the class composition of the
neighborhood, although professionals in the more working-class neighborhoods tended to be
from more working-class or campesino backgrounds.

An unpublished survey conducted by Ciska Raventós lends some support to these observations,
although it is without statistical validity, given the problems of sampling and a low response rate.
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157

2. The Campaign
The beginning of my fieldwork in August 2007 coincided with the high tide of this
electoral work. The energy was impressive. The Comités held regular weekly meetings beginning
around seven in the evening and continuing for two, three, or sometimes four hours, as
participants negotiated the innumerable details of a day of door-knocking or poster hanging, an
electoral caravan, a training session for electoral monitors, or the preparation of transportation
and food for supporters and activists of the No campaign on the day of the vote. Because I had
participated in several “initiative” (citizen referendum) campaigns in California in the 1990s, the
broad outlines of this work were familiar to me, although I was struck by the breadth and depth
of participation, and the autonomy with which protagonists of the NO acted as individuals and
Comités, whether deciding where they were going to knock on doors and what they were going
to print on their leaflets.

Making a Counter-Public
One of the principal activities of the NO was leafleting. Activists of the Comités cobbled
together flyers, stickers, posters and other materials from a variety of sources, some distributed
by the public sector unions or the opposition parties, others produced by the activists of the
Comités themselves. Members of the Comités went out to the street clutching stacks of flyers
from diverse sources explaining the anticipated drawbacks of CAFTA in areas as diverse as
telecommunications, healthcare, undersea resources, and export assembly. They knocked on
doors to explain in their own terms what the “free trade” agreement would mean for the country.
The issues were extremely complex and the debate evolved rapidly. In participating in these
door-knocking sessions (and in one appearance on community radio), I found myself compelled
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to counter a representation of US foreign policy emerging from the Bush administration,
struggling to explain why I felt it was unlikely that Costa Rica’s failure to approve CAFTA would
result in forfeiture of their existing access to the US market. The same issue was handled in a
slightly different way by an activist of a Comité Patriótico in the rural province of Guanacaste,
who recounted to me using a stick to draw a pie chart in the dirt yard of a humble rural home, to
explain what percentage of Costa Rica’s exports to the United States entered under which trade
regime (see chapter one).
The system of public education also provided a platform and a forum for the opposition
to CAFTA. Students and educators from the public secondary schools, universities, and technical
institutions formed a substantial base of the Comités and the movement of the NO more
broadly. The commission created by the University of Costa Rica had declared CAFTA
unconstitutional on numerous counts (UCR n.d., see chapter one). The University of Costa Rica
sponsored a student-run program of informational kioscos (kiosks) staffed by volunteers, which
travelled the country distributing explanatory literature on themes such as “the FTA and
employment” with the university seal on it and responding to questions. The information
presented was highly critical of the treaty, and the UCR effectively lent its substantial prestige to
the NO campaign.
The Church, named as part of the coalition of the NO in the Casas-Sánchez
memorandum, was much less visible than these other organizations and actors. In part, this may
be because the Costa Rican constitution prohibits the involvement of the Church in elections,
which was enforced by a kind of gag-order from the TSE during the campaign. The Church
maintained an arms-length skepticism, reiterating the importance of not sacrificing “the social”
for “the economic,” although some actors in the Church denounced CAFTA more forcefully.78 A

For more forceful statements of opposition, see e.g. a series of editorials from the Catholic newspaper
Eco Católico, reprinted as appendices in Lizano 2005 (65-70).
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few priests were relatively high profile opponents of the treaty, most notably the (retired) Bishop
Ignacio Trejos. Many of the most dedicated activists of the NO in Liberia in Guanacaste were
affiliated with the Pastoral Social although this entity was essentially an NGO that was relatively
independent of the Catholic Church hierarchy. The mainline Protestant denominations
(Lutheran, Episcopalian, Methodist, etc.), however, stridently denounced the existing record of
FTAs as “incompatible with the development of human life” and rejected CAFTA on “theological
grounds” for a long list of reasons including “accelerating the impoverishment of the people.”79
While the congregations of the mainline Protestant churches in Costa Rica are small, the
Lutheran Church and the Quakers provided space for meetings, forums and other events that
were important to the campaign.80
Opponents of CAFTA made extensive use of forums, film presentations, often held on
church grounds or in the salones comunales (community meeting centers for neighborhoods
and villages). On any given day in September, for example, it was possible to pick between ten
such events—mostly, but not all, in the Central Valley—that were publically announced and
circulated through email and on websites (as well as through word of mouth or flyers). Many
FTA opponents who could claim some degree of intellectual authority juggled work and family
responsibilities in order to be able to travel the country giving talks about the treaty. I
accompanied Pablo*, an employee in human resources at ICE and an activist with ASDEICE,
one of the institution’s umbrella unions, on a trip to a rural community located near La Fortuna
in San Carlos, several hours drive to the North of San José. The talk had been organized by a
friend of his, a schoolteacher currently living and working in the community. After several hours
of driving along winding mountain highways we arrived at the salón comunal where the talk was
Carta Pastoral de la Secretaría Regional para Mesoamérica del Consejo Latinoamericano de Iglesias
(CLAI): Nicaragua, Costa Rica y Panamá. Montes de Oca, Costa Rica, 2004.
79

The position of the mainline Protestant churches may have been more directly influential in Limón
where many are of Anglo-Caribbean heritage.
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to be held. There was quite a large turnout for a small community, perhaps twenty-five or thirty
people. Pablo had prepared a series of PowerPoint slides and went through the probable effects
of the treaty for domestic agriculture and small business. It was well-prepared and well
delivered—indeed, as he explained to me later, he had given the same talk a number of times,
most recently in Buenos Aires, an impoverished town in a pineapple-producing region near the
border with Panama.81 We arrived at his house well past midnight, thoroughly exhausted, and
parted ways so that he could get a few hours of sleep before returning to work at seven the
following morning.
A particularly memorable debate took place in the main Catholic church of Barva, a
suburb of Heredia (a city in the San José Metropolitan region). The large church was filled to
standing room only with a visibly excited crowd by the time I arrived. The event was billed as a
debate between Mario Devandas, an economist and prominent opponent of CAFTA, and Alberto
Trejos, one of the negotiators of the treaty. In the event, however, Alberto Trejos, sent a
replacement in his stead, a young man in an executive business suit that contrasted with
Devandas’s assertively casual attire. The debate moved quickly over a vast array of topics, as
debates over CAFTA tended to do. What was most striking, however, was the reaction of the
audience, which booed and jeered the representative of the SI with mounting enthusiasm as the
event progressed, despite his pleas to maintain “peace in the house of God.” By the end of the
debate, the crowd had grown so unruly that the representative of the SI was simply shouted
down during his closing statement.
This was not normally how these events went (it certainly contrasted with the much
more subdued—even boring—debate over the consequences of CAFTA for the electricity sector
that I had recently attended in a Catholic church in San José). The debate in Barva occurred a
Curiously to me at the time, the audience was rather more interested in asking Pablo about the ICE. My
perception at the time was that this was less a reflection of this being a predominant concern of the
audience, and more a way of attempting to understand and gauge Pablo’s interest in the treaty.
81
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few days after the release of Casas-Sánchez memorandum, and relatively late in the campaign, at
a point when the NO was mobilized and outraged. But what it shows as well is the extent to
which such public debates and forums had been appropriated by the NO campaign to form a
kind of counter-public to the spaces occupied by the SI. The NO organized and participated far
more in these kinds of events, which allowed them to counter, to some extent, the SI’s
dominance in the traditional media—although at the risk of sometimes organizing events purely
for the choir.

Confronting Class Divides
The Internet was an important resource in organizing this alternative public, through
emails and websites that circulated information about forums, debates, and meetings of the
Comités , as well as working as an important public arena for the NO in its own right. The fact
that the NO employed the Internet in organizing to a much greater extent than the SI reflects its
decentralized and voluntary character. In contrast to the SI campaign, events and even
organizing meetings for the NO were easily found through a simple Google search, often
including the names and telephone numbers of contacts in the Comités as well as public
announcements of the location of their meetings. On the other hand, this openness has to be
tempered with the fact that Internet users were still a minority defined by class, education, and
urban status. Use of the Internet both reflected, and helped to shape, the relatively middle-class
profile of much organizing for the NO campaign. Similar observations can be made for the use of
the Internet as a public forum. The NO dominated the SI in blogs, websites, and You-Tube
videos. While this allowed for the mobilization of the multitude of energized opponents of the
FTA, its audience was limited. It must be noted, as well, that the Internet provides for a degree
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of segregation of publics that the television (and particularly broadcast television) does not,
meaning that it may end up as preaching to the choir.
The ability of the NO campaign to construct alternative publics, the form that these
efforts took, and the content that they brought to them, were shaped by class, region and the
urban-rural divide in other, fundamental ways. As described above, the Comités had a very
significant participation (if not a preponderance) of persons with advanced education and
professionals. This provided the NO with important resources: the capacity and the confidence
to understand and interpret the highly complex, often technical issues raised by the treaty, and
to speak with authority in a variety of public spaces; sometimes in the newspapers or on
television, more often in classrooms, in a salón comunal, or at a neighbor’s door. It facilitated
the autonomy of the Comités, by equipping the participants to encounter the treaty on their own
terms, to explain the treaty, to design their own flyers. To be clear, this is not to say that a formal
education is necessary to do these things—some of the most cogent speakers on these issues had
very little formal schooling—but that it made it easier.
At the same time, for the same reason, the encounter between the NO campaign and the
voting public was sometimes an encounter between people in differently located in the class
structure, even if the distances between were often small. What I saw of the NO campaign—
which notably did not include the efforts of campesino organizations—seemed to be shaped by
the worldview of the Costa Rican middle classes closely tied to the public sector, and accordingly
tended to emphasize the social state (see also, Cordero 2005). The SI campaign, on the other
hand, was hammering home a simple message: without the FTA there will be no more jobs, and
you will likely lose the one you have. This is a theme that hit close to home with people
confronting a labor market that offered few opportunities to those without English language
fluency or specialized technical skills.
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I accompanied activists from the NO campaign on several missions to low-income
communities, including Pavas near San José, the Costa de Pájaros in Puntarenas, and the
maquilas outside of Heredia (where we leafleted to workers as they left the factories). Activists
from San José targeted these lower income communities because they felt that they did not have
access to critical sources of information on the treaty, and were vulnerable to manipulative
clientelist political relationships. In Pavas, we had few involved dialogues with voters at the
door, but when we did, employment and “progress” seemed to be their primary concerns. One
man simply told us to go away, “I want this country to progress,” he said, with contempt. In this
case, the person I was door-knocking with was extremely well-informed on the debate over
employment and could engage people on the fate of the maquila sector in El Salvador and other
related issues. In Costa de Pájaros, an impoverished coastal community in the Pacific province
of Puntarenas, the story was similar. Here I mainly accompanied Ronald, a young militant from
the PAC, as we went door to door. Ronald mainly talked about the future of the welfare state
institutions. “In Costa Rica, we can drink and bathe with the tap water. In other countries of
Latin America, you can’t do those things,” he explained. He argued that the SI was intending to
undo the legacy of “Calderón and Figueres, each of whom, in their own way, brought great
benefits to the country”—a framing that he justified to the others on the trip with the perception
that people in such communities responded to these founding figures of the twentieth-century
partisan order (which also encompass the full range of traditional partisan loyalties—see
introduction).
This discourse could seem patronizing: to two women resting on the porch of their
humble home, he claimed that “in other countries of Central America, you would not be able to
read this literature. It is because of our social model that you have the education to read these
pamphlets and understand what the FTA implies.” For the most part, those whom we talked to
listened politely and took whatever literature was offered. When people did respond, their
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expressed concerns were with “progress” and “jobs.” The group sat down to talk with an
evangelical pastor who they believed to have a lot of influence with the community (we were
working together with a local high-school teacher who had mobilized his own coterie of student
volunteers for that day). The pastor responded to the concerns advanced by the members of the
Comité : “the people from the SI say that this will bring jobs. We need jobs. Look around here.
Here we have nothing. What we need is progress.” At a certain point, I suggested to Ronald that
perhaps it would be better to talk to people about the consequences for the fishing industry. He
agreed “you’re absolutely right” but was at a loss about what to say. Later, during our
confrontation with the local representative to the legislative assembly, a man from the
community, told us off: “You’re not talking about what matters to us. What about the market for
our shrimp? How will that be affected?”

How to Get on Television
The NO campaign had more difficulty getting its message into the mass media. The first
obstacle was a lack of money. Some of the larger trade unions, and to a lesser extent the PAC
and other parties within the NO, provided a degree of support to the Comités , most (if not all)
support “in-kind” in the form of flyers or t-shirts. The Comités ’ regularly “passed the hat” to
collect small donations of 1,000 or 2,000 colones (about $2-$5) at a time, while some
participants would discretely contribute larger amounts, say, by paying for a run of photocopies.
The Comité Juanito Mora received much of its financing in the form of several hundred
dollars sent by someone who had migrated to California (members of the Comité liked to
observe that they were being “financed by the United States”). In another case, a small business
owner confessed to me that he financed much of his own Comité by clandestinely charging
customers bearing stickers for the SI a “solidarity tax” of 10 percent. Supporters of the NO
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sought to encourage donations through the campaign Al NO Financio Yo—literally “I finance the
NO,” but with much of the semantic sense of “the NO is financed by me.” The slogan, printed on
stickers and widely distributed, served not only to encourage contributions to the NO, but also
to mark the difference between the grassroots, self-financed NO and the well-resourced SI.
This particular campaign was linked to a fund dedicated to raising money to put
commercials for the NO campaign on the television. But once sufficient funds were collected,
Teletica (the most widely viewed channel) claimed that it “no longer had time available.”
Eventually, Teletica relented—a decision which Alejandra, who was involved in the negotiations
with the station, attributed to the recent release of the Casas-Sánchez memorandum and the
station’s embarrassment at being linked too closely to the SI. Even with the space opened up,
however, financial limitations meant that the NO was only able to place one television ad for
every ten run by the SI (Cortés 2008:39).
The NO campaign also entered the public through the employment of a classical social
movement tactic: congregating in the streets. This was something that the NO, with its energized
base of supporters, excelled at, in striking contrast to the SI; as Casas and Sánchez drily put it,
“[organizing marches] is an area in which we always have problems.” In addition to the large
mobilizations that preceded the announcement of the referendum, several large marches and
rallies were organized during the course of the campaign, including the march to defend the
autonomy of the University of Costa Rica and a protest against Oscar Arias at the independence
celebrations in Cartago.
The high water mark of these mobilizations—and for many, the climax of the movement
of the NO as a whole—was the march organized for the 30th of September. The march served as
an act of closure to the campaign before the period of officially-decreed “truce” in the week
preceding the vote, and more importantly as a demonstration of the numbers and commitment
of the NO. Participants were unanimous that it was the largest march in living memory. Equally
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impressive was the energy of the crowd, in two senses: first, for the raw enthusiasm. The crowd
regularly broke into spirited chants of “No, no, no al TLC.” They sang and clapped and cheered.
Those whom I knew were energized, jubilant—the very size of the crowd seemed to confirm what
the polls were increasingly indicating as a possibility: the triumph of the NO. More profoundly,
however, this very triumph would be much more than a vote against the treaty; it would be an
unprecedented victory of “the people” against the “politician-entrepreneurs” in the government,
an upending of the existing order of political power and representation. Here, in this very space,
was this demos made evident, tangible and real. And it roared. The energy was also visible in the
diversity of autonomous initiatives at the rally. There was the central stage, with its leading
figures giving speeches. But far more compelling was the assemblage of diverse autonomous
initiatives on display. The march and rally was thick with handmade banners and signs,
costumes and masquerades. Below we will take a closer look at how these energies were
expressed, and how the particularities of autonomous initiatives were forged into a sense of a
unified whole with universalistic aspirations.

3. The People against the Powerful
The NO campaign advanced sophisticated arguments against the content of CAFTA, in areas
ranging from telecommunications to intellectual property law to domestic agriculture to
maquila exports (see chapter 1). At the same time, however, the NO advanced a set of messages
that were less technical and more purely political in content, in that they referred to the
relations of power between political blocs in antagonistic confrontation with each other. It was
this message of confrontation between “the rich and the poor, the people and the government,”
which was most threatening to the SI. It was particularly threatening not only because it was an
“effective” message in the sense of being one that was persuasive to the “voting public,” but
because it was a message that mobilized new political subjectivities and practices. It mobilized
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because it allowed the NO to define itself as a unified political community with a distinct
antagonist, the SI, and to constitute itself as a demos in the classical terms of populist
movements: the people against the powerful. Once it became a demos, the NO was potentially
destabilizing beyond the confines of the referendum, CAFTA, or the Arias government,
threatening to reconfigure the relations of political representation in which the “PLUSC” sought
to pursue the politics of liberalization that were increasingly understood within the governing
circles all over the world as transparently rational. Their response was to embrace
“irrationality” and the defense of law and order. Predictably, the exposure of the SI’s strategy
upon the leaking of the memorandum inflamed supporters of the NO and deepened their
resolve; above all, the Casas-Sánchez memorandum confirmed the identity of their own
movement by making the elite, and unethical, nature of their opponent manifest.82 Because the
NO was defined by its antagonism to the SI as much as by its opposition to the terms of the
treaty itself, the release of the memorandum helped to consolidate the identity of the NO. The
memorandum and the “campaign of fear” became, accordingly, central to the discourse of the
NO.
At the same time, the NO as a demos had its points of weakness and instability—which
the SI was quite adept at exploiting. While it had a broader social base than the SI, the
movement was far from a universal expression of the nation, and its claims to represent the
people always required symbolic work, which was sometimes more, sometimes less successful.

The relationship is essentially that of the “constitutive outside” that Chantal Mouffe, drawing on
Derrida, argues is necessary for the formation of political movements (2009).
82
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‘NO’ as Affect
The NO’s version of the people against the powerful was sometimes phrased in exactly
those terms: “this is a struggle of the people against the politician-entrepreneurs.” But more
common were one of a number of auxiliary representations, which followed from and supported
this larger point. These can be grouped into a few themes, each of which I briefly illustrate with
a representative slogans from the NO campaign:











The SI is trying to win through intimidation and fear; “no tengas miedo”/ “no
tenemos miedo” (don’t be afraid/we are not afraid)
The SI is corrupting the institutions of the state; “es una institucionalidad
secuestrada” ( the institutional order has been hijacked)
The SI is lying to us; “no comas cuento” (don’t swallow the story), “SI guevón”
(yeah right, dumbass).
The SI will dispossess us of what’s rightfully ours; the SI are “vendepatrias”
(country-sellers), “el ICE no se vende” (the ICE is not for sale)
The struggle against CAFTA is a defense of the nation against an invading force
bent on domination and exploitation; “es la hora de Juanito Mora” (it is the
moment of Juanito Mora, the president who led the Costa Rican army to victory
against William Walker’s Filibusters in 1856)
The SI are unethical and seek only their own gain, whereas the NO are motivated
by solidarity, patriotism, love of country and compatriots; “mi corazón dice NO”
(my heart says ‘no’)
The NO is the authentic voice of the nation; “Costa Rica dice NO al TLC”

In order to clarify these points, I will discuss a few examples of how the NO articulated
these messages, beginning with two advertisements that the NO was able to circulate on
television—projects that demanded a great deal of effort and resources.
The first televised advertisement is particularly interesting because it draws explicitly on
the NO’s capacity for collective action to compensate for a paucity of monetary resources. The ad
opens with a grey-haired man—whom many viewers would recognize as Rubén Pagura, a singer
and poet—talking to the camera. He is wearing a NO t-shirt, standing in a park. Behind him
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people also in t-shirts are milling about. He says: “because we want a country that is free,
healthy, of clean people (gente limpia), of honest people.” As he reaches the word free, the
camera cuts to the Costa Rican flag waving against the sky, then pans down to linger on the man
waving it, surrounded by other supporters of the NO. As Pagura finishes, the camera cuts to a
woman in a red shirt, who says: “So that they don’t take away what is ours.” Drums and whistles
begin sounding in the background, slowly gathering momentum, as the camera switches
between images of supporters of the NO and close-ups of the various NO’s emblazoned on their
t-shirts. The camera settles on a group of children, four or five years old. One of them says: “life
cannot have a price.” Back to cameos of supporters of all ages and colors. Each one smiles at the
camera while waving an index finger at the camera, no, no, no. A message flashes on the screen
advertising the upcoming rally in San José. The tempo and volume of the drums and whistles
increases. The crowd can be seen engaging in some kind of coordinated movement in the
background, but it is not yet clear what it is. The camera switches back to two youths standing in
front of the crowd: “No comás cuento”—“don’t swallow the story”--they say, stern faced. Then
pans to an old woman, “vote no, don’t let them fool you.” Suddenly the camera cuts to a view
from the air. The crowd, with their red, white and blue t-shirts, has been choreographed in the
shape of the logo of the NO, the N plus the heart for the ‘O,’ in the colors of the flag. They jump
up from a crouch on the ground in unison, cheering, as the drums and whistles reach a
crescendo. As the camera holds the image of the crowd from the air, the cheer becomes a
chant—impossibly loud, as if the whole world was shouting at once: “NO, NO, NO al TELECE.”
The ad, while sophisticated in its conception, was anything but slick in execution. The
people are awkward and unrehearsed. This is a meeting of ordinary people of all ages, a rally in
the park, with a twist that demonstrates their unity as part of the NO. Pagura’s opening
reference to “a free country” of “clean” and “honest people” is a clear salvo at the SI, at the
corrupt politicians, at the campaign of fear. It urges defiance: do not be deceived, do not let
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them take what is yours or subject life to monetary values. There was some controversy over the
amount of money spent on the making of this ad, and some had been skeptical that it would be
possible to get that many people together to cooperate on something so complicated—but in the
end their ability to do so was part of the message. People were proud to have pulled it off.
A second ad that appeared on television takes up and elaborates on the theme of the
heart. It opens with a simple message on a black screen: this advertisement was made possible
thanks to the donations of 210 Costa Ricans through www.concostarica.com. In fact, those that
were involved in making this ad had to fight with Teletica to be able to lead with this message. It
was intended not only to encourage donations, but more importantly to mark the difference
from the SI campaign—the same purpose, essentially, as gathering people in the park on a
Saturday afternoon.
The ad itself opens with the image of a young woman in a simple white blouse against a
plain background. “In life you will know many hearts. Loving hearts, generous hearts, good
hearts,” she says gently. As she speaks, the camera moves quickly through images of hearts;
emblazoned on romantic cards, hanging from a rear-view mirror, cut out of construction paper
in the hands of a child. “Hearts that look for other hearts,” she continues, as the camera passes
over an image of a golden locket on a woman’s chest, then settles on the statue of Jesus in the
central market of San JoséJosé. The camera zooms in on the heart of Jesus as she says, “hearts
that sacrifice for others.” An image of the yellow hearts that the ministry of transport paints on
the road when a pedestrian is killed; “hearts that make us remember.” Then the music becomes
suddenly ominous. “But there are selfish hearts, hearts that want power, hearts that do not think
about you.” As she says this, the camera shifts between images of stickers saying “my heart says
SI.” Then it switches back to the narrator, “my heart, in contrast, is a heart that loves our
country.” Cut to images of posters saying “my heart says NO, and yours?” The music becomes
inspirational, as the narrator concludes, suddenly emphatic, “This is my heart, the heart of the
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NO, a heart that wants Costa Rica to keep beating. On the seventh of October, we have to
decide.”
The message here is more unified, and on the face of it, simpler: the NO is made up of
people who care about others and the national community, the SI is made up of selfish powerseekers. Almost as an afterthought, it suggests that deciding in the referendum—presumably
voting “No”—is an ethical obligation. But the emphasis is clearly on the difference between the
kinds of “hearts” associated with the NO and the SI, rather than the treaty itself. The primary
work that it does is to position the NO as the expression of an ethical self, and to distinguish the
bloc of the SI as made up of unethical people. This contrast between ethical people, people with
solidarity, and selfish people was a recurrent theme in my conversations with activists of the
NO. By placing the SI beyond the community of people with good hearts, it works to universalize
the NO. This is not a community of interests, it is a community of all good people who love the
country. At the same time, the SI is motivated by their selfish interests, including the desire for
power itself.
This way of drawing the distinction between the SI and the NO in ethical terms became
more common after the leaking of the memorandum. For example, a full page newspaper ad
taken out by supporters of the NO in Diario Extra points out that the SI has a strategy to pursue
a campaign of fear, but then asks, “what interests are behind this that could motivate them to
do such a thing?” The ethical failings that they suggest are evident in the employment of a
campaign of fear are given as evidence of the existence of shadowy interests. This also serves to
constitute the NO as the representative of the people in general, the demos: those that have
hidden interests are distinguished from the people, almost by definition. This theme was again
ubiquitous among activists of the NO. Those who were really behind the SI were said to be those
in a position to benefit from the liberalization of telecommunications and insurance, and the
sugar interests, which included Oscar Arias himself.
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Among the messages that had most resonance, however, for the people I was working
with was a simple You Tube video created by a young man named Manginho. It is a monologue
delivered as he walks down the beach, with the sound of the waves behind him. It begins like
this:
Hi, my name is Manginho. Today I have come to give you a message from the heart.
I’m not going to put on a chonete [canvas hat] and try to fool you saying that I’m a
campesino. Nor am I going to say something incoherent, like telling you that a heart of
the SI has fallen in love with a heart of the NO…. I’m going to be sincere with you: my
heart says sí-- Sí guevón!
The phrase sí guevón means something like, “yeah right, dumbass,” making the monologue
an ironic statement of the lack of credibility of the SI. But the rhetorical force of the
statement comes from the particular usage of guevón, a superlative form for huevos—eggs or
in this case, testicles. Guevón therefore literally means “one who has big balls,” but is used to
describe someone who is lazy, stubborn, and does not live up to expectations. It is usually
part of the run of friendly insults and teasing between young men known as choteo. 83 But in
this case, Manguinho follows guevón with an extremely offensive gesture referencing
penetration, instantly pivoting from an expression of skepticism associated with choteo to an
aggressive rejection of his interlocutor’s (the SI’s) whole person. It achieves devastating
effect by converting the language of masculine intimacy into an aggressive challenge.
Sí guevón instantly became another unofficial slogan of the NO campaign, repeated
in conversations, made the punch-line of jokes, diffused on signs, buttons and stickers. The
monologue went on to satirize the television ads of the SI, with its romantic relationship
between a male hippie NO heart and an attractive, intelligent female SI heart, and it ends
Two different persons separately recounted to me that the guevón is someone whose balls are so big
that they are rendered immobile. As for the choteo, it is not uncommon for young men to greet each other
as carepicha (dickface), while the ubiquitous informal address mae comes from maje a mildly insulting
term equivalent to “idiot.” The whole dynamic reflects a very particular alternation between the most
casual and most formal forms of address that characterizes Costa Rican Spanish.
83
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with a call to “say no to Yankee imperialism” on the day of the referendum. At its core the
video and the slogan express defiant outrage at being the object of manipulation and
deception. Again, it referred not so much to the treaty itself, as a relationship to the SI. As a
humorous yet deeply angry statement, it struck a chord with the structure of feeling in the
NO campaign. They were not going to be pushed around, or taken for fools.
Defiance also lies behind the exhortations and claims to resist the campaign of fear.
NO tengas miedo (don’t be afraid) and NO tenemos miedo (we are not afraid)—proliferated
in paid advertisements and handwritten signs in the wake of the leaking of the CasasSánchez memorandum. Rather than reassuring messages to assuage fear, these slogans
worked to reiterate and publicize that there was “a campaign of fear” going on and to declare
their defiance of that campaign.
This was, however, only one aspect of the NO’s messaging. Much of it concentrated on
the technical aspects of the treaty rather than the more purely political question of the
relationship between these blocs. The NO had a lot of intellectuals in its ranks—including
“traditional intellectuals” from the University and even the Church, as well as many more
organically linked to the development of the forces of production—above all engineers, who in
Costa Rica often worked for the ICE or other public institutions (cf. Gramsci 1971:5).
Intellectuals of all kinds advanced powerful arguments against the treaty in books,
debates, and flyers. Legal scholars took out wordy paid advertisements in tiny fonts on the
constitutionality of CAFTA (while the SI printed visually simple advertisements asserting that
the institutions of the welfare state were safe, or equating the victory of the NO with government
by trade unionists and communists). There was also technocratic element within the NO,
particularly from the ICE, that promoted planning and technical competence against politics.
But all of this was in the context of a movement that was experiencing new forms of political
engagement, the constitution of new alliances, and new political subjectivities. Making a demos,
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however, involved a claim to a certain provisional degree of universality. Below, I will explore
the possibility and conditions of that claim in more detail.

Some Limits and Contradictions of the Coalition
As we saw in the preceding chapter, the SI campaign and its allies in the media worked to
reduce the representation of the NO to a few handpicked figures, particularly from the public
sector trade unions and the left. In doing so they responded to the success of the NO in
organizing a popular coalition that unified distinct constituencies as the people in opposition to
the powerful. The NO was a broad coalition, and it did mobilize, in a most impressive way, the
energy and passion of a diversity of actors “at the base.” But the NO’s claim to represent the
people (el pueblo) was also a representation that had to be constantly defended in the face of the
evolving attempts by the SI to challenge and undermine it. The claim to represent the pueblo
was not just “framing” directed outside the movement, it was a part of protagonist’s evolving
political identity. They were part of a patriotic struggle for the nation. Allegiance was more to
the idea of the people and the nation, or even Latin America as a whole, than to any particular
group to which they might belong.
At the same time, they were aware of the fact that the movement of the NO as what we
might call a political bloc did not encompass the totality of the people, even if the political and
economic elites are excluded from that category and lumped in with the gringos and
transnational capital. In fact, I was often told by middle-class activists that it was essentially a
middle-class movement. “The middle is against, the very rich and the very poor are in favor of
the FTA.” This perception informed attempts to reach out to more “marginal” constituencies.
Importantly, this attempt to extend information to these communities also reveals that they
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were not considered to be natural constituencies of the SI. On the contrary, they were with the
SI because they were being lied to or their votes were being bought.
It is difficult to exaggerate how important and common this refrain was. The idea that a part of
the “people” might actually have an interest in the FTA was effectively banned from discussion.
This was not a product of an analysis of the treaty in economic terms—after all, it would be hard
to deny that at least some constituencies, such as garment industry workers, might reasonably
have an interest in the passage of CAFTA. Rather, this was essential to the imagination of the
NO as the authentic expression of the people. The tension between the particularity of the NO
and the universality of the nation was resolved by the conviction that the people in its authentic
expression said “no.”
Partly because of this analysis (and because of the results of the 2006 election), urban
protagonists of the NO misread where the weaknesses and strength of their political coalition
was. As the voting results would indicate, it was in fact much stronger in rural areas, particularly
where there were still campesinos producing for the national market, and much weaker among
the urban middle classes, especially those that worked in the private sector—a reasonably
predictable result based on the kind of appeals that the campaigns were making (see chapter 1).
There were also fractures within the movement. The successes of the liberalizing bloc in
discrediting the public sector trade unions, as well as longstanding antipathy to the Left (see
introduction), meant that there was pressure within the NO campaign to de-emphasize or
obscure elements of its coalition to the public, as well as internal tensions. The NO had both
Marxist-Leninists in the tradition of León Trotsky and heartfelt anticommunists (some people
even accused the SI or Oscar Arias of being Communists).84 These fissures would become more

I was present when one (well-educated) woman made this claim, which was greeted by derision by the
others present. Organizers in Guanacaste told me that they would sometimes encounter this sentiment in
rural areas: it was explained to me through the equation, bad=communist, bad=sí, therefore
sí=communist—but there may have been more to it.
84

176

significant after October 7th, when opposition to CAFTA in the referendum was no longer the
defining political option to make the people.

Out of Many, one ‘NO’
In this subsection I will discuss how the relationship of particularity and universality was
worked out in the march of the 30th of September. I chose this particular place and time because
I would argue that this was when the reality of the demos constituted by the NO seemed most
tangible and real, when, through sheer numbers, they seemed to approach the totality of the
people.
Through their signs, participants manifested the presence of the Comités representing a
variety of distinct locations—albeit heavily weighted to the Greater Metropolitan Area and the
Central Valley. The diversity of hand-painted signs, banners and costumes with their unique
messages more profoundly expressed the autonomous energies that were brought to the
campaign.
This diversity was manifested, however, in relation to an encompassing commonality.
The union colors that had been so prominent in the march in February were replaced with white
t-shirts emblazoned with the symbol of the NO. It is likely that this change reflected, in part, a
conscious decision to move away from the liabilities attached to the particularity of their
constituencies’ interests. But more fundamentally it evidences the degree to which the NO had
created, through the Patriotic Committees and other forums, new political institutions with
more universal aspirations, with new unifying principles.
There were also fundamental commonalities underlying the diverse messages, which
together positioned the nation as struggling against the gringos and the government. Moreover,
there was a tendency to claim to speak for a particular community. To bring the sum of the
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communities to the nation, a particularity that contributes to a greater unity. By claiming to
represent a particular community, they could claim to contribute that community to the national
public. Zarcero and Barrio Sur are against the TLC, so together, the nation is against it. The
change from sectoral to territorial representation is significant. The nation can be disaggregated
into territorial units making no reference to distinctions of interest, and out of these
homogeneous building blocks, a nation and a popular will.

4. Contention over the Ballot Box
While the strategy of the SI campaign included representing the NO campaign as a threat
to democracy, activists of the NO considered that the SI was corrupting democratic institutions
and were convinced that they would commit outright electoral fraud if given half a chance—
perhaps harkening back to the long history of contention over fraud that culminated in the civil
war of 1948.
As we have seen, the referendum law was untried and the TSE was still making up the
rules as the campaign advanced, a subject of constant contention. The activists of the NO
launched numerous challenges to the electoral practices of the SI, but as time went on became
more and more convinced that the deck was stacked against them. They organized protests
against the decisions of the TSE, including an early symbolic protest by a group called “the
Women in White,” and later a large march from the University of Costa Rica protesting
asymmetrical rulings that restricted the ability to use resources of the UCR to inform voters of
the university’s position on the treaty, while allowing the participation of President Arias in the
SI campaign, against all precedent.
The demands of organizing electoral monitoring consumed a great deal of energy. As in
many other places, ballots are counted by partisan volunteers at the voting table, which ideally
should place the vote count under the watchful eyes of members of all parties involved in the
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election (although in practice, mobilizing enough partisans to carry out the count at every voting
station is difficult, particularly for the smaller or newer parties). In the case of the referendum,
which was not, in theory, a partisan election, the TSE nevertheless decided that the monitoring
should be organized and carried out by the political parties (Raventós 2008:24). This decision
provoked some conflict within the Comités, as it allowed those affiliated with the PAC, in
particular, to claim control over the organization of electoral monitoring. Nevertheless, the PAC
was incapable of organizing enough fiscales (monitors) on its own—as had been demonstrated
in the 2006 elections, when the PAC had not had enough fiscales to cover all the polls. And in
any case, the supporters of the PAC were already collaborating with others in the Comités . The
organization of the vote monitoring was, then, largely taken up by the Comités , even as they
continued to present the monitors by party in order to achieve official recognition from the TSE.
As voting day approached, the responsibility of recruiting and training fiscales to
monitor and count votes took up an increasing proportion of the time and energy of the
Comités. Numerically speaking, a majority of those who participated in the Comités did so
primarily as fiscales: they arrived at the Comité for one or two training sessions, and served a
few hours on a table the day of the election. With the influx of volunteers and fiscales the
number of participants in the Comités swelled in the weeks before the referendum. I routinely
went to meetings in which there would be 30 or 40 persons present. On the day of the vote, the
NO mobilized nearly twenty thousand fiscales and many more volunteers. In the rural canton of
La Cruz, Guanacaste, where I worked as an election monitor, there were two observers at every
voting station, usually a university student or a high school or elementary school teacher.
While it seemed that the NO campaign was being forced to divert crucial resources from
the work of electoral proselytism, those with whom I raised this concern argued that the
monitoring was an appropriation by the people of democratic accountability, as well as an
absolute necessity given the conviction that the governing parties would steal the vote if they
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could. The experience of the contested presidential election of 2006, when the PAC had been
unable to mobilize the necessary number of observers, weighed heavily on some people’s minds
as they contemplated the possibility of electoral fraud. Sociologist Ciska Raventós suggested to
me that monitoring was a way of reclaiming political practice from the traditional political
parties and institutions (personal communication). It may also have given people a tangible way
to feel involved in the historic referendum that, for whatever reason, may have been more
satisfying to some than proselytism.
I suspect that there was also a performative aspect to the attention to monitoring. It
dramatized distrust in the politicians. I was recruited as an election monitor for the same
reason. The important part was “being there,” not that I would find anything. Similarly, bringing
in foreign electoral monitors, apparently for the first time in Costa Rican history, dramatized the
idea that Costa Rican democracy needed to be subject to scrutiny and doubt.85

5. Conclusion
I found that the Comités mobilized the same groups (and often the same people) that
had opposed prior attempts at neoliberalization: in urban Comités public sector workers and
students predominated, complemented with a heterogeneous mix of manual workers (usually
artisans), small business persons, members of the liberal professions, and NGO employees. In
more rural areas, campesino activists were prominent or predominated. In general they were
people who, for a variety of reasons, were closely identified with the institutions of the Estado
Social. But this was a point of commonality at a high level of generality, and the priorities of
those involved were as wide-ranging as the terms of CAFTA itself.

This seems to be an interesting local appropriation of the monitors’ function of “just being there”
described by Coles (2007).
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In the context of the referendum campaign, however, the opposition to CAFTA began to
transcend the aggregation of distinct constituencies to create a common identity: the NO.
Opposition to CAFTA provided an important element of this identity, but antagonism to the
heights of political and economic power was equally important. The NO saw itself as an
insurgent demos, the people (pueblo) in confrontation with the US government, transnational
capital, and the “politician-entrepreneurs” that had “hijacked” the “institutionality” of the “state
of law.”
As an insurgent demos, they saw themselves as fundamentally transforming the relations
of political power. In a narrow sense, activists of the NO argued that a failure to approve the
referendum would leave the Arias government discredited and impotent.86 But the imaginative
horizon of a victory of the coalition of the NO went further than this, taking different forms
depending on one’s political vision. For many, the experience of participating in the autonomous
and egalitarian Comités was a deeply affecting experience, which inspired them to imagine the
inauguration of a more egalitarian and participatory political order. The meeting of equals for
cooperation and deliberation became, as much as the protest, a fundamental part of the
imagination of a renewed popular sovereignty.
The identity of an insurgent demos was combined with the defense of the Estado Social,
often by the same people. There were several points of tension between these two stances
towards the institutionalidad, which would become much more important after the referendum,
as described below. The first point of tension was the fact that the pueblo was not in fact united
behind the NO. The general explanation was that those from more subaltern classes who
supported the SI were either bought (comprados) or fooled (engañados). This was in turn
attributed to a lack of political and moral education, and the manipulative practices of the media

Casas and Sánchez, as we have seen, agreed with this assessment, and were deeply alarmed by it, even
as they worked to encourage a particular perception of this possibility as part of the campaign of fear.
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and the dominant parties. Secondly, the sense of insurgency was in tension with the defense of
the law. Some to talk of the possibility of a constitutional convention in the event a victory of the
NO, and a few set their sights on a (generally long-term) socialist transformation, but in general
the transformative project was limited to changes outside of the law itself: the resignation of the
president and other changes in government (thereby putting others in charge of implementing
the laws); changes to political practices, sociality and habitus (a more participatory politics); the
breaking of the tight monopoly of information by the media. Together they formed a challenge
to the largely “civil” institutions through which access to legally-sanctioned authority was
constrained and controlled, as well as a critique of the occupants of those positions of authority
(which contradicted the SI’s emphasis on the need to respect and defend the authority of those
that govern and adjudicate, while sharing its assumption of the continuity of the established
legal order). For this arena of politics, however—which bridges the traditional liberal distinction
between state and civil society—there was little easily accessible language, and the activists of
the NO were rarely able to articulate what they were opposing, although the “políticosempresarios” was a step in this direction.87
The positive content of the NO was generally expressed in ethical, rather than
programmatic terms. In everyday conversation and in messages to the public, the opponents of
CAFTA represented themselves as the “patriotic” people with “solidarity.” The emphasis on
ethical qualities over class categories, ideologies, or programs, was by its very generality suited
to the rapid articulation of a persistently heterogeneous coalition, even as it remained deeply
antagonistic in its employment of these universalizing terms. It allowed the NO to represent
itself as the authentic expression of the moral community of the nation—whatever the real limits
of their popular support—while pushing the SI from the frontier of ethical, patriotic subjects.
On at least one occasion, a long-time activist commented to me on how useful he found this term for
naming the political task that they faced. Nevertheless, it was a term that was largely internal to the
movement, and was not generally used in campaign literature or public culture generally.
87
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But it also responded to the dilemma implicit in opposing the legally-constituted authorities in
the name of the law. If those authorities could not be said to be illegal in their use of the law,
they could certainly be said to be unethical. In the next chapter, I will take up how this dilemma
around the illegal use of law figured after the voice of the people had spoken.
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Chapter 5

The Voice of the People
Counting for Legitimacy

On October 7th, 2007, Costa Rican voters went to the polls to vote sí or no to the
ratification of CAFTA. For the active supporters of the NO, the day of the referendum was the
culmination of an extraordinary period of intensive political engagement. The referendum was
a pivotal event that marked a clear distinction between moments “before” and “after,”
differentiated above all by shifts in the conditions of political possibility that went well beyond
the immediate question of the ratification of CAFTA. In this chapter I will explain those shifts
through an examination of the process by which the meaning of the vote was defined and
contested, and how that production of meaning intersected with the particular trajectory of the
NO as a political formation.

1. Referendum Day
Night was falling as the polls closed and the fiscales began counting ballots in La Cruz, a
small town near the border with Nicaragua. Activists of the NO had begun the day of the
referendum well before dawn, anxious but optimistic; most of the polls showed a dead heat, but
a survey released by La Nación only four days before had put the NO 12 percent ahead. I
wandered back and forth through the hallways of the schoolhouse and principal polling site. I
peeked into classrooms to watch the counting, thinking that’s what an “international election
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observer” should do. People milled about outside the school, some in t-shirts of the SI or the
NO, many chatting excitedly.
The conversations became more boisterous as news of the results began to filter out.
Alberto*, a schoolteacher and the local fiscal general from the NO, passed me updates from text
messages claiming one or another district won in Guanacaste or San José. Eventually he
approached me with a grin to say that the NO had won enough districts in the Central Valley to
be confident of victory. Although he was disappointed that the SI had eked out a narrow
majority in La Cruz, the totals were close enough, and in any case it was the national vote that
counted.
Out of the chattering crowd a young man in a t-shirt and baseball cap approached me
with an outstretched microphone and, in a bright radio voice, asked me to share my
observations live on Radio Cultural Guanacaste. Surprised, I fumbled my way through what I
thought—with reservations—would be the most appropriate answer: that I had not seen
anything that day that would really allow me to doubt the integrity of the results.
Soon afterwards Alberto and another man from the Comité Patriótico in La Cruz invited
me to celebrate the victory of the NO. We drove to a small bar and restaurant, talking excitedly
about the campaign and the voting as we sat down to a meal of ceviche and beer. The
enthusiasm evaporated, however, as the official tallies began to appear on the bar’s television:
the SI was consistently ahead and then the referendum was called in favor of CAFTA. We
finished the meal quickly and Alberto drove me home in silence.
I spent the rest of a long night watching scenes in San José on television and talking with
my host from a local Comité Patriótico. The news cut from scenes of the SI carrying out a glitzy
election celebration with music and dancing on a giant well-lit stage, to scenes of youthful
supporters of the NO gathered in the streets angrily chanting “fraud.” The principle
spokespersons for the NO campaign, Eugenio Trejos from the National Technical University,
185

and Ottón Solís of the PAC, were visibly stricken. Trejos gave a rambling speech to what
appeared to be an angry crowd of NO supporters, while Solís granted a terse interview in which
he withheld recognition of the results pending a definitive counting of the votes by the TSE and
an analysis of reported “irregularities.” That same night, my host Ana*, told me that some of the
local youth were advocating taking the struggle to the streets on the model of the resistance to
the Combo in 2000 (see chapter 2), although she did not appear convinced. The next day the
residual energy seemed to have worn off and she was bed-ridden by despair. My hosts and I
spent the day watching movies and trying to avoid talking about politics.
In San José I found the same combination of outrage and despair. Years later, opponents
of CAFTA continued to emphasize the “pain” (dolor) that memories of the referendum
produced. Daniela, a university student active in the Comités of South San José spent the night
of the referendum crying, drinking and singing. Some were discouraged. Alejandra, who had
been as active as anyone in the campaign, burst into tears as she explained to her friends that
“no one can demand that I go out into the streets, no one! There’s no point and I’m tired.”
But while some reacted with grief, despondency, or a retreat from politics, others, like
Ana’s young friends, were energized by outrage and the need to protest the “fraudulent” victory.
In the following days, people declared their readiness to “throw rocks,” to blockade roads with
burning tires or go on strike, invoking the example of the Combo as a model of what could and
should be done (see chapter 2). Those who advocated taking to the streets did not always think
that there was any chance of overturning the referendum result, however; for some, protesting
was a duty or necessary self-expression. Others sought ways to continue opposition while they
refused or rejected “militant” tactics.
For the protagonists of the NO, the referendum was the culmination of an extraordinary
period of intensive political engagement, and it was a pivotal event that marked a clear
distinction between “before” and “after”—a transformation of political possibilities that went
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well beyond the immediate question of CAFTA’s ratification. In this chapter I will explain that
shift through an account of the process by which the meaning of the vote was defined and
contested, and how that process intersected with the trajectory of the NO as a political
formation. Responding to the vote meant articulating responses to complex and fraught
questions of responsibility and ethics: did responsibility or pragmatism require respecting the
results? What did that mean—particularly in relation to the package of thirteen (or so) laws that
were needed, allegedly, to make Costa Rica CAFTA-compliant?88 What was the responsibility of
opposition in relation to this “implementation agenda”? On which of these implementation laws
should the opposition focus its energies? Who was to carry out opposition and through which
tactics? How could the coalition of the NO be sustained and made politically relevant in the
post-referendum political environment?
In the first part of the chapter, I engage with the discourse of fraud, in relation to the
contested meanings of democracy and to the processes through which political claims are made
authoritative. I begin with some observations from my experience as an “international observer”
closely connected to the vote-monitoring efforts of the NO campaign, to consider some of the
reasons for, and limits of, the NO’s emphasis on ensuring the integrity of the vote.
This sets the stage for the second section, which explores the dilemma faced by activists
of the NO in confronting an election result that was neither clearly “fraudulent” in a narrow
sense, nor legitimate for them. I examine how this dilemma unfolded in evolving discourses
about “recognition” and “fraud,” which negotiated standards of “normative democracy,” a strong
critique of the undemocratic character of the referendum, and the practical exigencies of a
broader discursive environment in which the SI, for a number of reasons, had the upper hand.
To an important degree, I will argue, the apparent legitimacy of the vote was a product of

The number of laws said to be required by the treaty varied over time, an important consideration that
will be discussed in more detail below.
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disorganization of the NO. I then turn to an account of the various attempts at opposition that
did emerge, with a particular emphasis on the problem of dispersion and attempts to overcome
it. I conclude by considering the challenges to united action for decentralized networked
political coalitions in the absence of a readily-given politics of negation.

2. Observing the Vote
The chants of fraude on the television the night of the referendum caused me to question
my approval of the referendum in the interview with Radio Cultural Guanacaste earlier that very
evening, however cautious I had been. Did they know something that I did not? What had I
missed? Or was “fraud” simply a way of talking about the abuses of a democratic ideal over the
course of that contentious—and highly asymmetrical—referendum campaign?
My observations of the referendum were shaped by my transition from ethnographic
researcher to the distinct role of “election observer.” Mobilized by my involvement in the NO
campaign’s efforts to ensure a full monitoring (fiscalización) of the vote, I felt the responsibility
to lend my hand to preventing what they insisted was likely electoral fraud.
My ability to take on this role in a somewhat “official” capacity reflected some
unprecedented decisions by the TSE, beginning with the decision to invite international
observers.89 The TSE initially requested an observation mission from the Organization of
American States (OAS), presumably in reaction to the contentiousness of the referendum
process and the TSE’s own handling of it. It was a smart move; the international observers,
operating within standards of globally-circulating “normative democracy” (Nugent 2008),
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This was reportedly the second election in Costa Rican history to include international observers.
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produced a glowing review of the election (see below), shoring up its claim to legitimacy in the
post-referendum period.90
As explained to me sometime later by an official from the TSE, the participation of other
observers such as me had been made possible by lobbying within the tribunal. Not that this
presence seemed to be very significant to the TSE: the tribunal provided us with a brief
orientation, a copy of the electoral regulations, and a booklet explaining how and why the
contested 2006 election had been correctly decided in favor of Oscar Arias—as well as the much
more important name tag and photo identification with the TSE’s seal on it. Otherwise, the
meaning and practice of observation was very much left to my own definition and initiative, and
the networks of contacts that I had developed during my research.
Although Benjamin from the Comité Juanito Mora asked me to stay for the culmination
of our work in Barrio Sur, others convinced me that my presence as an international observer
would be more useful in rural areas, where it was thought that fraud would be more likely.91
After a few phone calls to people coordinating the NO campaign’s vote-monitoring effort, I
decided to take my official presence to the canton of La Cruz in Guanacaste, described to me as
“the most corrupt in the country” (a characterization, however, denied by activists of the NO in
La Cruz itself).
I arrived in Liberia, the capital of Guanacaste province, the night before the vote. There
was a flurry of activity in the small Catholic NGO office that served as headquarters for the NO.
Volunteers worked until after midnight and were up again by four in the morning to stake out a

In the end there were 184 observers, including 93 from the OAS, 27 from the UN-sponsored University
for Peace, (whose campus is in Costa Rica), 15 from the Panamanian electoral tribunal, and 13 from the
Lutheran Church. Smaller groups and individuals participated under the sponsorship of a diversity of
other organizations, including religious groups, academics, and NGO’s (see Mora 2007). The application
required a letter from a sponsoring organization, but the demands were not particularly stringent (I was
accepted with a letter from my department chair). At the same time, as far as I could discern only the OAS
mission was cited in the national press.
91This assumption itself reflected the perception that the SI was strongest in rural areas because of an
allegedly greater predominance of paternalistic and authoritarian political relations.
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(highly contested) place at the polling stations, to begin transporting voters, to make sandwiches
or chicken and rice for volunteers, and to the staff hotlines for violations.
I was picked up by Alberto, an elementary school teacher and activist of the Patriotic
Committee in La Cruz, as the sun was just emerging over the horizon. We drove an hour north
along the Interamerican Highway, while he talked to me excitedly about CAFTA and the NO
campaign, a conversation that continued throughout the day, as he drove me through the
extensive network of rural schools that served as polling sites within the canton. The son of a
Guanecastecan campesino family, who had learned to ride a horse and wield a machete almost
as soon as he could walk, Alberto had acquired his professional status within social state
institutions—an experience of upward mobility within the social state that characterized many in
the NO campaign. He was passionate about CAFTA and the future of Guanacaste and was
particularly concerned with how the treaty would impact ongoing struggles over access to water
in the province.
Our first stop was Las Brisas, a hamlet tucked away in the folds of a mountain range near
the Nicaraguan border. Since a bridge on the path to Las Brisas had recently collapsed in a
rainstorm, Alberto parked his car and we crossed the river in an inflatable raft attached to a
cable pulled by two wiry old municipal employees. Once on the other side, we continued on foot,
climbing steadily upward along a dusty dirt road, under the steadily-mounting force of the
Guanacastecan sun. Along the way, Alberto stopped at the humble plank-house home of an
elderly acquaintance of his, who served us coffee as he attempted to convince her of the
importance of voting over her professions of ignorance and ambivalence.
After an hour and a half or so, we reached the small concrete schoolhouse where the
voting was to take place, passing a few glossy posters for the SI and one small, cardboard sign on
which NO al TLC had been scrawled in red paint. A robust matron in an apron was preparing a
meal in the schoolhouse kitchen (with food provided by the SI campaign, we were told). A lone
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police officer with an assault rifle stood watch by the entrance to the classroom that served as a
voting station. Inside, two fiscales from the NO, and one for the SI, sat by the cardboard balloturn, in the company of a temporary employee contracted by the TSE. They told us that only one
voter had arrived so far.
Alberto suggested we wait around for a while to see if any voters showed up. We
encountered a group of young women outside of the polling station, two of whom were dressed
in t-shirts of the SI. Alberto began to talk to them. To my surprise, they claimed that they were
undecided about whether and how they would vote, and insisted that they had simply taken the
free t-shirt. Alberto tried to convince them to vote NO. Although they claimed to understand
very little about CAFTA (they pointed out that on this side of the mountain they only received
Nicaraguan television), they had heard enough to question Alberto on whether the TLC wouldn’t
bring more jobs, and whether competition wouldn’t improve the quality of the telephone service.
They were interested in his answers but expressed their exasperation with the complexity of the
treaty and maintained that they were unsure if they would vote or not. Eventually, a welldressed couple arrived in a large sport utility vehicle at the polling station. Although they lived
far away, one of them had been (to her confusion and indignation) assigned Las Brisas as her
voting station. (I heard a number of such complaints in the following days, in arguments by
activists of the NO that the vote had been “fraudulent”).92 After voting they drove us back down
the mountain, fording the river in their SUV.
Although the other half-dozen rural voting stations that I visited that day were busier,
many of the same features characterized all of them. Voters approaching the polling stations—
invariably schoolhouses of one or a few rooms—were greeted by supporters of the NO and SI
campaigns camped outside, invariably including groups of “guides” (guías), small children
Raventós et al. (2005:177) suggest that such problems of the electoral registry have been a relatively
important reason for involuntary electoral abstention since the electoral reforms of 1996 reduced the role
of the parties in maintaining up-to-date voter lists.
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festooned in the t-shirts of the campaigns, whose duty was to “escort” potentially friendly voters
to the door of the polling station. This practice, adapted from ordinary partisan elections reveals
the degree to which voting in Costa Rica is a far from individualistic form of political
engagement (cf. Lazar 2008:91-117).93 While the act of voting as producing a supposedly final
and inviolable record of intent is carried out in the solitude provided by a cardboard screen, this
moment is preceded by practices of self-declaration and collective identification that end,
literally at the door of the voting booth. The great importance attached to the transport,
greeting, and “guiding” of voters reflects, in good measure, the degree to which the
individualized moment of voting is couched within broader identifications.94
While both the NO and the SI had teams of adult volunteers and young guías at the
entrance to the polling stations and had organized transport for voters, there were evident
asymmetries in the two campaigns’ referendum-day organization. Perhaps the most obvious was
in transport, which activists of the NO routinely pointed to as an emblematic disadvantage. 95
The difference was glaring in the town of La Cruz, where the NO and the SI had their respective

I suspect children are chose as guías because they are less threatening, at the same time as they are
more prone to evoke affective dispositions associated with care, facilitating the acceptance of a relation.
94 I would argue that this is true everywhere, albeit perhaps to varying degrees. The form taken by the
articulation of individual political agency and collective agency is of course crucial, and differs from one
electoral regime to the next. In the United States, the voting decision is undeniably shaped by a complex
of collective identities, including class, race, gender, and region—probably even more so than in Costa
Rica (the United States, for example, has comparatively very high degrees of association between class as
measured by income and voting behavior; see Gelman 2009). Nevertheless, people are in general
circumspect about wearing their intentions “on their sleeves,” a tendency reinforced by laws banning the
display of electoral material within and near the voting station. The representation of voting as a purely
individual exercise of an independent intellect and conscience is maintained popularly and officially in all
electoral practices, from the hesitancy to declare partisan affiliations to the anonymous and solitary way
in which the voting place itself is approached. These differences are neither absolute nor fixed: the
willingness of US voters to openly identify with parties has waxed and waned over time, while the
tendency in Costa Rica towards partisan identification has decreased, as we have discussed, while
electoral reforms such as those of 1996 have reduced public financing for partisan banners and transport
(Raventós et al. 2005: 26). However, the enduring relevance of collective voting practices is shown by
their spontaneous adaptation by the SI and NO campaigns in the context of a supposedly non-partisan
election.
95 Some activists in San José complained that they were beaten to the chase by the SI’s more experienced
electoral machinery (i.e. the PLN) and failed to effectively occupy territory outside the polling site, but if
anything the NO seemed to have more people on the ground in La Cruz.
93
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headquarters in the town plaza adjoining the school that served as the principal voting site.
While the NO had a few small sedans volunteered by their owners, the SI had a fleet of private
cars, taxis, and at least one rented school bus. The accounts of supporters of the NO in San José
suggested that the differences in transportation resources were even greater.
Certainly, the inequality of access to transport made a material difference by permitting
voters to vote who would otherwise find it difficult or impossible to do so, particularly in La
Cruz, where distances between communities and voting stations are substantial and public
transportation is minimal. Nevertheless, the provision of transport, like the welcome and escort
provided by the guías, also implies relationships and identities. Beyond the relation implied by
accompaniment, these services also imply recognition of the importance of the voter. 96 Some
with experience in electoral campaigns on more than one occasion explained to me, with the
amused exasperation commonly applied to spoiled children, that voters who could perfectly well
get to the polls on their own would refuse to do so unless they were provided with this service.
Insofar as the victorious party has historically been in a position to offer some degree of material
reward or employment to its loyal followers, the significance of such demonstrations of the
voter’s significance to the party is heightened. In the case of the referendum vote, the inequality
in transportation resources on voting day would seem to underline the fact that the SI had made
promises to reward (at least some) loyal voters with housing assistance and other forms of
public patronage, whereas the NO was entirely unable to make such promises (even if they had
been inclined to).
The inequality of transport indexed the larger asymmetry between the SI and the NO. As
I was photographing the SI’s fleet of vehicles in La Cruz, a middle-aged man in dusty jeans,
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In her evocative description of “sacred democracy” in rural West Bengal (a case which presents many
parallels to Costa Rica’s partisan and participative electoral order), Mukulika Banerjee stresses the
affective importance of voting as an assertion of dignity and equal worth (2008: 71-8).
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faded t-shirt, and weathered face challenged me angrily from where he sat on the sidewalk in the
shade of a corner grocery. He was angry that I was (allegedly) only taking pictures of the SI, and
ignoring the very important fact that the NO also had organized transportation. He assumed
that I was wholeheartedly in favor of CAFTA—as a gringo dressed in my best attempt at
business-like attire—and was therefore making propaganda for the SI. It took me some
reflection to understand that what I was doing, in his eyes, was highlighting an inequality of
great emotional significance, and, at the same time, slighting the effort that the NO had put into
surmounting this inequality. Others active with the NO campaign on that day shared this
particular focus of anger on the transport issue and regaled me with stories of heroic carpooling
against incredible odds. At the same time, however, these stories were tinged with a particular
kind of pride, which I think goes further than the heroism of engaging in an unequal
struggle;The antagonism towards the SI as a concentration of political and economic power was
an important part of what gave the NO its identity and drive.
This asymmetry extended to who was doing the greeting and driving. At about noon, I
had coffee with the representative of the TSE in charge of the canton, who suggested that I
accompany the SI for the remainder of the afternoon. I was led over to the SI’s tent on the plaza
and introduced to the mayor, who seemed to be presiding over the campaign’s voter
transportation efforts. After a brief greeting I was brought over and introduced to the driver of a
sport utility vehicle which was being used to transport voters for the SI, and invited to
accompany him on his rounds.97 We chatted about CAFTA and the referendum as we drove from
the town of La Cruz to the remote voting station of Los Gatos. The driver described himself as a

I am not sure why the coordinators of the SI campaign in La Cruz wanted me to accompany them.For
the NO, the motive was very explicitly that I would provide at least a show of a countervailing authority to
those of the local and national state institutions that were suspectedsuspect of complicity in fraud (and to
dramatize their conviction in the possibility of fraud). Those of the SI were not motivated by these
concerns. Their interest had more to do with rectifying the asymmetry implied by my accompaniment of
the NO, particularly in a context where transport was associated with allegiance.
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manager at a local orchard that supplied juice manufacturers. He was concerned that in the
absence of CAFTA they would lose the possibility of exporting to the United States (see chapter
1). As we drove to the polling station and back, he stopped to pick up individuals and small
groups that he recognized in passing on the side of the road, all of whom treated him with a
deferential reserve. Hardly evidence of the “campaign of fear” that the SI carried out in the
workplace, this experience was nevertheless suggestive of how the organization of social
relations around collective voting practices could involve the exercise of forms of authority as
well, however subtle.
There is one area, however, in which the NO clearly outperformed the SI: the monitoring
of the vote. There were at least one or two fiscales for the NO at every voting station that I
visited in the canton, usually either teachers, university students, or in a few cases campesinos,
reflecting tendencies in the organization of the NO campaign that I had observed elsewhere,
whereas the SI had fewer volunteers at polling sites. The emphasis on the mobilization of
fiscales, discussed in the preceding chapter, reflected a preoccupation with fraud—as did my
own mobilization as an electoral observer. This concern with vote monitoring, however, had
some important, if unanticipated, effects, which became particularly significant after the
referendum.
I have already provided an account of the energies devoted to vote monitoring in the
period before the referendum and how these diverted efforts from the grassroots proselytizing
that was at the core of the NO campaign. Here I will consider another aspect of this emphasis on
vote-monitoring (fiscalización): the way in which it committed the NO campaign to a particular,
restricted definition of “fraud.”
As we saw in preceding chapters, the referendum process was beset by controversy from
the beginning. Controversy continued to mount as the TSE, faced with a legally-unprecedented
election, issued a series of controversial rulings all favoring the SI campaign, and as the
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asymmetry and material inequality between the two campaigns became clearer. The leaking of
the Casas-Sánchez memorandum provided a kind of culmination to this increasing antagonism,
leading many to question in a very fundamental way the democratic character of the referendum
in particular and the political institutions of the country more broadly. At the same time, with
the exception of a large march for “university autonomy” and a few other actions, organized
contention was not directed against the referendum itself or even the rules by which it was being
conducted.
There was discussion by some, particularly the more self-identified revolutionaries
within the opposition to CAFTA, of a rejection of the referendum process as a whole, and a legal
challenge was mounted. Nevertheless, the mainstream of the NO seems to have channeled their
discontent mainly into two areas: (1) working harder to win the referendum (the Casas-Sánchez
memorandum noticeably invigorated the base of the NO), and (2) a vigorous effort to provide
for a complete fiscalización of the vote. As we have noted, the language around vote monitoring
was notably contentious—in training sessions for fiscales, it was often emphasized that the SI
would steal the election at any opportunity and the ballots could not be left out of sight for even
a minute. In the last chapter, we discussed this as, in part, a manifestation of the antagonism
towards the SI. Here I will suggest that it also represented a kind of displacement of objections
to the broader referendum process. Monitoring the vote, after all, was the most available form of
intervention for the NO in the governance of the referendum campaign. The obstacles to
successfully achieving any other form of intervention were very high. In the first place, the
decentralized movement of the NO had been brought together for the purpose of campaigning
for the referendum; any other action, from protesting the rules of the election to advocating a
boycott, would have implied the exercise of effective leadership of some kind, or would have
threatened to divide the movement. The obstacles to a boycott would have been particularly
high, so much so as to make the notion all but unthinkable to most: the deep legitimacy of
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elections as a form of political expression in Costa Rica, including among the activists of the NO,
and the resulting likelihood that a boycott would do nothing more than throw the vote to the SI.
Perhaps most importantly, the NO in general thought the process, despite its abuses, was
eminently winnable. From this point of view, opposition to the referendum itself provoked
incomprehension and anger, even from some, such as Alejandra, who were convinced that the
conduct of the referendum was outrageously undemocratic; Alejandra argued, for example, that
those who were objecting to the referendum were unwittingly giving the government an excuse
to cancel it. In such a situation, the realistic option seemed to be working within the electoral
rules while using what mechanisms were available (principally the fiscalización of the vote) to
ensure that the NO would not be robbed of victory. The opposition to CAFTA, in other words,
was channeled into a relatively narrow concern with electoral fraud as part of the same process
by which it was led into the referendum; the emergence of a distinctly electoral reality created a
set of conditions that were not of their own choosing, and constrained action in important ways.
As I found myself in session after session of trainings for fiscales in the weeks leading up
to the referendum, I began to define my own role in the referendum in terms of “vote
monitoring.” The brief orientation given by the TSE to international observers reinforced this
emphasis on the integrity of the vote. I scrupulously studied the regulations related to voting
procedure to ensure that I would be able to recognize any deviance from the regulations. This
was, in fact, a misunderstanding of my own role—if anyone was going to catch fraud redhanded, it would be the fiscales who were at the tables consistently, not an interloping foreigner
(see Coles 2008).
I did see a number of things that either violated electoral regulations or that I simply
thought were suspicious, but my ability to act, as well as my judgment of what was or was not
acceptable, was dependent on local actors. To take two examples from Copalchí, the first
schoolhouse polling station at which we stopped., To begin with, I was shocked to see that there
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were already ballot boxes in the room, even though the official election materials had not yet
arrived. Alberto, however, was unmoved: “They just have them there for civics lessons, for
student elections and things like that.” I assumed that he, as a schoolteacher, would know and
dropped the issue.
During that same visit, I discovered a black pen in the voting table. This seemed to me to
be more serious. The control of balloting in Costa Rica includes the segregation of pens by the
color of their ink: voters use black pens to mark their choices, and the representatives of the TSE
use red pens to sign the ballot before depositing. The presence of black pens at the tables where
the TSE representative is stationed to receive votes is expressly prohibited, presumably on the
theory that someone working the table could more easily mark and deposit ballots
surreptitiously. In fact, the cautions about voter fraud that circulated in the training of the
fiscales included statements such as “don’t leave them alone there for a minute or they’ll throw a
party marking ballots and throwing them in the urn.” Accordingly, both Alberto and I requested
that the pen be removed. The TSE representative agreed to do so, observing that she had just
put it there “to use later.”
When we returned to the voting station at midday, however, the pen had returned to its
place on the desk. Alberto lodged a complaint with a hotline set up by the NO campaign in
Liberia, while I took the opportunity to inform the TSE’s representative in the canton over
coffee. Clearly amused by my concern, he laughed off the incident, saying that “there was always
confusion over the pens.” There was really nothing else that could be done; hardly evidence of
fraud itself, the pen was within a certain threshold of tolerable electoral irregularity that, for
obvious reasons, is not described in the electoral regulations. And even in this “model
democracy,” I discovered, it was not uncommon for both the fiscales and the representatives of
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the TSE to be unaware of, or cavalier about, basic elements of the electoral code.98 It also made
me aware of the ambiguity and limits of my own role as an “observer”—the whole purpose of my
being there revolved around the avoiding the possibility of fraud, but what would fraud look like,
if not a misplaced pen or an unofficial ballot box?
In fact, the activists of the NO who facilitated my participation understood this very well
and considered my role less in terms of fiscalización and more in terms of the implicit threat in
my ability to publicize irregularities to an international audience, a part of what Coles describes
as “mere presence,” which includes the deterring effect that the gaze of “international observers”
is understood to have on domestic actors (Coles 2008: 134-41). Indeed, while I am skeptical that
my “mere presence” made any difference at all, it was certainly not insignificant to the people
involved in the organization of the vote. As I was repeatedly told, I was the first “international
observer” to arrive for any election in memory. The TSE official responsible for the canton took a
substantial interest in my presence, inviting me for coffee to discuss the efforts the TSE was
making to ensure the reliability of the vote, and to hear my impressions. Supporters of both the
NO and the SI considered it important that I was accompanying and documenting their efforts.
My role was therefore discursively constructed, by a variety of actors, in ways which
reflected globally-circulating discourses of “normative democracy” (Nugent 2008), which
includes international observers and pronouncements on the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of
national elections (Coles 2007, Paley 2008b). Above all, this globally-circulating “normative
democracy” of which I became a part is concerned with the “transparency” of the vote as a
technology for faithfully recording voter preferences (Coles 2007). This implies a definition of
democracy in which certain kinds of institutional features—particularly the integrity of the
ballots—are greatly privileged over other considerations, such as the resources available to the

The same is true, for what it’s worth, in that other model of normative democracy—the United States
(cite).
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campaigns and the exercise of class power. The definition of the problematic of the referendum
in these terms would emerge as an important constraint on the opposition to CAFTA in the wake
of their loss in the referendum.
The OAS mission distributed several press releases during and immediately following the
referendum, as well as a somewhat more elaborate report to the OAS in Washington D.C. a
month later.99 The OAS mission’s observations are almost entirely dedicated to the technical
aspects of voting: the time of opening and closing of the polling stations, the presence of a visible
registry of voters and other necessary materials. There are a few, more general conclusions: the
absence of violence and coercion is mentioned several times. Besides this, there are other, much
more arguable, references to an atmosphere of “respect and tolerance.” There is no reference at
all to the Casas-Sánchez memorandum and its proposed “campaign of fear,” nor to most of the
many objections to the use of governmental and private power in the course of the referendum:
the pre-emption of a citizens’ by a governmental referendum; the use of the workplace as a place
of proselytism; the employment of public resources to encourage votes for the SI and to support
the SI campaign; the decisions of the TSE favoring the involvement of the president over that of
the University; allegations that the mandated period of “media truce” was violated by the
principal media outlets.
There are two areas in which the OAS mission did seem to acknowledge objections to the
process: (1) the unequal financing of the campaigns, and (2) the involvement of “external
actors.” In both cases, however, the language is cautious and non-“partisan” to the point of
inaccuracy. With respect to the enormous inequalities in resources between the SI and the NO,
and the lack of public financing and control over private campaign resources that enabled this
inequality, the final report limits itself to including a “recommendation” for “clearer
The full report is a remarkably scant twelve-page document, with only three pages dedicated to the
mission’s observations (the other nine are summaries of the legal context of the referendum).
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mechanisms” (mecanismos más claros) for the control of resources, noting that “diverse
sectors” had “expressed their discontent with legislation related to the financing of political
activities and equitable access to the communications media” (13).
Similarly, they note that “some sectors” indicated “dissatisfaction with respect to campaign
activities for or against the FTA on the part of external actors in general.” By far the most
evident of these “external actors” was the Bush administration, whose representatives
(particularly the ambassador and the US trade representative) made regular public
interventions in favor of CAFTA. Rather more emphasis is given to the presence of campaign
materials in and near the polling sites, about which the mission expressed concern at several
moments in the press releases and the final report.
All together this suggests an understanding of democracy in which regulations on campaign
finance and foreign involvement in elections are less important than having a visible registry of
eligible voters, polling stations that open on time, or campaign posters near the voting booth.
The concern is essentially limited to the inviolability of ballot-marking as a private act free of
interference.
The OAS mission effectively marginalized the reservations it did express with a laudatory
description of the referendum as a whole: “without doubt, the popular consultation carried out
in Costa Rica was peaceful, free, just, and participatory. The elections demonstrated, once again,
the capacity and legitimacy of the electoral bodies, the solidity of the institutions, and the
enormous democratic vocation of the Costa Rican people” (13). Finally, the last press release
ends with a “call to the citizenry to democratically respect the results released by the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal” (43).100 As we shall see, all criticisms of the referendum process aside, the
meaning of “respecting the results” was much more ambiguous than might at first sight appear.

Also worthy of note is language in these documents that indicates a certain orientation in favor of
CAFTA: “this process…served so that Costa Ricans could define if their country would accompany their
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3. Reading the Vote
Here I briefly present some observations made by comparing the returns from the election
with the most recent census data (by canton and district). The results confirm the expectations
about “natural constituencies” laid out at the end of chapter 1. The urban populations of the
Central Valley voted sí. The tendency is especially notable where export manufacturing is
concentrated (Belén, el Guarco in Cartago)—but no canton with more than 25 percent of its
workforce in industry voted no, and very few that had more than 20 percent. But the residents of
the urban core as a whole voted sí, including the area around the University of Costa Rica, a
center of opposition to the treaty, reflecting widespread concerns about investment and jobs (as
well as, perhaps, the importance of cable television). Areas associated with sugar cultivation and
processing voted sí (Carrillo and Cañas in Guanacaste). More interestingly, regions
characterized by banana plantations voted sí—most of Limón province, and parts of the Pacific
coast (Parrita, Corredores). Of course, bananas are the preeminent export crop and although
they had nothing to do with the FTA, it is possible people thought they did (alternatively, an
explanation might lie in the social relations of plantation life). On the contrary, places marked
by pineapple production often voted no (Upala, Los Chiles, Buenos Aires). This was probably
because the pineapple plantations have expanded in areas where there are also small peasant
cultivators, a process characterized by conflicts over land, water and contamination (see e.g.
Acuña 2006; Löding 2006).
No votes predominated in areas where there are still significant numbers of campesinos
producing for the national market or growing coffee (Pérez Zeledón, León Cortés, Naranjo,
Central American brothers (hermanos países centroamericanos) and the United States in a commercial
accord” [see chapter 1 for why “commercial accord” is itself a highly partial reading of the treaty]….Due to
the electoral participation of the citizens…the FTA was approved…closing one chapter in the history of
Costa Rica and opening the doors to new opportunities” (13-14).
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Atenas). Some of the provincial and smaller rural cities also voted no, such as San Ramón and
Limón—both of which have important concentrations of public sector and professional
employment.

4. Fraud
The chants of “fraud” that accompanied Eugenio Trejos’ speech on election night were
echoed by activists of the NO campaign who questioned the referendum’s legitimacy during the
days, months and years after the referendum. For a variety of reasons, which we will analyze in
more detail below, critiques of the referendum were effectively silenced in public discourse,
although they continued to circulate in the alternative public spaces created and sustained by
the NO campaign, including the meetings of the Comités Patrióticos, rallies, and occasionally,
flyers. The supporters of the SI rarely, if ever, engaged directly with the NO’s objections to the
legitimacy of the referendum. Rather, they represented any questioning of the legitimacy of the
result as evidence of the NO supporters’ inability to accept defeat and their lack of commitment
to “democracy”—which had been a consistent theme of the SI campaign, explicitly outlined as a
strategy in the Casas-Sánchez memorandum. Importantly, as we will see, these dismissals
extended even to opposition to the content of the “implementation agenda,” which were laws
allegedly necessary to make Costa Rica CAFTA-compliant, but which in fact had a specific
content that was not necessarily determined by the text of the treaty. By examining the discourse
of fraud produced by the NO, I will show that both of these charges, while capturing something
of the truth, were highly partial representations that served both to distort and to silence the
critique of Costa Rican political institutions raised by the supporters of the NO. I will further
suggest that these critiques from supporters of the NO raise important questions about how
political claims are made authoritative, and how to understand the substance of democratic
practice, with implications both in Costa Rica and beyond. From this point of view, the silencing
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of debate over the legitimacy of the referendum result, which was positioned as a defense of
democracy, can itself be understood as an anti-democratic practice.
For some the stakes of the referendum and CAFTA were so high as to potentially
override other considerations. Many never accepted that the treaty was compatible with the
constitution or their rights as citizens: if this was the case, then the referendum itself result
could not be legally respected—an argument suggested by the University of Costa Rica’s own
official report on the treaty (UCR n.d.). Moreover, many simply did not see the nexus of party,
state and class power in which the referendum was realized as democratic. Objections to the
legitimacy of the referendum result was grounded in conceptions of democracy that were
partially (by no means entirely) distinct from those employed by the supporters of the SI. These
alternative conceptions of democracy varied considerably within the coalition of the NO, and the
emphasis changed over time. In this subsection I will pay particular attention to the language of
“fraud” (fraude), which was particularly relevant in the immediate-post referendum period. I
will identify and explain some of the important common themes as well as signal important
lines of fracture and debate.
In their initial reaction to the vote, the leading public spokespersons of the NO campaign
remained preoccupied with the question of the validity of the vote. Both Eugenio Trejos and
Ottón Solís made public promises to withhold recognition until the ballots had been scrutinized
and all denunciations of voting-day “irregularities” investigated. By the following week,
however, Solís and the PAC legislative delegation, as well as several other public figures
associated with the NO, had conceded that the irregularities were not sufficient to put in doubt
the SI’s margin of victory in the vote count. From what I observed, the activist base of the NO
did not put very much stock in the idea that the official examination of the ballots by the TSE
would change the margin of victory (after all, the first count had been monitored by an extensive
network of fiscales of the NO), nor that there would be sufficient technical irregularities in the
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voting process to make a case for fraud “at the tables” (en la mesa). Although some stories
circulated concerning voting-day problems—people inexplicably registered at far away polling
stations, and the like—doubts about the integrity of the vote itself were progressively deemphasized and then disappeared almost entirely.
Nevertheless, activists of the NO, particularly those of the base, continued to talk about
the “fraud” that occurred in the referendum, or “frauderendum” as it was sometimes called.
Denying the legitimacy of the referendum as an expression of popular will remained a regular
feature of the discourse in the meetings of the Comités for some months afterwards--particularly
as long as opposition to the implementation agenda remained a political option. The objections,
when specified, essentially reiterated complaints that emerged in the course of the referendum
and that have been documented in the preceding chapters: the decision by the TSE to authorize
a presidential rather than a citizen’s referendum, the use of public funds to support the SI
campaign and incentivize the vote, the threats of factory closings, the interference of the
gringos, the dominance of the SI in the media.101 Most often, objections to the legitimacy of the
referendum were presented in a summary form as “fooling” (engañando) the people or “buying”
the vote; “people voted for the FTA because they were fooled or bought” would be a typical
statement.
In raising these objections to the legitimacy of the vote and its legibility as an expression
of the popular will, the activists of the NO articulated a discourse of democracy that shared
much common ground with globally-circulating versions of normative democracy and which
also appealed to longstanding national traditions and institutions. Not all elections, of course,
are regarded as legitimate by the standards of international normative democracy—besides
outright fraud, an absence of civil liberties or excessive interference by state institutions often
101Events

after the referendum were seized upon as further evidence of the duplicity and manipulation of
the SI campaign; for example, two days after the referendum the Costa Rican domestic goods producer
Atlas was sold to the Mexican firm Mabe, despite having reportedly warned workers that failure to
approve CAFTA would put their jobs at risk.
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cause electoral results to be regarded as illegitimate, for example in the case of Cuban
elections.102
That private money power can be an obstacle to democracy is also broadly recognized;
although it is given much less emphasis than state repression in liberal democratic discourse,
most liberal democratic states attempt to exercise some form of control over, or compensation
for, the power of concentrations of private capital to shape elections. 103 In the case of the
referendum on CAFTA, the SI benefited from a monopoly of both government sponsorship and
capitalist power unprecedented in contemporary Costa Rican history, both in form and degree.
The ordinary system of public financing for parties did not provide for the NO, while the SI had
extensive access to public resources as well as a relaxation of the normal limits on campaign
contributions and spending (Cortés 2008; Martí 2008; Raventós 2008). This should not have
earned Costa Rica’s referendum high marks: even the referendum organized by General
Pinochet in Chile included public financing for the NO.
As we have seen, opponents of CAFTA alleged from the beginning of the referendum
process that the SI had subverted Costa Rican institutions. They charged that the Arias
government had “hijacked” (secuestrado) the “institutionality” (institucionalidad) of the
country, particularly the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, in order to
advance spurious interpretations of the laws. Arguments against the legitimacy of the
referendum were therefore based, in good measure, on critiques from within the discursive logic
of the institutional and legal order governing the political process in Costa Rica.
I will not repeat the details of these critiques here, which we have covered in some detail
elsewhere, and which in any case varied considerably in emphasis and legal sophistication
Of course the judgment of which elections are legitimate or not has historically had as much to do with
geopolitics as conceptions of democracy, perhaps particularly during the Cold War (see the differential
legitimacy accorded by the United States to elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua, for example).
103 In US, a series of decisions by the constitutional court, culminating in the Citizens United decision, has
elevated the principle of protecting “speech” from the state to a degree which has seriously weakened any
possibility of restricting the influence of money on the electoral process.
102
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between different actors in the NO. Rather, I will limit myself to some more general
observations. In the first place, challenges to the referendum process made within the terms of
institutional and legal discourse were difficult to sustain once they were rejected by those legally
authorized to do so (i.e., the constitutional court and the TSE)—precisely because the authority
of these bodies was grounded in the same discursive legal traditions as the challenges.
Supporters of the SI were quick to invoke the authority of these bodies as guardians of the law,
sometimes going so far as to claim that anyone who even questioned the wisdom of their
decisions was a dangerous subversive, a process that reached its culmination with the
certification of the referendum vote. For the NO, this impasse could only be breached by
drawing on claims from outside of the discursive tradition that constituted the law. The result
was the creation of a hybrid: supporters of the NO combined legal claims (CAFTA is
unconstitutional, the TSE broke legal precedent by allowing Arias to campaign for the SI) with
other kinds of claims referencing, in particular, the relations of power between those who govern
and the governed, or between employer and employee. It was these relations of power, they
argued, that had corrupted (or “hijacked”) the legal order.
This critical discursive tradition had been developing strength and coherence since the
1990s, but received a solid push with the asymmetrical referendum process and the one-sided
decisions by legal authorities that accompanied and preceded it. A central theme was a populist
antagonism between the politician-entrepreneurs and “the people,” with an important class
component combined with an appeal to national-popular sovereignty. Despite these un-liberal
emphases, many of the particular complaints were quite compatible with important themes in
liberal democratic discourse; the misuse of public resources, clientelism, and the restriction on
the breadth of information and debate available to voters (see e.g. Held 2006).
As critical legal scholars have long argued, the history of legal reasoning is not intelligible
without reference to these broader operations of social power, and a discussion of them is
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necessary for the realization of democratic rule of law (Kennedy 2004; Mattei and Nader 2008).
Whether or not one thinks that the abuses were enough to justify rejecting or qualifying the
legitimacy of the referendum outcome, the critiques of democratic institutions produced by the
NO were substantial, and there is no doubt that the referendum process was problematic from
the perspective of diverse currents of democratic thought. By invoking very restricted constructs
of Costa Rican legal institutionality and normative democracy to give a nearly unqualified
endorsement of the referendum process while calling for an uncritical acceptance of the
legitimacy of the results, the official voices in Costa Rica and abroad (including the OAS
mission) in fact worked to cut off important debates about the quality of Costa Rican democracy,
and did so in the name of defending democracy.
There were, of course, differences of opinion and emphasis between supporters of the
NO about which elements of the referendum process were most objectionable—although there
was practically unanimous agreement that as a whole it was deeply problematic. The critique of
the TSE’s decision to allow a governmental over a citizens’ referendum was perhaps the most
potentially controversial, because important actors in the NO, including a large majority of the
legislative fraction of the PAC, had voted in favor of this decision. As has been mentioned,
participants in the Comités often sought to maintain unity by avoiding controversy, and nearly
all of the other critiques of the referendum process were unifying whereas this one was
potentially divisive.
There was, however, a strong current of thought that argued that the governmental
referendum had been an illegitimate imposition from the beginning. For many, the petition for a
citizen referendum had also been, at the least, a major tactical error. This current of critique was
strongest among those who had been skeptical of or opposed to the referendum process from
the beginning, who were also generally those most antagonistic to the electoral order and who
favored “the street”—strikes, road blockades, and mass protests—as arenas for making “popular”
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claims. It was most common among the partisans of the left (from the Frente Amplio to the
communists and anarchists), as well as trade union, environmental and campesino activists.
Advocates of this stance mobilized a critical discourse of democracy that was particularly
skeptical of elections, at least under current conditions, which were seen as the monopoly of an
established party system controlled by the “businessman-politicians.” Although they did not all
necessarily use the language of “democracy,” the political imaginary they articulated was
certainly a version of “rule by the people.”
For these activists of the NO, the referendum had been “fraudulent” from the beginning,
in that it was an imposition on and cooptation of a movement of popular resistance by an
electoral system that could be more effectively managed by elites. This contentious democratic
imaginary was most at odds with the standards of normative democracy, for which elections are
assumed to be the highest expression of popular rule. That Arias’s (reluctant) solicitation of a
referendum was evidently intended to channel contention into an electoral arena where the
dominant organized political forces felt their chances of victory to be higher, gives force to
critiques of the referendum as a strategy of control, and of elections as problematic vehicles of
democracy more generally.
While the argument that the referendum itself was flawed from the beginning did not
take center stage in the opposition’s interventions in the post-plebiscite public debate, rejection
of the referendum inspired sustained opposition. Those who understood popular protest to be
the essence of democracy were also generally those most committed to asserting the illegitimacy
of the referendum, and those who sought to continue the project of organized opposition to
CAFTA after the vote.
At the same time, the legitimacy of voting is widely accepted in Costa Rica, and even
those who argued for the virtue of struggle “in the street” often accorded a lot of legitimacy to
the procedures of electoral democracy. There was an urgent need for a less divisive argument
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and one that was more acceptable to the dominant discourse of democracy in Costa Rica. One
concrete critique—an example of the hybrid discourse described above—seemed to meet this
standard took precedence over the others when an explicit case was being made that the
referendum process had been “fraudulent”: the violation of the “electoral truce” (tregua
electoral or tregua política), the period of three days before the referendum in which the media
were not supposed to show ads for either side. The most oft-cited example was the interview
with an economist on CNN’s Spanish language service, in which he warns that a failure to ratify
CAFTA would be disastrous. Supporters of the NO complained that this clip was shown
repeatedly on domestic television stations during the day of the vote.
Based on this and other examples of pro-CAFTA reporting in the final days before the
referendum, the argument was often made that although there was little evidence of fraud in the
mesa (table), there had been a fraude mediática (media fraud), consisting, above all, in a
violation of the tregua (truce). This emphasis on the tregua puzzled me: I found the use of
public resources for clientelism and to coerce support from public figures such as mayors much
more troubling. I wondered, as well, why there was so much emphasis on the media’s inclination
towards the SI during the period of “truce” when this support had been ongoing and obvious
during the whole campaign.
One explanation for the emphasis on the media’s role in breaking the electoral truce is
that it provided a clear-cut example of a violation of the established practices governing Costa
Rican elections (even if it did not meet a technical standard of illegality). Indeed, some of the
things that I found most troubling tended to be relatively normalized by many people, in
particular the promises and threats involved in the distribution of public resources in return for
electoral support of the SI; although many of the activists of the NO were outraged by these
practices, and viewed them as structural issues that needed to be addressed over the long term,
they were also represented as persistent aspects of the electoral landscape rather than
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exceptional features of this election; “that happens in every election, Jeremy,” explained
Benjamín of the Comité Barrio Sur with a shrug, “for me it was more of a fraude mediático.”104
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the process of the referendum abounded in exceptions to
established procedure and controversial legal interpretations: the interventions of the US
ambassador and trade representations, the active involvement of the executive (including the
president himself), the campaign of fear in the workplace, and the lop-sided advocacy in the
media.
Just as important was that the intervention of the media during the period of the
electoral truce was viewed by many as decisive in turning the election to the SI. As a leading
figure in Frente Amplio put it in a meeting with supporters of the party, “we lost principally
because of the media, above all in the last couple of days. That was when we lost the middle
classes of the Central Valley in particular.” The last-minute intervention of the media provides
an explanation for how the SI was apparently able to recover from a significant disadvantage in
the final week (recall that the last poll released before the referendum had the NO ahead by 12
percent).105 As the quote above indicates, it also would explain the fact that the SI won in the
urban areas of the Central Valley, which was contrary both to the pattern in the 2006 election
and prior polling. Another contributing factor to explain this change may have been the lastIt is worth noting that such a normalization probably reflects a history of electoral competition
between relatively equal political blocs—the PLN and its ever-shifting rival “center-right” “Calderonista,”
or “Christian Democrat” opposition (whose most enduring incarnation was as the PUSC). The promise of
governmental largesse is of course an advantage to incumbent and established figures who can most
credibly make claims to access to resources, but where there is more than one establishment party that
can credibly make such promises they do not necessarily seriously undermine electoral competition. The
referendum, I would suggest, shone a particularly bright light on these practices because only one party,
the SI, was in the position to promise rewards or sanctions as a condition for electoral support.
105 There was, however, abundant skepticism about that poll from the moment it appeared, particularly
since it was conducted and distributed by La Nación (see chapter x). Many activists of the NO argued that
the publication of the poll, or even the poll itself, had been a trick to lull the NO to complacency and/or
motivate the SI to action. I am skeptical of these arguments, not least because electoral campaigns
generally prefer to suggest the strong probability (although not inevitability) of victory. In any case, if the
poll is to be taken at face value it suggests a striking volatility in the intention to vote, which may point to
the importance either of last minute interventions (the visit by the US trade representative, the news on
and near election day), and/or the success of the SI at the mobilization and transport of only marginally
inclined voters on election day.
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minute pronouncements of the US trade representative Susan Schwab on Costa Rica’s access to
the US market (see chapter 1).
The violation of the truce by the media was also a compelling narrative. It expressed the
understanding of activists of the NO campaign that the news media was a political actor, rather
than a neutral or disinterested reporter of the facts—only if this is accepted can the “reporting”
in the final days before the referendum be understood as a violation of the prohibition on
campaign activities. The argument is an expression of a critical consciousness that challenges
the categories through which political campaigns were legally regulated. The media’s violation of
the truce then serves metonymically to support a much broader critique of the role of the
establishment media in the referendum process and the political life of Costa Rica more broadly.
Finally, because CNN played a crucial role in the reporting on voting day, the narrative of
fraude mediático also points to the role of transnational capital and the gringos in particular in
the SI campaign (as well as the cultural significance of cable television). It neatly captures the
NO’s understanding of the obstacles they faced as a movement committed to a particular kind of
popular sovereignty against an alliance of domestic and transnational capital, and the Costa
Rican and US governments. The incident involving the CNN interview was particularly well
suited to embody multiple objections to the conduct of the referendum campaign. And while
much of what transpired during the course of the campaign occurred in widely dispersed arena
or away from the public eye, the repeatedly rebroadcast interview could serve as a common
point of reference.
It is also important that the “media fraud” occurred around and on the day of the
referendum. As we have seen, the discourse of electoral fraud, both in its globally-circulating
and dominant domestic forms, is particularly preoccupied with the moments and processes
immediately surrounding the vote itself. In this case, the intervention of the media had little to
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do with the technologies of ballot marking and counting that are so central to this particular
regime of truth (see Coles 2007).
But as Mukulika Banerjee (2008) points out, Election Day can also be understood as
possessing characteristics of the sacred in some electoral regimes. Costa Rica, with its discourse
of elections as “civic celebrations” (fiesta cívica), shares features in common with the rural West
Bengali regime of “sacred democracy” described by Banerjee, and that for this reason everything
that happens on election day has an outsized importance.106 But I would extend her argument to
suggest that this element of the sacred in fact articulates in important ways with the
circumscribed technical regime of truth-production described by Kimberly Coles (2007). The
NO campaign produced an articulation of these two in the concept of “media fraud,” whereas the
articulation from partisans of the SI was to argue that because there had been no fraud the vote
was sacred and its interpretation beyond question, discussion or debate.
Finally, the timing of the “media fraud” addressed a dilemma of the NO campaign after
the referendum. This dilemma was expressed by Epsy Campbell, one of the leaders of the PAC,
in a contentious meeting with representatives of the Comités and other supporters of the NO a
few weeks after the referendum vote. In response to complaints that representatives of the PAC
had agreed to recognize the referendum and cooperate on passing the implementation agenda
(see below), Campbell argued that it was too late: since they had agreed to participate in the
referendum election despite all of the abuses, “because we thought we were going to win,” as she
put it, they could not now say that the process had been fraudulent and refuse to recognize the
result. Many activists of the NO rejected this argument for reasons that will be explained in
more detail in the following section. Insofar as this logic was accepted implicitly or explicitly by
many people, however, the identification of a violation of due democratic process on election

This theme is creatively explored in the opening scenes of the documentary Santo Fraude (Cárdenas
and Rojas 2010).
106

213

day itself potentially provided a way out of the dilemma it presented. But as with all of the
objections to the referendum process, turning it into a politically consequential claim would
require convincing a critical mass of people that the abuses of democratic process were serious
enough to warrant a challenge to the almost sacred principal that the vote is an expression of the
“voice of the people.”

5. Recognition
The question of whether or not the NO would “recognize” the referendum result was distinct,
although by no means entirely separate from, the question of whether the referendum was
regarded as deeply flawed or even “fraudulent.” Of course, a firm assertion of the fraudulent
status of the referendum was certainly associated with a refusal to recognize the result. But it
was neither a sufficient nor necessary condition, because the issue of “recognition” was in fact a
complicated question in its own right that implied a number of pragmatic and ethical
considerations, in the context of the power and authority acquired by the dominant political
bloc, greatly enhanced by their referendum victory. In this context, the perception of
inevitability came to be inextricably entwined with that of legitimacy. And because the
increasing inevitability of the implementation of CAFTA was itself in good measure the product
of the decentralized and increasingly divided character of the NO campaign, which was not able
to offer up a unified and coherent public response to the referendum result, the apparent
legitimacy of the vote was also a product of disorganization of the opposition.
The question of recognition emerged as soon as the provisional results were released
giving a significant margin of victory to the SI, as the press reported the public pronouncements
by Eugenio Trejos and Ottón Solís, whom they regarded as the authoritative voices for the NO
campaign. Both Trejos and Solís deferred recognition of the vote to the settlement of the
question of electoral fraud, a definitive count of the ballots and an investigation of irregularities.
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This was immediately followed by a set of public pronouncements from the government and
opinion leaders in the press calling on these and others in the NO to recognize the referendum
immediately: the question of the possibility of fraud, irregularities, or a substantive debate on
the democratic quality of the referendum was simply brushed aside. At the same time, there was
a groundswell of outrage from within the ranks of the NO campaign, which invoked a critique of
the legitimacy of the referendum that was much larger than the question of the vote count posed
by Solís and Trejos. This produced an outpouring of debate within the NO over the question of
recognition in their alternative public of conversations, meetings, email list-serves, and
assemblies. At the same time, the dominant organs of public culture ignored the substance of
this discussion entirely, while confronting signs of hesitancy, doubt, and refusal from public
figures associated with the NO with a strong discourse on the necessity of recognition.
Recognition, however, was not a simple yes or no proposition. The recognition of any
election is a complicated issue: under the normal standards of representative democracy, it
implies at a minimum that the losing party surrender claims to be the legitimate occupant of the
contested position of legally-sanctioned political power. Beyond this, however, there is generally
no normative expectation that the losing party should cooperate with the victors to implement
their program of governance, and it is usually considered within their rights to continue to use
legal means to express and voice opposition.
The significance of recognition of the CAFTA referendum was, however, much more
ambiguous. Being an exercise of “direct” rather than representative democracy, there was of
course no legally-defined status to be either occupied or surrendered. In this case, recognition
would seem to be a straightforward matter of accepting the authority of the law in question. The
losing party is still free to voice criticisms of that law and to work to overturn or mitigate it,
although its proponents may gain rhetorical force from the apparent directness of the popular
mandate (as opposed to its mediation by elected representatives). In the case of the referendum
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on CAFTA, however, there was a fundamental ambiguity in the very nature of the yes-no
question proposed to voters on the ballot. This question asked only whether or not CAFTA
should be ratified, and said nothing about the laws that would actually be necessary to make
Costa Rica CAFTA-compliant, the so-called “implementation agenda.” In fact, president Arias
had insisted that these laws not be included in the referendum, asserting his freedom to pursue
the laws of the implementation agenda irrespective of the result of the referendum. Even for
those inclined to accept the referendum election as legitimate and binding itself, then, their
responsibilities as democratic subjects were far from clear.
Moreover, the implementation laws were not only sweeping changes to major Costa
Rican institutions (see chapter 1), but the content of these changes was only minimally
stipulated by the terms of the CAFTA treaty itself. For example, CAFTA required that Costa Rica
open its telecommunications market, but this could be done in a number of different ways, each
of which had potentially very different repercussions on the sustainability of the public sector
operator (the ICE), and access to services. Even if one accepted that one was bound, as a
“democratic” subject, to accede to some version of the implementation agenda as a necessary
condition of realizing the electoral decision that Costa Rica accede to CAFTA, it is another
matter to demand that one support a particular content proposed for those laws—particularly
when that specific content had been deliberately left off the ballot.
Complicating matters still further was the tight time limit established in the treaty for
countries to reach compliance, which gave Costa Rican legislators only a few months after the
referendum date. Even though the laws had been left off the referendum ballot, the SI began to
argue as if they had been voted on, based on the reasoning that there was simply no time to
amend them. The argument by opposition legislators that if that were the case they should have
included the implementation laws on the ballot so that voters could make a decision on the
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whole package of laws were effectively ignored by the press and politicians allied with the
government.
While this ambiguity might seem to open up room for various forms of opposition to
CAFTA, even by those who felt a commitment to recognize the legitimacy of the vote, it in fact
became an extremely powerful tool of the dominant political bloc. In effect, the SI converted the
open-endedness of the commitment to CAFTA into an equally open-ended commitment to
support the government’s version of the implementation agenda. Spokespersons for the SI went
even further than this, moreover, demanding the disarticulation of the NO as a political identity.
In the days after the referendum, La Nación was filled with editorials and opinion pieces
declaring that it was time to overcome the divisions of the campaign and to “move forward” with
a joint effort to realize the will of the voters by implementing CAFTA, while disparaging those
who withheld “recognition” as undemocratic. Even the OAS mission declared that Costa Rica
needed to “close one chapter in its history and move forward to develop new opportunities”
(2007:14).
While these sound like the statements normally made by political figures in the wake of
elections followed by calls to unify and to move forward, the context here was quite different. In
the first place, what was being called for was not a vague collaboration between erstwhile
political competitors in an open-ended program of governing subject to negotiation and
compromise, but the adherence of one party to a particular and expansive legal agenda.
Moreover, as we have seen, the NO campaign was not an ordinary electoral force, but a
new articulation of previously disparate social forces around a new identity that significantly
redefined the contours of the Costa Rican political landscape on the basis of an antagonism with
the “businessman politicians” and transnational capital. The demands that everyone put the
past behind them and cooperate together for the future was therefore nothing less than the
demand for the dissolution of the NO, which, as I have argued, was probably far more
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threatening to those identified with the dominant political bloc than the possibility of not
passing CAFTA.
In effect, the message from the government, from the media, and even from the OAS
mission, amounted to a demand to abandon any question of the democratic quality of the
referendum process, to do nothing to oppose CAFTA or the implementation agenda, and to
dissolve the movement of the NO which had been built around discontent with CAFTA as well as
the concentration of political and economic power. This message was not entirely new; much of
the SI campaign had been built around the characterization of the NO as agents of disorder and
a threat to “democracy.” The difference now was that they were able to make these demands in
the name of respect for the election result as a manifestation of popular will. As distinct as the
post-referendum moment was, it is essential to pay attention to the continuities in the
characterization of the NO as an illegitimate force opposed to democratic governance, because
these continuities help to reveal the extent to which “democracy” was a fungible term that could
always be employed to delegitimize opposition, particularly those elements of the opposition
that did not confine their political practice to the more institutionalized forms of partisan
electoral competition.
This, then, was the message that prevailed in public culture as the activists of the NO
confronted their collective sense of outrage, loss and impending catastrophe, and debated the
path forward, beginning with the question of “recognizing” the referendum vote, or not.
However, some of the most influential voices within the NO concluded that the flaws of the
referendum process were not enough to allow them to deny the legitimacy of the final vote—a
decision for which the failure to find significant election-day irregularities carried a particular
importance. This was more or less the public position of elected officials from the PAC and other
established voices of the NO (such as the rector of the University of Costa Rica), who argued that
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the vote had to be recognized based on the lack of sufficient evidence of election-day
irregularities, even as they reiterated criticisms of the referendum process.
The ambivalence of these statements, recognizing the vote while reiterating the flaws in
the referendum process, reflected a widespread dilemma that confronted activists of the NO:
being a democratic subject could imply either rejecting or accepting the legitimacy of the
referendum. To a significant extent, these contrary imperatives depended on distinct
understandings of the meanings of democracy and the quality of Costa Rica’s democratic
institutions. Nevertheless, these conceptions of democracy were not necessarily discrete,
internally-coherent and opposed ideological systems, but rather emphases within a broader
discourse of democracy that implied a largely shared universe of assumptions and values,
including, at least in general terms, the legitimacy of elections as an expression of popular
sovereignty.
To be sure, I have no record of ever hearing any of the activists of the NO express
ambivalence about their own ethical obligations with respect to the vote, although I suspect that
such doubts contributed to the particularly weighty emotional climate of the post-referendum
period. More often, activists of the NO would attribute ambivalence to pragmatic considerations
emerging from their location within the broader discursive terrain of Costa Rican politics. It was
argued that the people (la gente) would not accept an outright rejection of the legitimacy of the
referendum. As Nelson from the Comité Barrio Sur put it to me a few days after the referendum,
refusing to recognize the result would be “very difficult, very difficult, because for most people,
votes are simply arithmetic.” The statement by Epsy Campbell cited above fits this pattern to a
certain degree: the responsibility to respect the referendum vote emerged from a kind of pact or
understanding that the NO had made when they had agreed to participate in the process to the
end. At this same meeting, Ottón Solís cited his responsibility as an elected representative to
obey the law, and appealed to the need to maintain support of a broader voting public that was
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assumed to regard the vote result as legitimate, both of which are reasons that appeal to a
conception of a national public, its institutions and discourses as the grounds on which the
referendum’s claim to legitimacy must be respected.
These expressions of concern over public opinion must be evaluated in the context of the
lopsided power of the advocates of CAFTA in the principal organs of public culture. Although
activists of the NO had been confident in their ability to counteract the SI’s dominance through
the creation of a vibrant counter-public prior to the referendum, as is evident in the quotations
above, the movement as a whole largely lost confidence in its ability to shape public opinion in
the referendum’s wake. This was no doubt an effect of electoral defeat itself, which signaled that
the SI had a larger constituency of supporters than the NO (even if the level of commitment that
the SI’s vote was contested by many). To this we clearly must add the NO’s recognition of the
legitimizing effects of the referendum itself, as an election, and, even more, a direct vote.
More subtly, however, an important feature of the post-referendum period was the
extent to which any refusal to “recognize” the results played into the narratives established by
the campaign of fear waged by the SI campaign, which had made fear of radicalism, instability
and opposition to “democracy” central themes in the characterization of the NO. The activists of
the NO became increasingly afraid of the campaign of fear itself. Rather than leading to the
repudiation of the governing bloc that they expected to see, they were more than ever
constrained within its terms—to the point where they felt that their ability to express dissent was
increasingly limited. This paradoxical situation, I am sure, contributed greatly to the particular
combination of outrage, paralysis, and fear that weighed over the movement in the postreferendum period.
Finally, the increasing sense of impotence in the public debate was also a product of the
uncertainties, and eventual fracturing and decline, of the NO as an organized entity. There were
a number of processes that contributed to this disintegration, which will be discussed in more
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detail below, although not least among them were the very ambivalences and uncertainties
about the necessity and significance of “recognition;” in part, then, there was a kind of vicious
cycle in which an inability to articulate a unified response to the question of the legitimacy of the
referendum was both a cause and a consequence of the increasing political disarticulation of the
NO.
Much of the activist base of the NO, however, advocated for a position of non-recognition
of the referendum results, invoking the undemocratic aspects of the process. The call to not
recognize the referendum was linked, invariably, to pledges to combat the implementation
agenda. The result was the opening of a widening gulf between the elected officials (and most
loyal partisans) of the PAC and the activist bases of the NO campaign.
Many at the base—particularly those who had been committed to a strategy of
opposition “in the streets”—felt that the referendum had been an imposition from the beginning,
and saw no reason why they should be held to the outcome, in contrast to the opinion of leaders
of the PAC, including Epsy Campbell cited above, that participation in the referendum implied a
commitment to respect the results. A poster distributed by activists of the Comités some months
after the referendum nicely sums up this position. It read:

OUR HEARTS HAVE NOT STOPPED BEATING.107 Never has there been so
much injustice and insult to democracy as in this Referendum. We never
accepted their rules…they never accepted our demands. We had no options. But
we gave a clean fight and LEFT STRENGTHENED AND LEGITIMATED TO SAY:
NO TO THE IMPLEMENTATION AGENDA.
The activists who aligned themselves with this position became increasingly outraged
with the PAC and the decision of leading figures in the party to recognize the results. A proposed
solution at the outset of the debate on recognition, which gained some currency, was simply to
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This is a reference to the logo of the NO, a heart in the national colors.
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ignore the question of recognition or not, to refuse to make public pronouncements upon it,
while continuing to exercise the right of opposition to the treaty itself. This might have provided
a solution, but doing so depended on an assertion that the referendum and its result had
nothing to do with the right to actively oppose CAFTA—a position that was perhaps too close to
the non-recognition position for those who were articulated a need to respect the authority of
electoral processes, on the one hand, and was unsatisfying to those who felt the need to
denounce the abuses of the referendum, on the other. Nevertheless, after an initial period of
debate over the question of recognition, and after those on both sides of the question made
pronouncements, the issue of recognition did fall away as an explicit subject of debate, being
replaced by the issue of how to continue opposition to CAFTA or to neoliberalism more broadly.
At the same time, however, the positions taken on the issue of recognition continued to resonate
in practice.

6. Resisting the Implementation Agenda
Whereas refusal to recognize the referendum allowed maximum latitude for dissent, the
implications of accepting the referendum result were much more ambiguous, for reasons
discussed above; it was by no means clear what recognizing the results meant in practice, even
as the representatives of the governing bloc mounted a public campaign to argue that
recognition of the “voice of the people” meant accepting the legislative majority’s version of the
implementation laws. The advocates of CAFTA bolstered this argument with an appeal to
temporality: not only was any attempt to oppose or alter the implementation agenda an
“obstruction” that prevented engagement with other pressing legislative issues, they argued, but
it also put in danger the popular will itself, because failure to implement the laws in accordance
with CAFTA’s legislative timetable could, in theory, make Costa Rica ineligible to join the treaty.
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In fact, events would prove that the United States and other CAFTA signatories were
more than willing to issue multiple extensions, but this was not known to all actors at the time.
(Along with many in the NO, I suspected that the Arias government was aware of this flexibility
but found the urgency a useful cudgel to compel obedience to the government’s legislative
agenda –although this is ultimately conjecture.).

In the Legislature
The legislative fraction of the PAC was in a particularly difficult position, since they were
called upon to make regular legislative decisions on the implementation of the treaty. In the
following months the elected representatives of the PAC, while publically accepting the result of
the referendum as legitimate, used their power in the legislature to intercede in the
implementation of the treaty through the introduction of a large number of amendments and
legal challenges to the government’s version of the agenda. Although the PAC claimed that these
interventions were intended only to limit the damage to public sector and regulatory
institutions, advocates of the treaty in the government and the press accused them of attempting
to obstruct the accession to CAFTA in contradiction to the alleged popular mandate provided by
the referendum.
At the same time, the activist base of the NO was pressuring for a militant strategy of
refusal and non-cooperation; in the assembly of Patriotic Committees on the 29th of October of
2007, representatives voted to “urge the [elected] representatives of the NO to reinforce,
increase and apply, without limits, all possible mechanisms to impede the approval of the
implementation agenda” (emphasis mine).
In the months after the referendum the legislative sessions were attended by lively
crowds of NO supporters protesting the implementation agenda and demanding the
223

renunciation of Fernando Sánchez, one of the two authors of the “memorandum of fear.”
Supporters of the NO crowded the visitors’ gallery. They affixed posters and signs to the thick
panes of glass that separated the gallery from the floor of the assembly, while they chanted and
stomped and pounded on the glass to create enough noise to gain the attention of the legislators
on the other side. This became a regular activity for many supporters of the NO, and eventually
gave rise to the organization of a new Comité, the Committee of the Gallery of the Legislative
Assembly (Comité de las Barras de la Asamblea Legislativa), which organized a group of activists
to pursue a particularly close monitoring of legislative activity and an oppositional politics based
on a contentious presence within the space of the assembly.
On the legislators’ side, the representatives of the opposition parties (PAC, PASE and
Frente Amplio), produced a constant parade of long speeches denouncing the content of the
agenda in detail and with dramatic rhetorical force and proposing a long list of amendments.
The legislators of the government occasionally cast an annoyed glance at the gallery, but rarely
stood up to speak, or even give much sign that they were paying attention to the proceedings at
all. It was evident that as far as most of them were concerned, the legislative process of CAFTA
was over; all that remained was to approve the implementation agenda as currently written.
The attempts by the Comités to intercede in the implementation agenda were
characterized by some of the same ambiguity. In the two contentious open assemblies in the
month of October, the Comités agreed to take action on the implementation agenda.

In the Streets
In two public assemblies held in October, representatives of the bases of the NO
campaign—principally the Patriotic Committees—voted to “define a strategy of resistance with
coordinated and simultaneous actions on the national, local and regional levels, beginning with
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an activity that will take place in November of 2007.” The point of agreement immediately
following this one was; “this assembly commits itself to opposing the plans of concession and
opening (apertura), and to defending and supporting the actions of the social and economic
institutions that are the basis of the model of an inclusive and solidary society, such as the CCSS,
the ICE, the INS, and JAPDEVA, among others.”
The liberalization of public sector institutions was the only aspect of the implementation
agenda that was explicitly mentioned in the assembly’s agreements. This reveals the extent to
which plans for resistance to CAFTA after the referendum were organized around opposition to
the liberalization of public sector institutions, particularly the ICE. In part, this emphasis
reflected the importance of these institutions to those present. Elsewhere we explore more fully
how and why these institutions were so valued, particularly by middle classes closely tied to
public sector institutions that were predominant in many of the Comités (and especially in
those present in the assembly of the 29th of October). That there were few representatives from
campesino organizations or rural Comités present at the assembly, might help to explain the
relative absence of emphasis on resistance to the further opening of the agricultural sector, for
example.108
In the period following the assembly, the future of the ICE—out of all the state
institutions named in the agreements—was invested with a practical and strategic significance
which elevated it above other concerns raised by the implementation agenda in the
conceptualization of protest strategies. This was essentially because the “privatization” of the
ICE was widely viewed as the issue that could mobilize a national popular constituency. The
successful opposition to the Combo in 2000 was the model and the reference point for hopes of
There were some Indigenous representatives from Talamanca present, which ensured the inclusion of
a statement in opposition to the repression of workers affiliated with the Asociación Indígena Cabecar de
Talamanca. The same motion manifested against the reprisals against the “100 workers of Pindeco” (a
major pineapple producer). These were the only distinctly rural or campesino concerns explicitly
addressed by the accords.
108
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organizing opposition to the implementation agenda “in the streets,” just as it had been before
the introduction of the referendum (see chapter 2).
There were specific features of the post-referendum moment that encouraged this return
of the opposition to the Combo as a model. Those who hoped to continue the NO as a form of
popular mobilization generally saw the need for something to rally around, and the particular
issue chosen was a secondary concern. There were some who advocated using protest against
one of the more controversial aspects of the implementation agenda in order to oppose CAFTA
as a whole: by creating a situation that would make it difficult or impossible for the legislature to
approve all of the implementation laws within the schedule provided by the treaty, it was hoped,
Costa Rica would be left out of the agreement. By this reasoning, opposition should be organized
around whichever aspect of the implementation agenda was most able to mobilize opposition in
the streets; memories of the Combo in 2000 encouraged many to think that the ICE would
provide such a catalyst.
Many were not convinced that it would be possible to derail CAFTA in this way, either
because they doubted that the timeline for the implementation agenda was really so inflexible,
or because they thought it was unlikely that a sufficient degree of mobilization could be achieved
in the wake of the referendum and its legitimating effects. For other reasons, however, the desire
to protest exceeded (or was not limited to) objections to any one aspect of the implementation
agenda, or even to CAFTA as a whole. We have discussed the profound outrage that
accompanied the loss of the referendum, which refocused attention on the violations of
democratic process and “institutionality” in the campaign. Beneath the acute outrage was a
long-simmering discontent with the monopolization of institutionalized arenas of politics by
elite proponents of a liberalizing agenda. In this context, protest in the streets was often
characterized as a good in itself—to which any particular claim was, to an important degree,
secondary. Most importantly, protest opened up other avenues to make political claims beyond
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the monopoly of the partisan-electoral system, and was part of how protagonists of the Comités
hoped to transform the practical culture of citizenship. In the weeks and months immediately
following the referendum, however, there was also a hope that protests might serve the more
proximate purpose of maintaining the unity-in-action of the NO.
The experience of participating in the Comités was highly valued by many of the activists
of the NO, as was the potential that they saw in this coalition as a transformative political force.
There was a strong desire to maintain the NO as an active coalition, and to sustain and develop
the Comités as a novel means of political participation. At the same time, the process of building
a working unity was complex and evidently contentious, as the chaotic and, for many, deeply
unsatisfying experience of attempting to come to some kind of working agreement at the two
assemblies in October illustrated. Faced with the difficulties of defining a working political
unity, many gravitated towards what seemed to be a ready-made common project: a series of
coordinated protest actions. This plan drew on a model of action that all were familiar with, and
indeed represented, in good measure, a return to the implicit program of the pre-referendum
period. It was consistent with the affective antagonism towards the politically powerful that had
become increasingly central to the NO campaign, and which had, if anything, only increased in
power in the wake of the referendum. And it did not require moving much beyond the politics of
negation—of CAFTA, and of the políticos-empresarios, that had been fundamental to the NO. A
more propositional politics, not built around a relationship of negation, potentially opened the
door to a more contentious discussion of what the movement was for, rather than what it was
against.
Importantly, however, the efforts in opposition to CAFTA quickly coalesced into
opposition to specific aspects of the implementation agenda, rather than to CAFTA or the
implementation agenda as a whole. In an ongoing series of discussions in the Comités in which I
was participating at the time, it was emphasized that the implementation agenda was simply too
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abstract for “the people” to respond to, and therefore could not serve as a rallying point for the
formation of a popular coalition dedicated to resistance in the streets. (“The people have no idea
what the implementation agenda is, they think it’s to make the FTA better!”). The fate of the
ICE was viewed as a “concrete” issue that would touch people’s “pocketbooks.” At the same time,
the ICE’s largest and most vocal trade unions (particularly ASDEICE and ANTTEC) appeared
willing to take the lead in spear-heading opposition. A mythology around the “yellow stain”
(mancha amarilla)—yellow for the ICE workers’ uniforms—suggested that the workforce was
could be counted on to turn out in force. The November protests promised by the assembly
quickly became centered on the defense of the ICE. But in contrast to 2000, this was no longer
enough.
Attempts to oppose the implementation agenda continued. In the months that followed,
I attended march after march and rally after rally, each with fewer people than the last.
Eventually, the protagonists moved on to other things—whether more localized struggles or a
renewed attempt at national electoral politics (see Rayner 2008).

7. Conclusion
A narrow majority of voters chose to mark sí on CAFTA in the referendum. In the wake of
this vote, the tensions between the NO’s articulation as the representatives of a manifestation of
insurgent popular sovereignty and their defense of the law and Estado Social broke apart in the
context of a reassertion of the heterogeneity of the underlying coalition. At the same time, the
SI’s discourse concerning the relationship between authority and democracy gained new force,
and ultimately worked effectively to fulfill its core purpose: the demobilization of the opposition
to neoliberalization with its trump card of contentious protests in the streets.
Indeed, one of the striking features of this post-referendum moment was that the
struggle against the Combo re-emerged as the (often subtextual) referent of all political
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discourse. A key aspect of the referendum was that the results of approval were themselves
ambiguous: the voters had approved the ratification of CAFTA, but in order to enter into effect
the legislature still needed to approve a packet of laws to make Costa Rica compliant with the
terms of the treaty, including contentious reforms in telecommunications and intellectual
property rights. With the referendum over, could or would the opposition return to oppose the
implementation of CAFTA through the marches, strikes and road blockades that had been so
effective in overturning the still recent efforts to liberalize the telecommunications and
electricity sectors?
Activists of the NO began to talk of a return to the tactics of opposition to the Combo on
the night of the referendum vote, almost as soon as the election returns were made public. There
was a broad and deep sense of outrage; more than one person told me they were ready to “throw
rocks.” At the same time, the “spokespersons” for the NO were immediately called upon to
pronounce whether or not they would accept the results of the referendum. In the subsequent
weeks, the activists of the NO engaged in a series of emotionally intense discussions concerning
recognition and the possibilities of opposition. They were caught in a difficult position. It is one
thing to oppose the results of a vote in the name of a higher ethical commitment, but the NO had
articulated itself as the representative of popular sovereignty. Instead, activists pointed to the
high levels of abstention (about 40 percent), the narrowness of the majority, and the
“fraudulent” nature of the result. Here fraud was equated principally to the alleged violation of
the “electoral truce” by the media, whose news coverage had been even more strongly favorable
to the SI than usual in the final days of the campaign (when the “truce” prohibits proselytism).
Again, however, the TSE did not give this objection the seal of law. A sense of the illegitimacy of
the vote was indeed very widespread—not just because of the violation of the electoral truce but
because of the broader critique of the conduct of the referendum and Costa Rican electoral
democracy more generally. But many of the activists of the NO doubted their ability to
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effectively counter the result in public, given the legitimacy the result was assumed to have with
the people (this time, la gente). In other words, they could no longer easily oppose CAFTA in the
name of popular sovereignty.109
At the same time, the SI triumphantly reiterated their stance that the authority granted
by elections is the essence of popular sovereignty, or democracy. The referendum was the “voice
of the people,” and democracy means “knowing how to lose.” And as before, they claimed an
expanded ground for this authority, to silence dissent and opposition not only to the ratification
of CAFTA, but to the specific terms of the implementation agenda (which were in fact not strictly
determined by CAFTA itself, but even within the framework of the agreement contained large
areas of substantive disagreement). What’s more, it was the duty of every loyal democrat in the
legislature to actively cooperate in the passage of the implementation agenda, in order to realize
the “will of the people.” This discourse was complemented by a more diffuse, pervasive social
pressure to drop the NO and conform. Activists of the NO began to talk more about pressures
from their employers, the disapproval or even possibility of violence from their neighbors. My
own landlord tried to forcibly take down the posters for the NO that had been hung in the
windows. Faced with the “will of the people,” the attempts to oppose the implementation agenda
never really got off the ground. After a series of disappointing marches, what was left of the
movement went on to other forms of engagement and other projects.
The process of contention recounted here highlight tensions and contradictions in the
idea of popular sovereignty itself in its relationship to the national state, law, and the political
participation of nominally free subjects. A popular sovereignty exercised by a unitary people (el
pueblo) is an impossibility given the heterogeneities in any social space. Contemporary
normative democracy calls upon the majority vote, to select a representative or, in more limited
In this the referendum was quite different than the resistance to the Combo, which had been against
the actions of elected representatives, who could more easily be said to have departed from their mandate.
Moreover, the opposition was at that time bolstered by a series of opinion polls, which can be said to have
functioned here as a kind of extra-legal referendum.
109
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cases, to legislate directly. A good democratic subject owes obedience to this majority, or its
appointed agents. But how much obedience, and what kind? What if the legally-constituted
agents of the law are breaking the laws? Here the high liberal theory tie themselves in knots.
Most people are more pragmatic, if they question it at all. In real situations of political discord,
the issue comes up as a welter of competing ethical claims and pragmatic considerations,
including, of course, will I go to jail, or lose my job?
In general, of course, normative liberal democracy recognizes some limits to the majority
rule. There must be protections for the corporal integrity of minorities and dissenters. There
may be controls on campaign contributions, media access and public financing. Secret ballots
are now de rigeur. When are enough of these measures in place, and when are such measures
enough to call a political order democratic? There is a kind of normative standard embodied in a
globally-circulating discourse of democracy, including in the organizations of international
observers that quickly affirmed the fully democratic nature of the referendum vote. For the
activists of the NO, however, to call this majority democratic seemed rather like a cruel joke.110
The referendum had laid bare the capacity of economic and political elites to exercise a broadbased, multifaceted power throughout the social space, from the courts to the media to the
workplace. Lacking a language to precisely name the operation of this power, they said that the
institutions had been “hijacked” by “businessmen-politicians,” the vote was a “fraud,” the
government a “dictatorship.” And they looked towards an alternative standard of popular
sovereignty, rooted in the meeting, the assembly, and protests of an engaged citizenry.
Nevertheless, called upon to respect the sovereignty of that majority, for the most part, they did,
in good measure because of the degree to which they had based their own opposition to the
heights of political and economic power in a common discourse of popular sovereignty.
As one activist form a Patriotic Committee reflected to me; “All they are concerned with is a number,
just numbers. Fifty-one and a half percent, what does that mean? In Paso Ancho, there was exactly the
same number of votes for the SI as the NO. If one more person had shown up, what difference would that
have made? The whole thing seems so surreal.” What he said was true—‘sí’ and ‘no’ each got 500 votes.
110
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Chapter 6

A New way of Doing Politics
Of Meetings and Parties

The Comités Patrióticos provided new experiences of politics and the political for those
who participated in them. As autonomous entities in a loosely integrated, horizontal network,
the Comités contrasted with the hierarchical political and economic institutions that dominated
participants’ prior experiences of public life. In the context of the 2007 referendum, moreover,
the activists of the NO experienced their participation in these Comités as a particularly
empowered, even “historical,” agency; ordinary citizens who felt politically marginalized most of
the time were suddenly capable of going toe to toe with the most powerful forces—and not just
their own domestic political and economic elites, but the overbearing power of the United States
and its mammoth transnational corporations, too. Few were unaffected, and many were greatly
inspired and deeply transformed, by this experience.
In this chapter I will provide an analytical account of the everyday practices, forms of
sociality, and principles of organization through which activists of the Comités worked to create
what they sometimes referred to as a “new way of doing politics.” I emphasize the period after
the referendum of 2007, which is when the making of a political alternative became a conscious
project rather than a spontaneous response to the demands of the referendum campaign. I begin
with an account of the core activity of the Comités: the weekly reunión (meeting), where
activists deliberated over what kind of political intervention to make, and how to make it. In this
chapter I will attend less to the content of those conversations than Their form—to the social
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practice of “meeting.” Following Francesca Polletta (2004), I argue that activists of the Comités
consciously worked to create new forms of sociality to facilitate a new kind of politics, but in
doing so drew, often unconsciously, on familiar relational idioms. Taking as examples the three
Comités that I knew most intimately, I show that participants in each created distinct forms of
sociality by emphasizing different relational idioms. At the same time, I argue that a shared,
albeit loosely defined, idiom of compañerismo provided a common framework for the
movement as a whole and constituted an important symbolic resource for the development of
self-consciously political relationships.
In the second part of the chapter I turn to attempts to bring the Comités together to
collaborate on common political projects, attempts which included mass assemblies, regional
associations, and a movement to forge a national electoral coalition for the 2008 presidential
election. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s conception of the role of the party, I look at how and
why activists of the Comités repeatedly tried to organize themselves to act in concert at larger
scales, and at the contradictions and obstacles that they encountered in doing so. I explain why
these obstacles ultimately frustrated attempts to create unified national, or even regional,
working coalitions of Comités for any length of time, despite the manifest desire of the majority
of those who remained in the movement to continue to be consequential agents at the national
scale after the referendum.
Altogether, this chapter is a sustained reflection on how the activists of this movement
sought to reconcile autonomy of action with coordination at larger scales. Doing so successfully
seems to depend on articulating sociality, affect, identity and organizational form. But the
political context—the kind of decision-making it demands—seemed to play an essential, if not
the predominant role. In the context of the referendum, disparate energies were united
spontaneously by a common negation (of CAFTA and the SI). The forms of sociality developed
by the Comités , and the cultural idiom of compañerismo that underlay them, provided
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important symbolic resources that helped participants to work together in less hierarchical
ways. In the context of the unity and commonality of purpose provided by the NO campaign,
these symbolic resources facilitated the spontaneous creation of a remarkably horizontal and
participatory movement. After CAFTA, however, the need for a more proactive politics created
new pressures, at which point participants began to create hybrids of direct and representative
democracy. Although these initiatives did not endure, I would suggest that they merit being
taken seriously. That it is easier to come together to say “no” (and “not you”) than it is to come
to agreement on what is worth struggling for, is a problem that will be familiar to many who
have participated in decentralized movements. The attempts by the activists of the Comités to
create new assemblages of participation and representation carry useful lessons for those who
might hope to pursue a more genuinely egalitarian and participatory politics. This chapter
accordingly seeks to add to a growing body of work exploring the proliferation of experiments in
alternative democratic forms, which have been particularly consequential in—but not limited
to—Latin America (see e.g. Fernandes 2010; Juris 2012; Lazar 2008; Nugent 2008; Razsa and
Kurnick 2012; Sitrin 2006; Smilde and Hellinger 2011; Zibechi 2010).

1. Meetings: practice and sociality of the Comités
In this section I discuss the forms of sociality that characterized the meetings, the shape
of leadership and decision-making, as well as the harder-to-pin down processes involved in the
making of a sense of unity, shared identity and solidarity. I discuss in detail the three Comités
that I came to know best—those whose meetings I attended on a regular basis during most of the
two years of my fieldwork—and attempt to account for the differences between them.
Despite their differences, however, the meetings of all of the Comités that I attended
were characterized by important similarities. They varied in size from the high of forty or fifty
persons they achieved just before the referendum, to typically less than ten a year later. They
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were notably horizontal in organization, operating without formal leaders, and in an open and
participatory style in which all present were encouraged, or even expected, to speak. Participants
often expressed commitment to equality and participation as core values.111 (This does not mean,
however, that all were able to participate on an equal footing; differences of class, age and
gender were significant, as I explain below). Important decisions were usually ratified by a vote,
although votes often tended to occur after a significant level of consensus had been achieved,
and were rarely contentious.
Participants often contrasted the participatory and egalitarian character of the Comités
to trade unions or political parties. They complained that these organizations were dominated
by a handful of leaders who excluded those who wanted to participate and stifled alternative
viewpoints. After attending several union assemblies and meetings of political parties I certainly
noted the difference. Both the unions and the parties were dominated by a handful of persons,
and usually one big personality. At assemblies and meetings, these leaders would speak
authoritatively, while supporters were essentially confined to positions as spectators. In one
case, in an assembly of a trade union of employees of the ICE, much to my surprise the
leadership insisted on changing the results of a vote in front of the membership because the
union’s president did not like the outcome. There was some grumbling but the matter was soon
resolved and the meeting concluded.

Compañeros
Francesca Polletta argues that participants in participatory democratic movements tend
to draw on other pre-existing frameworks to order their interactions. Because such movements

At the same time, there was little explicit discussion about the conduct of the meetings themselves, in
marked contrast to the interest in “process” I have encountered in horizontalist movements in the U.S.
111
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are often unfamiliar to those who enter them, and because their very lack of formal structure
creates ambiguity, participants draw on more familiar frameworks of interaction to guide their
relationships. In the case of the contemporary and historical US social movements Polletta
researched, participants in movements related to each other variously as "co-religionists,"
"teachers and students," and "friends." The dominance of one idiom or another in a movement
carried distinct implications for its evolution, including characteristic dilemmas and crises
(2004:17-23).
Like the movements studied by Polletta, activists of the Comités drew on relational
idioms with which they were familiar, even as they consciously worked to create new forms of
sociality and political participation. While the relational repertoire of activists in the Comités
included many of the idioms identified by Polletta as important to US social movements, these
relationships were given distinctive accents and emphases.
In addition, one idiom, which does not figure centrally in the movements Polletta
studied, was particularly important to the Comités: this is the relation of compañerismo.
Compañero/a could be translated either as "companion" or "comrade," and in fact carries many
of the connotations of both of these terms. Lugones and Rosezelle provide an apt discussion of
the term in the context of a discussion of relational models in feminist organizing: "[Compañera
is] the term...for the sort of relation that consists of joining forces and efforts and imagination in
common political struggles…."Compañera" does not require the depth of emotional attachment,
empathetic and sympathetic communication that "hermana" [sister] and "amiga" (friend)
require…. "Compañera" connotes egalitarianism, but the egalitarianism is one of companionship
and participation in common political struggle (1995: 138, also cited in Polletta 2004:174).112
112 Polletta

provides a brief discussion of compañero/a as an alternative to "friendship" and "sisterhood" in
feminist movements, but none of the movements that she studied were actively employing this term. In
my own experience, compañero/a has some currency with contemporary Anglophone activists in the US
(and commonly with Latinos), particularly those with some familiarity with Latin American movements.
The tendency to adopt the term reflects, I would suggest, the fact that it allows for a conception of political
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While Lugones and Rozaselle give the term a distinctly political valence, however, it is
not in fact limited to political contexts: one can refer to one's compañeros de trabajo, colegio or
universidad (work, high school and university), and it can also apply to romantic relationships,
domestic partners, and spouses. In all of these cases, the term is used with at least a measure of
affection, and connotes a sense of solidarity and shared experience, but without necessarily
implying the intimacy of amistad (friendship). In addition, as Lugones and Rozaselle suggest,
the relationship of compañerismo tends to be defined in relation to a shared experience of
institutional contexts or involvement in a common project; "it is very important that the term
does not connote unconditional bonding…. if someone ceases to be involved or interested in or
betrays the struggle, the relationship is at an end" (ibid). As used in the Comités and other
spaces of political organizing, the idiom of compañerismo provides a unique symbolic resource
that defines the relationship in terms of solidarity in the face of shared struggle.
Nevertheless—and probably inevitably given the multiple contexts in which it is used—
compañerismo in practice tends to be informed by, or overlap with, other kinds of relationships;
it may be more or less purely political or project-oriented, more or less accented by friendship,
collegiality, affection or love. Indeed, as a relational idiom that is applied in quite distinct social
contexts, the expectations, obligations, and limits of the relationship of compañerismo are for
most people less defined than those of, say, friends (amigos/as) or siblings (hermanos/as). This
is particularly true of the relatively politically inexperienced (which many participants in the
Comités were), while more experienced activists have more elaborated expectations of
compañerismo. But even for the experienced, the self-conscious newness of the Comités
encouraged people to question and redefine existing models of political relationships, including
those associated with compañerismo. As a result, activists of the Comités drew on more familiar,

relationships that is not readily available in English, particularly given the semantic narrowing of
"comrade" to a kind of caricuture of communist militancy.
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and culturally elaborated, relational forms such as friendship or collegiality to situationally
define the meaning of compañerismo, even as they employed compañerismo to define their
relationships to others in the movement; in other words, compañerismo provided a certain
amount of guidance in relating to others, but in practice it was refined and supplemented with
other idioms.
The existence of an idiom proper to egalitarian cooperation in a shared (political)
struggle, then, modifies (but does not negate) the process of borrowing idioms from other, more
familiar relationships, identified by Polletta among activists in the US. Moreover, I do not
advocate a Whorfian linguistic reductionism that might suggest that the existence or absence of
a term such as compañero makes a relationship like compañerismo possible or impossible. Just
as activists in the Comités had to flesh out the meaning of compañerismo, activists in the US
have developed cultures of relating politically that are not reducible to terms such as "friend,"
even if they generally lack a name for that relationship. Nevertheless, the existence of the idiom
of compañerismo is significant because it makes more easily thinkable certain important aspects
of working together politically. In particular, it helps to define relationships in terms of the
obligations and shared burdens inherent in a shared struggle or project. Friendship is often a
problematic basis for a political relationship, in part because the obligation in a friendship is to
the other person, rather than to the cause. In the idiom of compañerismo, on the other hand,
the common bond is principally defined in relation to the shared burdens of a common struggle
(in this way it is much like mística as used in Costa Rica, see chapter 1).
Compañerismo was the principal shared idiom that defined relationships in the Comités.
Although rarely used in the context of the Comités' weekly meetings, and only very occasionally
as a form of address to an individual, it was the default form of address when addressing the
movement as a public, for example in speeches at rallies or in emails to list-serves which would
invariably begin with a salutation such as estimad@s compañer@s (where the arroba was used
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to incorporate both gendered endings). As a collective address, it served to define the audience
(the Comités as well as their allies and supporters) and the speaker as part of a solidary
community organized around a common struggle. It was also commonly used in reference to a
third party, particularly one that might not have been known to the speaker, e.g. "the
compañeros from Desamparados are organizing a demonstration"; in this usage, again, the
idiom served to define the group or individual as committed to the same cause.
Indeed, there are some notable parallels between compañerismo as a relational idiom
and the empty (and subsequently floating) signifier as a symbolic element allowing the
"articulation" of coalitions of social actors into unified "populist" movements. Like Laclau's
empty signifier, compañerismo is used to expand bonds of solidarity to create more unified
movements. In this case, invocations of the idiom of compañerismo were broadly coterminous
with the movement of the NO (although there were also many who would be hesitant to consider
the whole movement of the NO to be their compañeros, revealing how fragmented the
movement remained, particularly along partisan and ideological lines). The idiom can be seen as
the relational equivalent of the movement's unifying symbols: the word "NO" and the flagemblazoned heart. And like these symbols, the idiom of compañerismo is characterized by an
important degree of "emptiness": because it is not a fully elaborated code of behavioral
expectations, it can contain and express a variety of different kinds of relationships. Just as the
signifier that unites a movement is rarely (if ever) truly "empty," however, compañerismo does
its work because it is in important ways defined, as we have seen, in terms of the burdens of a
shared struggle and common project.
Compañerismo, then, serves as a more directly social (in the sense of interpersonal)
complement to the symbolic role of the signifier in facilitating the creation of a new,
encompassing political identity that creates bonds of solidarity between pre-existing
oppositions, differences and particularities. The existence of this relational idiom, in fact, points
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to a lacuna in Laclau's conceptualization of populist movement building: the kind of
relationships created among participants and supporters. This absence, in fact, works to blunt
the force of Laclau's important work in freeing populism as an analytical rubric from its
association with a particular historical moment or form of government (such as
"authoritarianism"). The creation of new political identities and oppositions is often
accompanied by profound changes in how political agency is lived as a relationship to others,
even in the cases where a populist movement has articulated around a charismatic leading figure
such as Juan Perón (see e.g. James 2000). In the case of the Comités, however, attention to the
relations within the movement is particularly important because a populist dynamic of
reinscribing social divisions was accompanied by an attempt to create "a new way of doing
politics," in good measure through the construction of new forms of political sociality.
Just as the "empty signifier" that unites a movement is filled with meaning over time,
compañerismo is given form in relation to more particular experiences; in this case, the practice
of living relationships. Although it was occasionally used as a form of address between
participants in a given Comité in the context of a meeting, this usually only took the form of a
collective address: "compañeros, we have to think about how the neighbors (vecinos) view these
demonstrations." Again, compañero served to reiterate the foundation of the relationship
between the speaker and the rest of the Comité as a shared political struggle, and rhetorically
invoked the register of the political speech in order to add gravity to one's statements. That it
was rarely applied as an address to an individual is because it could, correspondingly, be
interpreted as distancing; effectively, compañero/a referred to the common denominator
shared by everyone committed to the movement, and for the same reason could be interpreted
as a denial of a more specific relationship. (In personal address within a Comité, the addressee’s
name was mostly commonly used, sometimes with the honorific don or doña which, along with
the formal usted, is a standard everyday form of address in Costa Rica).
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Compañero/a served as a basis on which more particular relations were forged in the
context of the Comités and the movement of the NO, supplemented by other relational idioms.
While compañerismo, with its emphasis on shared participation in a common struggle, formed
the basic relational idiom of the Comités in general, the particular accent given to it by the
invocation of other idioms such as friend, sibling or colleague made for significant differences in
how the Comités were made and lived. As a result, despite a marked degree of similarity in what
one might call the more formal aspects of the Comités —including the absence of formal
leadership, rhetorical commitment to creating an egalitarian and participatory alternative to
"traditional" politics, their trajectory from national to local scales of engagement—each Comité
was a different social experience. The differences in styles between Comités was occasionally
remarked on by participants, although these differences were not subject to more systematic
reflection; among other reasons, because few people had direct experience of participating in
more than one Comité. Below I will attempt to account for the differences in relational style
between the Comités, principally in terms of the dominant idioms used to supplement
compañerismo.
I will not, however, attempt to derive a conclusion about which one "worked better."
While such a conclusion would be tempting given its potential to inform activist efforts in the
future, it is for me a nearly impossible task given the small sample size, incidence of other
"factors" (such as the class composition of the neighborhood), the broad similarity in the
activities and trajectory of the Comités, and the difficulty of defining success for what was a
constantly evolving movement with multiple, ever-changing near- and long-term goals. Rather,
by showing how the activists of the Comités used different relational idioms to produce distinct
realizations of a shared framework of participatory politics, I affirm the relevance of Polletta's
analytical account of US-based movements in the Costa Rican context. Even without venturing
to claim that one or another "works better," participants in participatory, egalitarian, and
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loosely-structured movements would do well to keep in mind the importance of relational
idioms and affective styles. US movements, in particular, might gain much from a more careful
attention to the idiom of compañerismo, and particularly its emphasis on creating relationships
around shared struggle in the pursuit of common projects.
At the same time, I also point to a dimension of the borrowing of relational idioms for
participatory politics that remains relatively untreated in Polletta's account: the usage of a
relational idiom in a new context changes its meaning. It does so, in part, by expanding the
range of significations; "friends" comes to mean something a bit different when it takes shape in
the context of a shared political project. The busy schedule of meetings, rallies, leafleting,
collecting signatures, and all the rest, created new relationships and transformed them over
time. Moreover, relationships such as those forged in the context of the Comités come to
compete in all kinds of more or less material ways with other kinds of affective relations;
principally by using up a lot of a one's time. This also presented a constraint on participation:
there were few participants who had young children, which meant that participants tended to be
either younger or older than child-rearing age, or they were simply unattached. This constraint
seemed to apply to men as well as to women, which probably reflects at least a partial
assumption of childrearing responsibilities by men (cf. Gutmann 2006).
In some of the Comités, broadly rethinking existing forms of social relations (beyond the
more instrumental use of the Comité as a means to a "new way of doing politics") became an
explicit aim (as was also the case with most of the movements that Polletta discusses). But even
when creating new forms of sociality wasn't an explicit goal, the relations that were created
changed the context of other relationships and cast them in a different light. While
compañerismo might be a relatively open (or "empty") idiom, other more culturally-elaborated
relational forms (such as friendship and family) are themselves far from fixed. In their attempt
to create new kinds of political relationships, participants in the Comités were also remaking
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and reimaging other kinds of relations, even as-and in large part because-they drew on these
other idioms to inform compañerismo. This open-ended and experimental form of sociality was
to me one of the most striking aspects of the experience of the Comités.
Kath Weston's (1997) account of how gays and lesbians in the United States create
families of choice by innovating on existing cultural idioms of kinship is as useful as any model
of politics for understanding the Comités ; even though the relationships did not have the
durability, multi-dimensionality, or profundity of the kin relations Weston documents, a few of
them began to resemble “families of choice” to varying degrees. 113
At the same time, the Comités also drew on the practices, discourses and symbols of
formal politics. Particularly in the post-referendum period, there was an increasingly explicit
desire to develop the Comités as an alternative mode of politics that would be more horizontal
and participatory. Activists discussed and debated structural forms, and despite the desire to
create something new, the models invoked often shared features in common with existing
formal organizations. Complicating the situation was that some participants were also
committed to the future of formal political organizations, particularly political parties, which
informed their engagement with the Comités and their future. These discussions became
particularly important when efforts were made to establish more formal structures of
coordination between Comités. At the same time, within the Comités themselves, there was
always a partial and selective use of a register of formality, through practices such as the
113 I

am indebted to Kandice Chuh for introducing this idea into a discussion on horizontalist
politics in the Solidarities seminar of the Committee for the Study of Globalization and Social
Change. The capacity of compañerismo to serve as a means for remaking kin relationships is
suggested by its adoption as a substitute for novio/a (boyfriend, girlfriend, or fiancée) and
esposo/a (husband, wife) by both same and mixed-sex couples. Although similar to the use of
"partner" in English, compañero/a evokes the bond of shared burdens more than the
contractual relationship that is associated with its Anglophone equivalent. The making of
compañero/a together with idioms such as friend, colleague and brother/sister worked in much
the same way, if in a distinct relational domain.
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adoption of a name or the keeping of minutes. This formal register was used to affirm and create
an identity and a sense of permanence, as well as to locate the Comités in organized political life.
The hybrid of formal and informal expressed the particular aspirations of activists to make the
Comités into a new form of mediation between official politics and the life-world of the pueblo.

The Comité Juanito Mora de Barrio Sur
When I first began attending meetings of the Comité Juanito Mora, meetings were held
in a house shared by one of the principal activists, Benjamín, his elderly mother, his ex-wife and
his son. The house was located at what might be considered the civic center of the
neighborhood, at the edge of the football field which in turn adjoined the salón comunal
(community center), a meeting space for Alcoholics Anonymous, and a much-neglected sports
facility or polideportivo. The elementary school and the Catholic Church were each a few blocks
away. This area in the center of Barrio Sur was recently urbanized; a mix of older and newer
houses, with a population ranging between low income and lower-middle class, broadly
representative Barrio Sur and the neighborhoods of South San José more generally. In
surrounding areas, pockets of more extreme or concentrated poverty and of relative affluence,
including a few small gated developments. With the exception of some small congregations of
men at the pulperías (small groceries), there was little visible neighborhood life in the streets—
although there were certainly more people to be seen walking in the streets than in the uppermiddle-class neighborhoods to the North and East. The general view was that walking in the
neighborhood at night was unsafe, and those who did so were careful to carry a small amount of
money to hand to robbers "so that they don't get upset and kill you."
Those who participated in the Comité generally did not know each other before the
referendum campaign: this was not a meeting of neighbors or friends with longstanding ties.
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The Comité came together through participation in events related to the referendum and email
list-serves. I was surprised to learn this, however, because the relationships between activists
seemed to be characterized by a kind of informality and camaraderie that led to me to initially
assume that the Comité was built out of long-standing acquaintance, if not friendship. The
meetings were conducted with a minimum of formality or structure. They were held in the small
narrow living of the house, packed with chairs from the kitchen in which the eight or ten who
showed up would sit. An agenda was set at the beginning, but it was flexible and the time
devoted to each topic was unstated and highly fungible, which meant that meetings often
continued from seven in the evening until ten at night. People spoke informally when they felt
they had something to say. Sometimes votes were held when it seemed that a decision had to be
made between contending options, but most decisions tended towards a consensus-without this
being stated as an explicit value.
The meetings then drew on an idiom of friendship which was conducive to a relaxed and
informal meeting style. Particularly after the urgency of the referendum had passed, there were
long discussions, not just of potential actions, but of political developments in Costa Rica, Latin
America, and the United States, as well as of more profound and enduring political questions,
such as, “on what kind of temporal scale should revolutionary changes be imagined?” and “what
kind of lessons could be learned from attempts at transformation in Venezuela, Bolivia and
Cuba?” Although there were attempts to provide an agenda for discussion, it was always
fungible. The resulting loss of efficiency in decision-making was compensated to a significant
degree by the development of relations of mutual respect, trust and commitment characteristic
of friendship. Building relationships on the model of friendship made participation in the group
attractive for some, particularly youth. While the lasting nucleus of the Comité was composed of
a group of four men ranging in their forties, fifties and sixties, a number of university students
participated for extended periods of time, particularly in the contentious period after the
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referendum. Over time, the calendar of political activities expanded to include a number of
social events—overnight visits to the countryside, excursions to cultural events, dinner and
drinks. Between the bonds of solidarity forged in the course of the referendum campaign and
the protests afterwards and the regular social activities, some of these relationships solidified
into real and enduring emotional commitments. For the same reason, this was the Comité with
which I established the closest personal relationships, cemented through long days at rallies,
leafleting, and nights spent drinking in the mountains.
Friendship was also increasingly supplemented by an idiom of family. The men who
formed the core of the Comité referred to each other, and to me, as "brother" (hermano). A
change of location also lent a decidedly more domestic cast to the weekly meetings; some
months after the referendum, Benjamín began to withdraw from the Comité, disappointed that
they were not dedicated enough to continuing the fight against CAFTA and its implementation
agenda (see chapter 5). The Comité began to hold meetings in the house of Ricardo (the man
with the dog mentioned earlier) and his wife, Patricia. Patricia assumed the role of the maternal
host, providing juice and tortillas with fresh cheese or hot French bread. While the meetings
continued to be characterized by the loosely-structured and informal friendly conversation,
Benjamín's older brother Guillermo emerged as an unofficial leader, directing conversation and
contributing the largest number of proposals for political actions and social and cultural
activities. While this leadership was I think mainly based in his decades-long experience in
community organizing, as well as his remarkable energy, eloquence, insight, and charisma (in
this case, the ability to connect emotionally with those with whom he interacted), it was, I think,
not inconsequential that he was also the oldest male in the room, particularly given the notable
strength of traditions of deference to elders in contemporary Costa Rican social life.
Other people tended to drift away, however. As Polletta shows, friendship as a basis of
movement organizing carries the potential for divisions based on feeling excluded as (non)
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friends (2004:142-148). Relatedly, the very informality of relationships can produce a "tyranny
of structurelessness," the subject of the well-known critique of non-hierarchical feminist
organizations by Jo Freeman; the lack of a formal structure does not necessarily do away with
power relations, but it makes those that continue to exist "informally" less visible and less open
to confrontation (1972, see also Polletta 2004:164-8). In the case of the Comite Juanito Mora
the group was small enough for the relationships to be relatively transparent. However, the
idioms of friendship and kinship entailed particular kinds of relations and obligations that had
consequences for participation, consequences that at least to some extent fell along age and
gender lines. Participation in the committee demanded the ability to sustain relationships of
friendship with a core of older male activists, some of whom were also very strong personalities.
For all of the reasons of personality that make some friendships work better than others, this
attracted some to commit to the Comité, and others to distance themselves. The long, informal
and open-ended talking sessions were pleasurable for some, and less so for others: as one young
man of Nicaraguan descent put it in explaining his decision to leave the Comité: "all we do is
talk" (whereas this same intellectual and political talk was something that others valued very
highly).
But there was also a structural dimension to when friendship worked and when it didn't.
Even as the model of friendship was often attractive to youth, younger persons also perceived
these relationships with older people (and mainly men) as tinged with the hierarchy of
paternalistic familial relations. And even if these relationships are generally easier and more
fluid in Costa Rica than in the United States, they did not necessarily feel liberating. As a result,
younger activists tended move on to more youthful groups after some time. Gender made a big
difference as well. Friendships between men and women are at least as complicated in Costa
Rica as in the United States, and the framework of friendships opened the door to flirtation,
making the space of the Comité at the least complicated for women (and particularly younger
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women). Moreover, because as full participation and belonging to the Comité depended on a
commitment to and set of intensive friendships and a round of social and political activities, it
potentially competed with other emotional, familial, personal, and working commitments. This
too had a structural, class and gender, dimension; no one in the Comité had small children or
worked a double shift.
There was yet another model guiding relations in the Comité Juanito Mora, however:
this was the spiritual community or congregation. Particularly once the friendships that formed
the core of the Comité began to solidify, Guillermo began to introduce a discourse and a set of
practices inspired by his idiosyncratic syncretism of Andean sacred traditions. During stays at
his cabin in the mountains he would guide his guests, including members of the Comité and
others, through a series of rituals focused on honoring Pachamama and cultivating love for each
other and for nature. We would end embracing each other or, sometimes, a giant ancient tree.
Politically, these rituals and the discourse that surrounded them were connected to a strong
environmental commitment, as well as an indigenist and pan-Latin Americanist politics that
sought to emphasize pride in indigenous roots as well as solidarity with movements throughout
the region, and particularly in Bolivia. The rituals served to reiterate and elevate these valuesbut just as much to solidify the Comité and sympathizers in a solidary community cemented by
affection and a moment of collective effervescence. While Guillermo organized and conducted
these rituals, he claimed no particular status, and they were informal affairs celebrated in the
context of relations of friendship, celebration and a large dose of good humor. As informal as
they were, however, the rituals and the associated discourse of indigenist spirituality were also a
reflection, and an important part of, Guillermo's intellectual and moral leadership.
The cultivation of a dimension of the sacred reflected something else as well: the Comité
Juanito Mora was not conceived by its participants as just a group of friends. It was, rather, a
purpose-driven organization with an (unstated) mission. It was unique and special and, its
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supporters hoped, had a unique historical role. In addition to the rituals and the practice of the
sacred, this was emphasized in other ways, particularly through the cultivation of aspects of a
named, identifiable, formal organization. While there were some aspects of formality, such as
the planning of an agenda for meetings, that were more purely functional, others were more
clearly directed towards the cultivation of an organizational identity. This became particularly
important after the referendum, when the Comité began to refer to itself more frequently as the
Comité Juanito Mora. Having a name, and an associated logo (the image of President Juan
Rafael Mora Porras), facilitated the creation of an identity and a public persona for the Comité
that circulated on flyers and other public representations. Moreover, the name was a reference
to the historic president who led the Costa Rican contingent in the fight against William
Walkers’ Filibusters in 1856. This name connected the Comité with the struggle against US
imperialism. More abstractly, the name also served to connect the Comité to a profoundly
important moment in Costa Rican political history, and to locate it as a part of the stream of
national history itself.
By drawing on all of these models--a group of friends, a family, a spiritual congregation,
a political organization engaged with others in the making of history, the activists of the Comité
created a new and very particular kind of sociality. This was not only a new kind of politics, but
an experiment in different ways of relating to others in the private and personal as well as the
public, which were neither wholly divorced from, nor merely repetitions of, existing culturally
informed models of friendship, family, spiritual community, and politics.

The Comité Lomas
The Comité Lomas shared a great deal with the Comité Juanito Mora in its purposes,
organization and practices. Nevertheless, the conduct of the meetings and the character of the
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relations between participants were strikingly different. I argue that much of this difference is
due to the fact that the participants in the Comité Lomas related to each other more as
professional colleagues than as friends—and certainly not as a family or a congregation. This did
not necessarily make any perceptible difference in the sustainability or political activity of the
Comité, but it certainly made the Comité itself a substantially different experience for
participants. It is difficult to assess the meaning or consequences of the difference in sociality,
although it is certainly the case that these differences in experience intersected with differences
of age, class, and gender. My take is that the more professional idiom, at least in this case, was
more conducive to working across gender lines, but perhaps did not facilitate the same degree of
identification with or emotional commitment to the group. Whether or not this is the case, the
difference underlines again that the Comités were forms of sociality being actively constructed
by participants.
Meetings were held in a room of the public elementary school of the district of Lomas, a
mainly upper-middle-class neighborhood in the municipality of Montes de Oca, which is
contiguous with the city of San José and which hosts the flagship campus of the University of
Costa Rica. Most of the participants were professionals: engineers, administrators, and
university faculty and students. Many shared some degree of connection through the university
or through involvement with the PAC, but as with Juanito Mora, most came to know each other
through participation in the Comité . When I first began to attend meetings in August of 2007,
the Comité was considerably larger than that of Juanito Mora, with approximately twenty five
persons attending meetings, a number which swelled to forty just before the referendum (again
with the influx of people being trained as fiscales). This number gradually dropped after the
referendum, until by the end of 2009 meetings normally had only five or six persons.
As with Juanito Mora, the Comité Lomas did have an informal leader, Cristina. Cristina
was an engineer with a relatively high administrative position in one of the public-sector
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autonomous institutions. Her leadership was mainly as a facilitator and an organizer of
meetings and events. At the beginning of every meeting she would introduce the agenda and
report back from the weekly meetings she attended with representatives from other Comités of
Montes de Oca. When the Comité organized events, she would undertake the task of calling
supporters to convince them to come. Her approach was energetic, unfailingly cheerful, but also
business-like: the agenda was strictly focused on the activities and organizational questions of
the Comité. The personal and phatic conversations were kept to a minimum, and they did not
engage in the kind of wide-ranging discussions of national and international politics that so
characterized the Comité Juanito Mora. The fact that the meeting was held in a school, rather
than in a house underlined the public and formal as opposed to private and personal
atmosphere of meetings, while food, which marks nearly all social activities in Costa Rica, was
rarely if ever present. The professional and business-like style of meetings was matched by an
absence of purely social events. My own relationship to participants in the Comité was
correspondingly different: I saw them only at meetings and political events, and ultimately came
to have a much less personal relationship with members of this Comité than with those of
Juanito Mora. Rather than friends, participants related to each other as colleagues.
In addition to relating to each other as colleagues, the Comité Lomas also drew on
practices of organization characteristic of more formal institutions, or a “technocratic passion”
as one participant sardonically described it to me. After the referendum, at the urging of one of
its more active members (an administrator by profession), the Comité embarked on a complex
and time-consuming process of defining shared values and political priorities to use these as the
basis of a mission statement. While the idea of a mission statement was no doubt influenced by
the organizational practices of firms and NGO's, the methodology sought to be both democratic
and participatory; participants in the Comité wrote out their values and priorities on cards
which were then read aloud and discussed. Participants were both applying and reworking
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models of professional relationships, in a way not unlike Juanito Mora’s reconfiguring the
meaning of friendship.
The formal practices of organization building however contrasted with the more informal
practices of discussion of values and purposes pursued in the Comité Juanito Mora. The attempt
to define the Comité as an organization with explicit values and a stated mission was, however,
parallel to Juanito Mora's adoption of a name and logo-in both cases, they were gestures
towards formality meant to establish the Comité as an enduring organization. The differences in
how this goal was approached reflected the differences in the form of sociality that characterized
them (between an organization of colleagues and a spiritually-based community of friends). It
also reveals a difference in how the Comité was understood to relate to its ends: for the activists
of Juanito Mora, the community of the Comité was nearly as, if not more, important than
whatever political ends it might serve (just as is also the case with a group of friends, a family, or
a spiritual community). For Lomas, on the other hand, the Comité was treated principally as a
means to achieve political ends, just as colleagues meet and discuss to achieve a particular
purpose rather than for the pleasure of the meeting itself.
The difference in styles between these Comités likely reflects, to some extent, the class
makeup of the participants. While some of the core activists of the Comité Juanito Mora were
college-educated professionals, the Comité Lomas was more homogeneously professional, and
participants were more likely to occupy higher-level administrative positions. The model of the
colleague was thus more generalized to more of the members. The size of the meetings, at least
initially, probably also encouraged a more formal style of engaging in meetings. But the
differences also reflect the agency of participants, in particular those that exercised one degree
or another of informal leadership. The Comités were personal and collective projects, and the
forms of sociality that characterized them were the result of conscious and unconscious choices
in the making of a new social and political form. The discourse of friendship, family and spiritual
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community was quite explicit in the case of the Comité Juanito Mora, a reflection of the greater
emphasis placed by some of its leading members on the creation of an alternative form of
community which, as Guillermo consistently emphasized, was at least as important as the work
done by the Comité itself. While the professionalism of Lomas was tacit, the participants in the
Comité Lomas consciously or unconsciously pursued a model of relating that they viewed as
most efficient in getting the work of the Comité done: the Comité Lomas was viewed much less
as an end in itself and much more as a means. The result was that even though the general
outlines of these projects were broadly similar—creating a new form of political participation for
the realization of a more authentic popular sovereignty—the sociality created within them
differed markedly, and produced a very different experience for participants. The differences,
resulting from a combination of conscious and unconscious choices, serve to emphasize the
degree to which the Comités were social spaces uniquely open to experimentation in making
human relations as part of finding a "new way of doing politics."

The Comité Iglesias
The Comité Iglesias was characterized by yet another relational style, distinguished by
the prevalence of often contentious debate. Relation in the Comité Iglesias has some elements of
the formality of professional collegiality, but were less reserved, sometimes warmer and often
more adversarial. It was compatible with a more open expression of affect, which allowed for
relating as friends, but unlike Juanito Mora, this was neither expected nor required of
participants: some related as friends, others had notably confrontational relationships with the
other participants but continued to participate anyway. Even those who related affectionately
frequently raised their voices at each other, something that I saw in no other Comité. This was
also the most partisan of the Comités: partisan commitments and electoral politics were more
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prevalent topics of discussion and debate than in the others. The common denominator of
relations in the Comité was a version of compañerismo inflected by the experience of partisan
electoral organization. Friendships emerged but were secondary, and tended to fall along the
lines of partisan divisions.
The Comité Iglesias met in the house of Juan*, a plumber at the edge of a working-class
neighborhood in San José. A couple of the regular participants were from similarly workingclass backgrounds, but several also came from more middle and upper-middle-class
neighborhoods nearby. (The man who hosted the meetings often, in fact, did not participate,
because he was either not at home or because he would retire to his bedroom, although
occasionally he would appear and participate animatedly in the meeting, usually regaling the
attendees with stories of corruption and the ties of local PLN politicians to organized crime and
violence). This Comité was notable for a more thorough decentralization of leadership --- there
was no leading figure comparable to Cristina or Guillermo, although one woman, Gladys, who
participated intermittently, was granted a great deal of respect for her tireless organizing work
and capacity to mediate with other social movement organizations.
The core of the Comité however was composed of a group of activists of the PAC, who
had been working together as a partisan committee before the referendum began. This group of
activists from the PAC was diverse in terms of age and gender, including a college student, a
young engineer with the ministry of transport, two retired high-school teachers, a homemaker,
and a computer specialist in the administration of a public technical college. Leadership in the
Comité, such as it was, tended to be exercised by this group collectively, which had affectively
closer relations and a substantial degree of mutual familiarity and trust, although not the same
degree of integration as friends as was found in the core group of Juanito Mora. Around this
core group were several more peripheral figures, although some were regular attendees. One of
these was don Jorge*, an elderly shoemaker from the neighborhood, had been a lifelong activist
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with the communist Vanguardia Popular, and was now a committed and active supporter of the
leftist Frente Amplio.
The debates, sometimes heated, that characterized Iglesias tended to erupt across party
lines. Don Jorge often voiced his opposition to the orientation of the Comité, arguing that the
mostly middle-class activists of the PAC were out of touch with the concerns of the people in the
neighborhood and that the Comité could only gain a base by confronting issues that mattered
materially to them, a perception informed by his own experience of neighborhood activism.
Over time, don Jorge began attending meetings less and less, out of a combination of frustration
and declining health (which, unfortunately, led to his death shortly after the end of my
fieldwork). Before I began participating in the Comité, Catalina*, a leading figure in a small
Trotskyist party, had ceased to participate in the meetings after a series of highly contentious
confrontations with one of the leading activists of the PAC. The most contentious interactions
that I saw, however, emerged within the ranks of the PAC supporters; as the PAC struggled to
define its response to the implementation agenda, most of their supporters in the Comité
became increasingly alienated from the party, which they viewed as betraying the struggle
against CAFTA. A series of heated arguments emerged between one loyalist and those that were
moving to definitively break with the party (which they eventually did). Those who remained
loyal to the PAC eventually ceased to attend.
The Comité did become more relaxed, and friendlier, over time, whether because the
departure of dissidents reduced the amount of conflicts in the Comité , because of the bonds
forged in working together over a span of years, or because of the decreasing intensity of the
period after the attempts to stop the implementation agenda were abandoned. The habit of
bringing food was established, and then became increasingly elaborate, until the meetings
turned into potlucks including tortillas, beans, chips, cakes, sour cream, cheeses, coffee, sodas,
and occasionally Chinese take-out. Meetings began to have something more of the atmosphere
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of a party. Beatriz,* one of the original core activists of the PAC (and subsequently one of the
party's most dogged critics), told me that she very much appreciated the house over the school
where they had sometimes met in the past because the school felt too "cold." Sometimes, the
participants in the Comité would go out to dinner after a rally or other similar event. As the
singular focus and immediacy provided by the referendum and the implementation agenda
passed, the meetings turned into increasingly open-ended conversations, the breadth and depth
of which were more similar to Juanito Mora than to pragmatism of Lomas. Nevertheless, the
relationships did not develop the intense sociality nor the sense of a spiritual community or
family, that characterized Juanito Mora. The activists of the Comité remained, essentially,
compañeros and compañeras.
Like the Juanito Mora and Lomas, Iglesias carried out a set of practices that defined and
reiterated the Comité as an organizational body. Whereas Juanito Mora concentrated on
developing a public symbolic presence (for example through a name and a logo), and Lomas
borrowed practices from the world of administration, Iglesias kept scrupulous minutes. The
minutes were transcribed in hard bound notebooks by don Walter*, a retired high school
teacher and solemnly read aloud by him at the beginning of each meeting, before being
invariably unanimously approved by a vote of those present. While the necessity of the ritual of
the minutes was explained in terms of maintaining continuity between meetings and ensuring
that agreements and goals were adhered to, it also underlined that the Comité was a real
organization that took its business seriously (I could never accept that the enormous amount of
time devoted to the minutes could be compensated by any simply practical purpose). That this
Comité instantiated itself through this particular ritual of legibility and accountability
underlines the extent to which Iglesias's practices were influenced by those of public and
representative institutions.
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Although I argue that the pattern of relationships established initially within the Comité
Iglesias was influenced by experiences of partisan organizing, the Comité also made changing
the characteristic modes of relating in political parties a central aim. This critique of the parties
began to emerge as a dominant theme at the same time that the participants in this Comité (as
well as in many others) began to shift focus from engagement with politics on the neighborhood
and urban scale towards the coming national elections. During this period, the activists of
catedral became some of the most vocal proponents of a unified electoral front of the "parties of
the NO" (sometimes also described as "the opponents of neoliberalism"). This proposal was
accompanied by a critique of the organizing and decision-making practices of the parties,
particularly the PAC; the proposed electoral coalition would have open primaries, an end to the
nomination of candidates by party leaders, and the adoption of a platform created by the base
through a participatory process of deliberation in public meetings; indeed, the activists of
Iglesias claimed that the resulting coalition would not be a party at all, but rather a new kind of
participatory political form (I discuss the struggle over this coalition in more detail below).
The impulse towards a coalition and the critiques of partisan practice clearly emerged
out of the experience of the Comité: the non-hierarchical and participatory process of
deliberation and decision-making, and the experience of having worked closely with followers of
other parties to a near victory in the referendum against seemingly overwhelming odds. While
these critiques centered on what might be termed the formal structures of governance, they were
not abstractions but rather reflections of a distinct lived experience, the projection (or "scaling
up") of a distinct way of making compañerismo.
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Comparing the Comités
While it is clear that these different styles of sociality produced very different experiences
for those who participated, the significance of these different relational styles for the
achievement of the Comités ’ political aims is much more difficult to assess. All three Comités in
fact had very similar trajectories, including a gradually declining membership after the
referendum, a period of preoccupation with the implementation agenda followed by a turn
towards local organizing and/or a return to electoral concerns. The more intimate community
forged by the Comité Juanito Mora, as I have explained, pulled some in to a profound
engagement while it tended to push others away. The less affective relationships that
characterized the Comités Lomas and Iglesias may have produced less intensive commitments
by participants, but was also less demanding, and probably more conducive to creating more
sustainable working relationships across gender lines. The similarities among the trajectories of
the three Comités as well as the differences of personality, social origins, political orientation,
and location are more than enough to render any further comparison of the consequences of
these different models impossible. What it demonstrates, however, is the extent to which the
Comités were projects for the creation of new forms of political practice, which drew upon, but
also reworked and transformed, existing idioms of social relations.

2. Coordinating for the national scale
The principal organizational space of the Comités was the meetings of particular Comités
. The coordination between Comités mainly occurred through overlapping networks made up of
email list-serves and common membership in trade unions, political parties, environmental or
other organizations. There were, however, repeated attempts to bring the Comités together in
larger deliberative and decision-making forums. The first impulse to do so came from the
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uncertainty of the post-referendum period; prior to the vote to ratify CAFTA, opposition to the
treaty and the concrete task of promoting a "NO" vote had provided a clear-cut basis for unity in
a common project. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the uncertainty that emerged once the
concreteness of "NO on CAFTA" had passed seemed to demand some new forum for
deliberation and decision-making, if the loosely-integrated movement were to continue to
pursue a common course. That they would be able to do so was very much hoped for by many of
the activists of the Comités; despite the despair and outrage of the post-referendum period, the
close vote seemed to show the potential strength that lay in their unity. Moreover, the
experience of participating effectively in a decentralized, networked movement had been newly
empowering. People who had participated in the Comités felt that they had been able to
influence the course of history and felt a renewed sense of political agency. The dream of
creating a united movement out of the Comités was also a dream of creating a "new way of doing
politics," a phrase that emerged in this period and would continue to resonate thereafter.
In each of these initiatives, participants worked to maintain the non-hierarchical,
participatory character of the Comités. Each attempt, however, ended in dissolution. I attribute
the dissolution of these initiatives to a complex of interrelated realities: (1) Differences in
priorities born of distinct projects and worldviews, which made it difficult to find common
ground once the unifying cause of opposing CAFTA in the referendum was removed (including
the conflicts described in detail in the preceding chapter). One important subset of this first
challenge was the partisan commitments and associated ideological identifications, which
produced antagonisms and power struggles associated with electoral calculations. A second was
the strong identities, internal cohesiveness, and unyielding independence of the Comités
themselves. (2) The unwieldiness of the larger forums, which made both processes of
deliberation and decision-making slow and difficult. (3) The high expectations of participants in
the movement for achieving concrete changes in policies, particularly national policies. While
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many activists of the Comités had been deeply inspired by their experience of political agency in
a non-hierarchical and participatory movement and wanted to see this experience generalized,
deepened and broadened to more political arenas, this was as a rule a secondary priority to
achieving more tangible goals such as preventing the privatization of public institutions,
maintaining universal access to potable water and saving forests from destruction.
Moreover, many hoped to achieve many of these things together by taking control of the
government, a goal that the 48 ½ percent of the referendum vote won by the NO campaign
encouraged some to imagine might be achievable. In the context of the rapid implementation of
CAFTA and the rapidly looming elections of 2010, then, there was little patience in many
quarters for slow deliberative processes. It began to be common to hear activists of the Comités
say that the NO needed a charismatic leader, and that they would have to “take [state] power” to
have any impact. The push for an electoral coalition of the forces of the NO, built on the
foundation of new political practices, was one attempt to come to some synthesis of these
contradictory pressures.

The National Assemblies
Two assemblies were held in the period immediately after the referendum. The first took
place in the cafeteria of the University of Costa Rica, and the second in a large meeting hall in
Zapote, a near suburb of San José. The structure and proceedings of the assemblies were
broadly similar: A stage was set up with a large screen behind, on which was projected the
ongoing transcription of minutes and the resolutions to be voted on and approved. Around the
stage the crowd was congregated, standing at the assembly in the UCR and (mostly) seated in
Zapote. In both cases the crowds were large, particularly in Zapote, where there was hardly
room for everyone who wanted to see and hear. Speakers came up to the stage and were allotted
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a short amount of time to share their point of view or to make proposals. Both assemblies were
moderated by Eugenio Trejos, the rector of the public technical university, who had served as
kind of a spokesperson for the coalition of the NO. There was a general commitment in both
cases to letting as many people as possible speak, the principal difference being that
participation in the assembly at Zapote was limited to "Patriotic Committees," a somewhat illdefined category, given the lack of any formal structure for the Comités, but one that was meant
to exclude speakers from participating in the name of political parties or trade unions. For the
assembly at Zapote, then, each Comité was given the right to send one representative to speak in
their name. Trade union and party leaders were there as observers, including Ottón Solís, the
leader and perennial candidate of the PAC, who left conspicuously early. Voting, however, was
extended to all present: this occurred in the final stage of the meeting, as all the proposals that
had been made were listed on the screen and voted on in turn. Nearly all were approved nearly
unanimously, including the proposals that had been approved by the prior meeting at the
university.
The atmosphere was serious, and people paid close attention for some time. By the end,
however, frustration was mounting. Some were unhappy with the results, and others were
simply tired from hearing so many speakers. The unanimous voting reflected just as much a
desire to approve something and move on as it did unanimous agreement. Despite the amount
of talk, there was little actual deliberation.114

As chaotic as they have often been, the structure of meetings developed by the global justice and
Occupy Wall Street Movements allowed for rather more of a deliberative process. My sense was that the
culture of affective bonds expressed in the idiom of compañerismo was not matched by a similar
development in the process of conducting participatory democratic assemblies, which has been developed
in movements in the United States and Europe and in some other parts of Latin America, notably
Argentina and Bolivia. There were other differences, however, with the US movements, which I will not
venture to argue were either beneficial or not: while they insisted in as broad a participation as possible,
the Comités were not wedded to consensus decision making, although they tended to gravitate towards
something like near consensus in the votes.
114
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The chaotic nature of the early assemblies led to a broadly shared conviction that
important decisions needed to be taken by a smaller group of people, at the same time as there
was extensive resistance to the delegation of authority to any representative body. After some
discussion and deliberation within and between the Comités over the scale and territorial basis
upon which representation would be organized, it was decided that the Comités would send
delegates to a closed meeting, which would work to decide the direction of the movement.115
Although I did not attend these closed meetings, I spoke to some of the participants
about their experiences, and accounts were given in the meetings of individual Comités. The
reports from those who attended as delegates painted a picture of meetings that were much
more contentious, and possibly even more chaotic, than the open assemblies. The experience
was universally described with some mixture of frustration and anger. Much of the time and
energy of the meetings had been consumed in attempts by participants to disqualify each other,
whether for being too militant or, on the contrary, for being unwilling to take protest "to the
streets." Some were accused of being infiltrators linked to the government, and a few were
excluded from participation on this basis (including two very committed activists that I am
certain had no ties to the PLN). Representatives of the more "revolutionary" communist (mainly
neo-Trotskyist) parties and trade union representatives were also asked to leave the meeting, in
what was described as a particularly contentious episode. 116
The opinion of most of those that I heard from was that most the conflict emerged from
an attempt to consolidate power by partisan interests, particularly a few dissident members of

It is important to note that while the aspiration was that all of the meetings and assemblies would be
nationally representative, the number of representatives that arrived from rural areas was minimal, and,
with few exceptions, tended to represent areas within the Central Valley or the provincial capitals of the
more rural provinces such as the towns of Liberia, Limon and Puntarenas.
116 These divisions reflected in part a strongly anti-communist political identification of some within the
comités, including an oft-stated concern that a movement allied to communists would not be able to
secure the support of "the people." Others, however, objected to what was seen as an intransigent and
confrontational comportment. There were of course divisions between the various left tendencies that did
identify to one degree or another with the communist tradition.
115
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the PLN that hoped to convert the Comités into an electoral base for a new party that might
serve as the vehicle for their electoral aspirations. This argument would seem to have been
largely borne out by the course of events over the next year and a half, and particularly the
foundation of the party Alianza Patriótica by former high ranking PLN leaders (see below).
Divergent political projects and the power struggles, and the mistrust and conflict that
accompanied them, seems to have been the principal reason for the collapse of these efforts at
national coordination of the Comités. An attempt to return to open assemblies some months
later-once again in the main cafeteria of the University of Costa Rica -- was as inconclusive and
unsatisfying for participants, as the first two.
There were essentially two distinct responses to the frustrations of these attempts to
coordinate on a national scale. One was to continue in the attempt to find a workable form of
cooperation between the Comités, on national or more local scales. The second was to turn
towards engagement with specific communities on local issues, effectively abandoning the
attempt to constitute the Comités as a distinct collective political force. Below I will continue the
discussion of the various forms through which activists of the Comités tried to achieve a
workable unity. The turn to more local engagements by particular Comités is discussed
elsewhere (Rayner 2008).

Alforja sessions: coordinating through popular education
In the wake of the collapse of the assemblies the NGO Alforja attempted to step into the
breach, applying methods of "popular education" to attempt to encourage the Comités to better
work together in defining common goals. This effort extended over many months and included a
series of carefully planned meetings including workshops and interactive activities of various
kinds. The themes addressed by the meetings included gender relations within the movement,
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lessons from the history of past Costa Rican social movements, the sharing of information
between Comités about their current activities and plans, and the creation of common goals.
The sessions were time consuming (usually occupying the better part of a Saturday), but wellplanned, and generally relaxed and even somewhat festive; participants shared food and talked
and joked between the more serious activities. The attendees of the meetings that I went to were
mostly from within the San José urban area, meaning that the coordination that did emerge was
not so much national as regional in scope. In any case, little in the way of common goals or
lasting forms of cooperation emerged from these meetings. Participants from the Comités that I
knew tended to view them as interesting and somewhat useful but hardly indispensable, and by
the last of the meetings, the frustration of the principal organizer was evident. Alforja’s efforts to
encourage thinking about the fundamental issues of organizing and working together, while
important in itself, did not, I think, seem adequate to the sense of urgency that the activists of
the Comités felt concerning the need to define shared political goals that could be acted on in the
present.

Pabru Presbere and the Barrios del Sur
Pabru Presbere117 was formed during the period after the struggle against the
implementation agenda had been abandoned in favor of more local engagements by Comités
acting autonomously. The initiative, named after an indigenous leader who had led a campaign
of resistance against the Spanish in the 18th Century, was organized principally by the Comité
Iglesias, with support from the Comité Barrio Sur (Guillermo* of Juanito Mora, with his talent
for potent historical references, proposed the name). Pabru Presbere was originally intended to

117 The

name of this indigenous leader is usually recorded as Pablo Presbere, but Guillermo argued that
this was a misrecognition of an honorific title, pabru.
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provide a space of coordination for Comités in San José to share information and lend mutual
support in their interventions in the neighborhood, as well as to try to find common initiatives.
In the final meetings, however, the agenda shifted to the attempt to forge a coalition of parties
opposed to neoliberalism, discussed in more detail below.
Pabru Presbere met various times over the course of a few months in the headquarters of
APSE, the association of secondary school teachers (several of the activists of Iglesias were
recently retired teachers with connections to the union). In addition to Juanito Mora and
Iglesias, other Comités from the immediate area of San José attended on a regular basis. Like
the previous initiatives at coordination, however, Pabru Presbere also encountered difficulties.
The tone of the meetings was rather more formal and frequently more strained than was the
case with the meetings of individual Comités -the dense sociality that facilitated easy interaction
within the Comités was lacking. There were repeated conflicts over who set the agenda and how
the meetings were facilitated, with some representatives from other Comités objecting to the
leading role taken by the members of Iglesias in these areas.118 There was also some tension
between the priorities of those who were most interested primarily in engaging with issues in
their neighborhoods (in which case Pabru Presbere was essentially a forum for mutual support),
and those who continued to be drawn towards engagement in national politics, culminating in
the introduction of the electoral coalition as a theme. No significant new common projects
emerged from the meetings, which were eventually abandoned.
After the decline of Pabru Presbere, Juanito Mora initiated another round of meetings of
comités, originally conceived as meetings of the Barrios del Sur (the neighborhoods of South
San José, which have a longstanding reputation for working class and community organizing).
The goal of these meetings was by explicit design less ambitious; as Guillermo, the principal
118 Similar

problems emerged in other attempts to organize regional associations of Comités. In Heredia,
activists of some of the Comités that I worked with complained that the forum that claimed to speak for

all the Comités in Heredia was not representative and was in fact "just one more Comité" itself.
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inspiration behind these meetings, put it, the idea was simply to bring people together into a
common space and cement personal relationships. This was an extension of the Comité Juanito
Mora's (and particularly Guillermo's) emphasis on building strong affective relationships on the
idioms of friendship, kinship, and spiritual community.

Montes de Oca
In the canton of Montes de Oca, where the Comité Lomas was located, a more sustained,
and arguably more successful, organization of the Comités was achieved. From early after the
referendum, weekly meetings were held between representatives of the distinct Comités of the
canton; Cristina* opened every meeting of the Comité Lomas with a report from the canton
meeting. Occasionally, all of the participants in the various Comités were actively encouraged to
attend to discuss important issues. The Comités maintained their own dedicated meeting space,
a woodshop renamed the Casa Patriótica (or "Patriotic House"), decorated inside and out with
material from the NO campaign.
The Comités also established a common agenda related to the policies of the
municipality: bus service, infrastructure, misuse of funds, and property taxes. They worked
together, for example, to present complaints about the quality of the sidewalks and other issues
to the municipal government at town-hall assemblies, and to collect signatures and spread
information about a proposed property tax increase, which, they argued, would price many
lower income residents out of the community. The ability of the Comités to work together on a
common agenda over time reflects, I would argue, the fact that they were all willing to pursue a
politics of scale to which their degree of organization was well-suited: a municipal coalition
focusing on municipal issues. No doubt, however, it helped that the municipality of Montes de
Oca was significantly smaller than that of San José, where the amount of influence that could be
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exercised by a small group of people, as well as the diversity of issues faced by residents, made
engagement at the municipal scale significantly more complex and difficult.

Autonomy, Voice and Trust
With few exceptions, then, the efforts to create an infrastructure that would allow the
Comités to work were both frustrating and disappointing to those involved, and did not produce
significant common political projects. On the other hand, participating in the individual
Comités was for many a profoundly engaging and rewarding experience. Within their Comités ,
participants established relations of trust, compañerismo, and friendship, and they had a voice
in decisions.
Not only was this voice and trust lacking in the larger assemblies, but there was an
undercurrent of fear that it would be sacrificed to the control of some outside force. There was
constant discussion of the possibility of cooptation of the movement, particularly by electorallyoriented parties. As one activist put it, “we’re the blondes of the barrio, everyone wants to dance
with us.” An activist from Iglesias who had attempted to take a census of Comités to facilitate
coordination found most of those she contacted unwilling to share information about their
Comités because of suspicions of who would control the information. Delegation raised
suspicion of a loss of direct input, even as the undelegated assemblies appeared to be
unworkable.
Paradoxically, however, the lack of a larger project to plug into produced tensions and
frustrations within the Comités. The particular experience of the referendum had been unique:
by providing a common purpose and a clearly defined goal, it had enabled people to work
together without, as it were, working together. But acting independently in their own
neighborhoods was accompanied by impatience and a desire to make a larger impact. The
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memory of the feeling of participating in the referendum, and particularly when they felt they
were almost winning. The exuberance of the September march was a point that stood out as a
high point to many. Above all, this was a group of people that were committed to transforming
the nation (sometimes as part of a larger transformation of the region). Without a larger
movement that might promise this, motivation waned.

From Movement to Party?
Beginning in 2008, a number of activists from diverse Comités began to talk about
promoting an electoral coalition among "all the parties of the NO" or "all the parties opposed to
neoliberalism." This initiative was above all a response to the dilemmas described above, and
the central question that bound them together: how to maintain the Comités as a network of
autonomous entities working together on a common transformative political project? There
were reasons both more conjunctural and more enduring that hopes for a resolution to these
dilemmas came to be placed on an electoral coalition. The strongly partisan and electoral
political culture of Costa Rica was the fundamental reality that grounded the more specific
reasons–although, as we shall see, not necessarily in the ways that one might expect.
One of the principal rationales behind an electoral coalition from early on was that it
would serve as a precautionary measure against what activists of the Comités saw as the
inevitable division of the movement of the NO along partisan lines during the coming elections.
An electoral coalition between "all the parties of the NO" would mean that activists in the
Comités with partisan loyalties would maintain a common interest. The assumption--to me
surprising, given the low level of electoral engagement to which I was accustomed--was that the
coming elections of 2010 would deeply engage the passions of the activists in the Comités,
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threatening to break the bonds of solidarity that had been built and the political work that
depended on the compañerismo of the Comités .
The idea of an electoral coalition was also imagined as an initiative that could unite the
disparate strands of the NO—whether inside and outside of the Comités, activists or passive
supporters—in a common project. Such a coalition, it was hoped, would recreate the unity and
clarity of opposition to the referendum. Equally importantly, many in the Comités saw a united
electoral effort as the most effective strategy for opposition to “neoliberalism.” The near-victory
of the NO in the referendum was regularly cited as evidence of the possibility of winning control
of the government by electoral means. At the same time, as hopes of successfully opposing
CAFTA’s implementation agenda “in the streets” waned, more and more of the activists of the
Comités argued that only by taking control of the government could they effect meaningful
change.
An alternative to organizing an electoral coalition was to form a new party. A new party,
some proposed, would allow the Comités to participate in the electoral arena while maintaining
their autonomy, rather than being co-opted or subsumed by the established party hierarchies. In
a meeting I held between representatives of Comités in the canton of San José to discuss options
for participation in the 2010 elections, however, the option of a new party was discarded by
most present as impractical. Representatives of a Comité from downtown San José who had
long experience organizing with Frente Amplio and its antecedents on the left pointed out that
organizing a national party was a major undertaking that required carrying out assemblies in
every canton of the country. They also pointed out that their own commitment was to Frente
Amplio, and that others would have similar conflicts; even if it were feasible, then, organizing a
new would not obviate the problem of partisan divisions emerging within the movement—in
fact, they pointed out it might make the problem worse. These same persons also pointed that a
coalition presented its own obstacles. While they were not against the idea in principal, they
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argued that the terms under which the parties would come together and select candidates would
be crucial. As I discuss in more detail below, the organization of a coalition was bedeviled by
these very issues.
In fact, a party of the ‘NO’, Alianza Patriótica (Patriotic Alliance) was organized in time
for the 2010 elections. Alianza Patriótica drew heavily on the symbols and discourses of the NO
campaign, included its name suggesting a party representative of the movement as a whole
(which, after the referendum, increasingly described itself as the “Patriotic Movement” rather
than the “NO”). The leading figure of the party was Rolando Araya Monge, who was a wellestablished figure in the PLN and had been the party’s (unsuccessful) presidential candidate for
the elections of 2002. He was joined by another high-profile Liberacionista and opponent of
CAFTA, the head of the rice-growers’ association, Oscar Campos, who tearfully announced his
own decision to leave the PLN and join Alianza Patriótica in a press conference. The reaction to
the foundation of this party among the Comités with which I worked ranged from indifferent, to
suspicious, to hostile. With the exception of Gladys,* who briefly worked as a paid employee for
Alianza Patriótica, I did not know anyone who involved themselves in the party—and Gladys
ended up being one of its most vocal critics.
People were deeply suspicious of these establishment political figures, who had so
recently left the PLN, and tended to see their actions as opportunistic. They complained that
Rolando Araya had allegedly “bought” a canton-level party in Alajuela to serve as a base for
constructing the national party. Oscar Campos was distrusted by almost everyone I met, and
some had deep animosities, particularly those who felt that he had played an instrumental role
in disrupting the attempts at coordination between Comités in the closed assemblies (see
above). The prior accusations that he had introduced partisan divisions and blocked moves
towards direct action in the interests of converting the Comités into an electoral vehicle now
seemed to be confirmed. Activists from the Comités were particularly incensed by the
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appropriation of the symbols of the movement, which they viewed as an appropriation of all that
was achieved by the movement in the service of particular ambitions.
The idea of an electoral coalition was more appealing to the Comités with which I worked
most closely, but Iglesias was by far the most invested in the project; Lomas had dedicated itself
to interventions in municipal politics, and Juanito Mora remained rather more focused on
encouraging more profound changes in the political culture of Barrio Sur. The core of the
Comité Iglesias was, as I have described, made up of former activists (militantes) of the PAC,
who had recently become alienated from the party. The effort to push for a coalition, in fact,
brought them into further conflict with the party. A coalition without the PAC was nearly
unthinkable; it was the only party of the coalition of the NO that had any significant electoral
representation—in fact, it was the second party in the Legislative Assembly and it had almost
won the 2006 presidential elections. Moreover, the PAC was organized as a national party,
which would allow it to postulate presidential candidates.119 The former activists of the PAC
differed from the militantes of Frente Amplio to the degree that they placed a particularly high
priority on winning control of government in the near term, and were not content to be a
minority party of principled opposition, and this meant an alliance with the PAC. Nevertheless,
their own disaffection with the party and its leadership meant that they were no more content
with the idea of a coalition dominated by the PAC (as currently organized) than were the
activists of Frente Amplio or other smaller parties. Their discontent was not simply with the
leadership or policies of the PAC: they had been inspired by participation in the Comités to
imagine new possibilities for a more participatory politics.
The activists of Iglesias, together with others from the Comités, proposed that the
coalition would be organized according to principles that would differentiate it from the
Frente Amplio subsequently organized the necessary assemblies to be recognized as a national party, a
monumental effort which consumed the energies of party activists for a good portion of the period
between 2008 and 2010.
119
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standard practices of partisan electoral decision-making. These reforms included the selection
of national and local candidates through open assemblies in which everyone could participate
without regard to party affiliation. Effectively, this would amount to breaking open the existing
partisan divisions within the coalition of the NO--which is who they imagined participating in
these open assemblies. It was also seen as an important democratization of the candidate
selection process. The activists of the Comités argued that they would have to put an end to
hierarchical practices of partisan control, which they described as the nomination of candidates
al dedo (“at fingerpoint”) by party leaders. They further proposed that the platform be decided
collectively by the base through collective deliberation. A series of meetings of the Pabru
Presbere were given over to initiating the process, and a draft platform for the coalition that had
been created by the Comité Iglesias was circulated to the representatives of the Comités present.
In fact, however, discussion of the draft never proceeded very far because it was pre-empted by
concerns about the members of Iglesias having assumed undue authority in the proposal of the
agenda and the execution of the meeting: the organization of a coalition was not necessarily the
unifying process that its advocates hoped it would be.
The proposals for open assemblies and deliberative processes to create platforms and
choose candidates would in fact have rendered the parties participating in the coalition
irrelevant. In fact, these proposals could be read as replacing the existing parties with a new,
more encompassing, party. The members of Iglesias that particularly pushed for these
proposals, however, denied insistently that the coalition would be a party. In doing so, they were
revealing the extent to which the coalition as a project was born of the desire for a “new way of
doing politics” conceived in opposition to the dominant partisan-electoral system. It was not to
be a party, in other words, because it would be different than anything that they had known by
that name. It would be, rather, a means for maintaining and building upon the experience of
working in the Comités, a re-creation of the moment of the referendum.
273

In a very real sense, however, a party is exactly what the proposed coalition would have
been. It would have encroached upon the organizational terrain and projects of the existing
parties, in the core areas of candidate selection and the formation of proposals for governing.
For these reasons, the parties potentially had a lot to lose by a coalition, and particularly by the
more radical proposals put forward by activists of the Comités. And of the parties that were
potentially part of the coalition, none had more to lose than the PAC (and particularly its
leadership): as by far the largest and most electorally successful party in the potential coalition,
its leadership was effectively being asked to surrender a measure of their own autonomy, power
and influence. Many of the activists of the base of the party were open to, and sometimes
enthusiastic about, at least some versions of the proposal. A series of meetings were held
between representatives of the various parties and other interested participants aligned with the
movement of the NO (now reimagining itself as a movement against “neoliberalism”). I attended
few of these meetings, but the discussions were ongoing in the Comités, particularly Iglesias.
There was opposition to the idea of open assemblies and voting by non-party-members, which
were viewed as opening the PAC up to the danger of being overrun by infiltrators (those in favor
of the open assemblies argued that the PLN simply did not have this capacity for
mobilization).120 Other disputes revolved around the mechanics of candidate selection and the
apportionment of offices. Would it be a coalition for the presidency only? Would they attempt to
establish common candidates for the Legislative Assembly and other offices?
While some within the PAC made efforts to explore the possibility of an electoral
coalition, the PAC’s founder and leader, Ottón Solís, was resolutely opposed. This was made
clear to me when I was invited to attend a small party meeting where Solís responded to a
In fact, the PAC’s candidate selection process seems to be significantly more closed than that of the
PLN, which allows non-party-members to choose between candidates, at least for the presidency. Some of
the activists of the Comités chose to vote for Jonny Araya (brother of Rolando Araya) in the elections for
the PLN candidates, as a preferable alternative to Arias’s protégé Laura Chinchilla, despite their having no
intention of voting for Araya in the general election.
120
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proposal from representatives of Comités regarding the possibility of an electoral coalition. The
meeting began in the mode of a cocktail party, with guests mingling over hors d’oeuvres and
wine in a well-appointed and spacious home in the upscale neighborhood of Barrio Escalante.
Before long, however, the guests were directed to a garden patio, where most of the chairs had
been arranged in a rough semicircle. At the center of the semi-circle sat Solís, flanked by one or
two others I recognized as important political figures currently associated with the PAC. Solís
began to field questions, which he answered at length—he was the center of attention and his
was the authoritative voice. When two that I recognized from activities of the Comités
demanded that he reconsider his objection to an electoral coalition, Solís provided a long
explanation of his objections to the coalition. His principal point was that the ideological
differences between the PAC and Frente Amplio were too large, while the other potential parties
to the coalition were insufficiently committed to the fight against corruption, which was a
defining issue for the PAC.121 He spent rather more time explaining the issue of ideological
incommensurability, however. While arguing that he had been “fighting neoliberalism” since his
time in the cabinet of the first Arias administration, he suggested that an alliance with Frente
Amplio would define the party too much to the left, endangering the centrist identity of the party
and its appeal to mainstream voters. In a particularly notable comment, he argued that
“Churchill and Stalin could make an alliance against Hitler, but once Hitler was defeated, there
was no reason for them to be in alliance.” While I was taken aback by the implicit comparison of
Frente Amplio’s founder, José Merino, to Joseph Stalin, the fundamental point struck me
initially as both a sensible and an illustrative one: the coalition of the NO had worked because it
was founded in a negation. The move to a propositional politics proper to an electoral campaign
introduced a host of potential lines of division.
While Solís did not name anyone in particular, it was clear to me that he was referring to Rolando
Araya’s newly-founded Alianza Patriótica. The corruption of Rolando and his brother Jonny Araya (the
mayor of San José), was a constant theme in the meetings and conversations of the comités I attended.
121
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Nevertheless, I, like many in the Comités , remained unconvinced that the most
significant differences between the parties were programmatic: despite significant differences in
foreign policy (particularly towards Cuba and Venezuela), it seemed obvious to me that the PAC
and Frente Amplio had more than enough common ground to work with, particularly in the
defense of public institutions and the protection of the environment. My conclusion, shared by
many others, was that the fundamental objection was to the dilution of the PAC’s quota of
political power and influence, as well as its public image, given the demonization of José Merino
as a tool of Castro and Chavez. Insofar as the latter consideration dominated, one of the legacies
of the “campaign of fear” was the division of the opposition to neoliberalism itself.
Although a number of local electoral coalitions were organized in the cantons outside of
San José, the national coalition envisioned by some of the activists of the NO did not come to
pass (which was widely attributed to Solís’ opposition). A coalition of sorts was formed in the
final moments of the presidential campaign, when two of the smallest parties, including
Rolando Araya’s Alianza Patriótica (but not Frente Amplio), urged their supporters to give their
votes to Solís. This last minute deal between party leaders, however, had no resemblance to the
project proposed by the activists of the Comités , who wanted to rethink the very meaning of a
party.
While the leadership of the PAC was able to maintain its autonomy and control over the
party, their decision to eschew broader alliances likely cost them electorally—as many in the
Comités predicted it would. The PAC came in a distant second in the presidential election and
remained the second largest party in the legislature, but its performance was far below that of
2006. The most common explanation for the weakening of the PAC among the activists of the
Comités was that the party had lost the enthusiasm of its base, who had either gone to work for
other parties or stayed home during the election (the activists of Iglesias and Juanito Mora, for
example, dedicated themselves to Frente Amplio). The importance of the disillusionment among
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the party’s supporters seems confirmed by PAC’s even worse performance in the municipal
elections which followed; because of low turnout, municipal elections in Costa Rica are decided
by the mobilization of the base, and the PAC now had very little. The party’s leadership,
committed to playing by the established rules of partisan politics, did not realize the extent to
which the experience of the NO campaign had transformed the hopes and expectations of their
active supporters.

Party? What party?
As I noted above, those committed to the electoral coalition denied that their project was
to create a new party. In turn, I observed that by encroaching on core aspects of partisan
organization and purpose—candidate selection and platform formulation—the coalition
threatened to encroach upon, and reorganize, the existing parties. Indeed, if a party is defined as
an organization for the selection and promotion of electoral candidates and agendas for
governing, then the proposed electoral coalition could be defined as a new party in the making.
But it is rather more illuminating to consider the project of an electoral coalition from the point
of view of a broader understanding of what a party is. Antonio Gramsci’s writings in the Prison
Notebooks provide an entry point. As with most of his key terms, Gramsci’s statements on the
nature of parties are ambiguous and often apparently contradictory, but it is in fact his very
refusal to impose static and fixed definitions on historically-situated political practices that is
useful here.
In a section devoted to “the Political Party” in the “The Modern Prince,” Gramsci
discusses parties primarily in terms of their role in providing the intellectual and moral
leadership, as well as discipline and commitment (“policing functions”), which enables unified,
effective political struggle corresponding to the interests of a class. The institutionalized forms
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of political organization commonly recognized as political parties are then only one
manifestation of “party”; the term, he suggests, could just as well be applied to an editorial
group that works to establish an agenda for political actors (1971:148-9). The relationship
between any given manifestation of a party and class interests is somewhat ambiguous in this
account (see also Showstack Sassoon 1988), but Gramsci does suggest a distinction between
more particular or conjunctural forms of party organization and a more fundamental “organic
party” that expresses the real political necessities of a given class (1971:150-7).122
Given that I consider class interests to be essentially indeterminate and therefore not
subject to a purely objective analysis, I depart from Gramsci in his attempt to define an essential
party project in these terms, preferring to understand parties as the articulators of political
projects that are informed by (but not reducible to) class projects (rather than “interests”). As in
Gramsci’s conception, the articulators of a political project can be found both inside and outside
of the institutionalized (usually electoral) political parties. The boundaries and center of gravity
of party activity shift as new political projects and alliances are articulated.123 For my purposes
here, I suggest that this definition of “party” in functional terms conceived at a relatively high
level of generality allows us to better situate the project of an electoral coalition in terms of the
broader arc of the Comités’ organizational initiatives.
If a party is understood in this way, as a process and a project to provide intellectual
leadership capable of incorporating disparate political actors (actual or potential) into a unified
political project, then one might say that when a critical mass of actors in a movement has

Accordingly the “organic party” would seem to constitute a subset of the category of “organic
intellectuals.”
123 For an example probably familiar to many readers, since the 2008 elections the Republican Party as an
electoral or-ganization has been increasingly marginalized by a combination of grassroots organization of
the base (the Tea Parties), the rise of “Superpacs” as principal sources of campaign financing, the growing
importance of think tanks and other extra-party organizations (ALEC, Freedom Works, etc), and the
growing importance of partisan media (conservative talk radio, Fox News)—all of which have worked
together to advance a more radical “neoconservative” political project of which the Republican Party has
increasingly become merely an electoral vehicle (see e.g. Skocpol and Williamson 2012).
122
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undertaken such a project, the movement has passed into a moment of party formation. Such a
moment of party formation is a common (albeit not inevitable) outcome of more spontaneous or
acephalous movements, which at some point often find that the need to consolidate their efforts
into a unified and proactive political project—particularly where, as is often the case, these
movements have previously found their unity and purpose primarily through negation or
through very particular initiatives.124 Discursively and symbolically, this process of achieving
unity usually involves both the elevation of an “empty signifier,” as Laclau emphasizes, as well as
the more rationalistic articulation of shared aspirations which Gramsci describes as intellectual
and moral leadership. Organizationally, this process can take many forms, not limited to the
institutionalized forms of electoral competition or the (increasingly irrelevant) Leninist
revolutionary vanguard: I would argue that the various organizational initiatives of the Comités
in the wake of the referendum, from the assemblies to the electoral coalition, constituted
attempts to achieve the capacity for unified political action in new and more participatory ways.
From this point of view, the Comités entered into a moment of party formation shortly
after the referendum, when the negation of CAFTA was no longer a sufficient basis for unity, and
activists felt the need to create organizational forms capable of generating proposals that would
serve as the basis for coordinated action. This moment of party formation was notably not
equivalent to the Comités adoption of one or another of the forms of institutionalized, electoral
partisan organizing: after all, the Comités were created as the equivalent of the partisan groups
that mobilized for elections. Moreover, in preparation for the referendum vote, the Comités
adopted many of the practices and symbolic trappings associated with political parties,
including the deployment of fiscales and guides, the provision of transportation and food, and
the display of a distinctive campaign logo and colors. Nevertheless, because they were organized
Again, I am informed by Gramsci’s discussion of the purposes of a party, and particularly by the
contrast he draws between a true political party and a trade union, which tend to be particular in their
aims and unable to articulate a more universalist and transformative politics.
124
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fundamentally on the basis of the negation of CAFTA, they did not have to adopt organizational
forms capable of articulating a common agenda and could act as a decentralized and acephalous
network of independent committees. The NO as an electoral force was far from anything like a
party in the sense used here.
At the same time, the employment of elements of partisan-electoral organization by the
Comités is important, if for no other reason than that it revealed the strength of the
institutionalized forms of party organization and practice (including electoral competition for
control of the government) in the political commitments and imaginaries of the activists of the
Comités. Partly for this reason—but also because of the difficulties of creating alternatives—the
process of party formation eventually moved towards the existing partisan institutions of
electoral competition between the assemblies to the electoral coalition. As we have seen, this
process was contentious, in no small measure because of commitments to existing electoral
parties. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that even as activists of the Comités began to
articulate their own organizing efforts to the existing electoral parties, most sought to do so in a
way that was transformative of electoral partisan institutions, aiming to incorporate the
participatory politics that they had experienced in the Comités to make a new kind of (avowedly
non-party) party for a new kind of politics.125

3. Conclusion
As we have seen, the activists that remained in the Comités after the referendum worked
to build on their experience of unprecedented historical agency in the acephalous, decentralized
NO campaign, to create “a new way of doing politics” for the future. This “new way of doing
Daniel Hellinger (2011) finds that much of the support Hugo Chavez’s initiative to create the Partido
Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) derived from a similar desire to
create a new kind of party form that would be controlled by participation from the base rather than by
professional politicians.
125
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politics,” activists hoped, would be more participatory and less hierarchical than the trade
unions and electoral political parties to which many of them were accustomed, and would be, as
the NO campaign had seemed to be, capable of challenging “neoliberalism” on a national scale.
In practice, this meant sustaining the autonomous and egalitarian space of the Comité
while articulating with others in a broader movement working towards common goals. This
proved to be a monumentally difficult task. The autonomy of the Comités had been easily
compatible with a common effort when their political project was effectively decided for them by
the government’s move to ratify CAFTA and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal’s decision to
approve a referendum on the treaty. Without the clarity of purpose provided by the imposition
of the treaty and the referendum, however, the Comités faced the difficult task of creating
organizational forms capable of proposing political projects and deciding between them.
Differences of ideology, political priorities, tactical preferences, partisan commitments, and the
very autonomy of the Comités emerged as lines of fracture in the movement, which activists
were unable to bridge. It is also worth remembering the sense of urgency and frustrated
potential that confronted a movement that had almost—but not quite—won a major victory on
the national stage, against all the odds, only to be confronted by what they regarded as an
illegitimate defeat with nearly apocalyptic consequences. This context both raised expectations
and contributed to impatience with the forms of dialogue and representation that were
established—as did fatigue and the demands of home, friends and work.
Sustaining the autonomous Comités as spaces of egalitarian and cooperative political
work was less difficult. In doing so, the activists of the Comités drew on the resources provided
by the idiom of compañerismo, inflected by other relational idioms such as friendship,
professional collegiality, and kinship. In the process, they created novel social spaces which
provided alternatives to existing forms of sociality and political participation. Many—although
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certainly not all—valued these spaces deeply, as places for new social and political, even
spiritual, experiences.
At the same time, the inability to establish a shared political project that would maintain
their effective agency on the national stage ultimately began to erode the autonomous Comités
themselves. Compañerismo as a relational idiom is dependent on participation in a common
struggle. And for many, although not all, of those in the Comités, this common struggle had to
be national in its impact to be meaningful. In the absence of a meaningful political project, the
Comités were simply friends, and they were not necessarily as friendly as that. As for the
coordination between Comités, compañerismo might have helped but was not enough to make
up for the lack of organizational forms for representation, dialogue, and decision-making. And
in any case, without personal histories of shared struggle and the glue of friendship
compañerismo quickly fell apart in the face of doubts about whether or not everyone was really
in the same struggle. In fact, those Comités which sustained themselves the longest were those
that found meaningful political action outside of (or rather, in addition to) national politics—and
that effectively cemented compañerismo with other solidary relations (as I have briefly
discussed elsewhere; Rayner 2008). In the wake of the Comités, however, compañeros have
repeatedly come together to work creatively and effectively in struggles against open-pit gold
mining and to save the Caja, amongst others. The ongoing process by which activists of the
Comités and others have continued to find creative and effective ways to work together is,
however, properly the subject of another work.
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Conclusion

The struggle against CAFTA in Costa Rica was a movement for popular and social
democracy and against a globalizing neoliberal property regime, a contest over the substance
and meaning of democracy that was being played out in various guises all over the world at the
end of the 20th century. For many of CAFTA’s advocates in the United States, democracy was
equated to “free markets” and above all the freedom of owners to dispose of their property as
they see fit. A more globally palatable governmental discourse argued that free trade and
investment promote the most efficient pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number. Both
discourses have worked to advance a globalizing legal agenda that empowers transnational
corporate capital at the expense of democracy.
While the context was global, the discourses about CAFTA that emerged out of the Costa
Rican social democratic tradition were particular. The struggle over CAFTA in Costa Rica was
shaped by the contention over liberalization and political representation that preceded it as well
as the traditions and institutions of national politics. In the terms of this evolving struggle, the
SI and the NO appealed to different aspects of the institucionalidad—the SI to the authority of
elected leaders and the NO to the constitutional and institutional underpinnings of the social
state. In doing so, they collectively brought to the fore contradictions within and between
liberalism and democracy.
The SI campaign, led by the government of President Oscar Arias, was at least as
concerned with reestablishing “governability”—or recovering the authority of the political
class—as it was with passing CAFTA. The Arias administration’s “campaign of fear” was meant
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to accomplish both aims by disarticulating and discrediting the growing movement against
neoliberalism. The campaign of fear presented a stark choice between economic catastrophe,
disorder and disorientation, on the one hand; and order, progress and effective leadership on
the other. Democracy was equated to voting for the familiar faces of political authority; anything
else was dangerous and even subversive of democracy.
The SI with its material advantages of control over money, political parties, state
institutions, and workplaces demonstrates how power can operate civilly in a liberal democracy,
and shows how important fear can be to the exercise of that power. But the SI not only gained
advantage from command over those resources, it was the very embodiment of that advantage,
of social power and order. As Oscar Arias liked to point out, every ship needs a captain (and, he
might have added, don’t rock the boat).
For the same reason, for protagonists of the NO the stakes were greater than CAFTA
itself. At the beginning of the 21st century, the identities, alignments and political practices that
shaped the field on which politics had been contested were in flux, and the position of the
masters of that game was in jeopardy. An evolving coalition that included agriculturalists, public
sector workers, teachers, students, environmentalists, and others challenged liberalization and
created new avenues of political participation through protest. The unprecedented move to
decide the issue of CAFTA in a referendum was, somewhat paradoxically, both a redirection and
culmination of this process of developing alternatives to representative democracy. But for the
protagonists of the NO, in contrast to the SI, the refusal of CAFTA would bring not disaster but a
renewal of popular democracy—a possibility nourished by the experience of autonomous agency
as protagonists of a decentralized and horizontal movement.
The NO can accordingly be understood as a kind of “horizontal populism” that
articulated an insurgent identity around a division between the people and the powerful, helping
to bring together an incipient coalition of activists from different walks of life and with different
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life projects and political priorities. In the process of giving meaning to signifiers such as the
people and NO protagonists of this movement were exercising and developing their agency.
“NO,” then, was both a catalyst and product of collective energies, which is what made it
meaningful and powerful (cf. Graeber 2001). This is often the case: powerful political symbols
are produced when a significant part of “the people” is in some real way moved to exercise
agency. One problem with the metaphors of “empty” and “floating” signifiers is that they imply
detachment from human action. At its height, ‘NO’ was as charismatic, expansive, and
contentious as the movement itself.
There are dangers, however, in a politics of the popular. Here I have highlighted one,
which is that it reiterates the fiction of a unitary popular will. In this case, the NO was
profoundly challenged as a popular movement when “the voice of the people” said sí, allowing
the SI to claim this vox populi as the mouthpiece for its agenda. For anyone in the NO
committed to electoral processes, this was going to be a complicated moment, because it
introduced some unresolved, and probably ultimately unresolvable, contradictions.
In fact, despite diverse social pressures to treat the relationship self-evident and
transparent, the relationship between voting and legitimate authority is variable and contested
both within and between polities. On the one hand is the question of the legitimacy of the vote.
The globally-circulating normative definition of democratic legitimacy which declared the
October 7th referendum to be a model election was based on a kind of liberal minimal standard
mainly concerned with violent coercion and physical alteration of ballots (I say liberal because it
assumes an autonomous subject with self-determined preferences).
The legitimacy of the referendum was, however, questionable from the point of view of
the standards set by the long Costa Rican tradition of electoral regulation, which recognized and
at least attempted to compensate for class inequalities and institutionalized political power. For
many Costa Ricans this model exercise in direct democracy was accordingly an outrageous
285

fraud. In the face of this controversy, the legitimacy gained by the referendum was in part a
product of loyalty to the popular will, partly a product of power: of the repetition of one
narrative about the meaning of the referendum, and the fragmentation of the NO as a coalition,
which left it unable to continue to articulate a common project (or even narrative) once
opposing CAFTA in a referendum was no longer a defining political option.
Beyond the integrity of the election were other questions of responsibility and realism.
What are the ethical responsibilities of a democratic subject vis-à-vis legally and electorallyconstituted authority? And how would the people answer that question? In Costa Rica, as
elsewhere, political elites asserted that to be an ethical, democratic citizen is to obey the legallyconstituted authorities. As I have shown, however, the referendum was a result of the
increasingly widespread conviction among Costa Ricans that they had the responsibility to defy
the “illegal” use of law when they saw it (and that they were seeing it a lot). The dynamic of
increasing refusal of political authorities’ claims to legitimacy was however reversed by the
referendum which took “the popular” from the grassroots movement against neoliberalism and
gave it to those politicos charged with making and implementing the law. Nevertheless, those
who felt that the law was being used illegally did not stop thinking so, and many went on looking
for other ways to make their voices heard.
Parallel to the project to create a popular movement was another one to create new
forms of democratic practice. The Comités Patrióticos both embodied and inspired protagonists’
desires to create “a new way of doing politics” that would be more participatory and egalitarian.
Drawing on the many hours I spent participating in meetings, I explained the practices of
sociality and more formal aspects of organization that shaped the Comités’ particular form of
“direct democracy.” Drawing on the framework proposed by Francesca Polletta (2004), I argued
that protagonists of the Comités drew on existing idioms of sociality to create more participatory
political forms. While compañerismo provided an important common symbolic resource, it was
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developed through a variety of idioms such as friendship, family, and professional collegiality,
creating different forms of sociality. The “choice” of idiom was influenced by participants’ prior
experiences, as well as contingencies of each Comité’s formation, but the diversity of
participatory spaces that emerged also testifies to the creativity of activists’ social praxis—and to
an important area of democratic practice that movements might well pay attention to.
At the same time, the open-ended conversations and social idioms associated with faceto-face interaction that sustained the Comités were not easily scaled up. Coordination between
Comités obeyed a different practical logic and proved to be more difficult over the long run. How
to organize the Comités into a national network capable of coordinated action became a central
concern for activists after the referendum. By contrasting these attempts to organize after the
referendum with the more spontaneous process of coordination that preceded it, I argued that
negation plays an important role in facilitating networked and horizontal movements. At the
same time, creating a proactive political project demands more complex decision-making than
coming together to say “no” to someone else’s initiative—something more horizontal movements
have not necessarily been very good at.
This dynamic has been repeated over and over again in contention over neoliberal
globalization. Like the movement against CAFTA, opposition to the WTO allowed for the oftremarked coalition of “teamsters and turtles,” while the subsequent “alter-globalization”
movement allowed the efflorescence of deeply democratic, horizontal and networked organizing
in the context of opposition to institutions and initiatives such as the WTO, IMF, G20 and G8.
Similarly, the horizontal Occupy movement in the United States made an important cultural
intervention by establishing the terms of a popular identity around the signifier 99%, but it
quickly lost its momentum as a political movement because its unity was too much based on the
negation of the 1 percent. In Argentina, the remarkable movement of grassroots assemblies did

287

not survive the moment of opposition expressed in “que se vayan todos” (out with all of them),
ceding to a social democratic and developmental Peronism under the Kirchners.126
In the case of the NO, the impetus to move from negation to proposition introduced new
pressures for party formation, with “party” understood in a broad sense inspired by Gramsci; as
a means of deciding among and committing to common projects (that are not necessarily
elections). But this process that I call party formation can take many forms, and which form (if
any) emerges plays a big role in deciding whose voices are heard and what kind of projects are
taken up. Protagonists of the NO worked to find a balance between the autonomy of the Comités
that they valued so highly and the desire to coordinate shared initiatives, from more and less
open and participatory assemblies, to attempts to reorganize electoral parties to recreate the
ecumenical, popular, participatory and egalitarian aspects of the NO campaign. Although none
of these initiatives resulted in the enduring and effective organization that their protagonists
hoped for, they present one more set of alternatives for those concerned with finding ways to
combine coordination with autonomy. The creation of such new hybrids of party and movement
may be an important emerging area of political practice in the Latin American region worthy of
further research (see e.g., Hellinger 2011; Keck 1992; Lazar 2008; Nugent 2007).
In the wake of a series of financial crises that culminated in the greatest global crisis
since the 1930s, the failure of austerity to resolve that crisis, accumulating ecological problems,
and endemic poverty and inequality, the latest round of attempts to create a global selfregulating market seems to have fallen short—even of its own standards. An alternative is to
look for ways to re-embedding the economy, to submit the production and distribution of wealth
and our ecological relations to democratic decision-making. Creating new forms of democratic
This is not to deny the importance of continued experiments in horizontal and direct democracy in
Argentina, including a remarkable movement for factory occupations and worker control (Sitrin 2006,
2012), or the lasting impact of the Occupy movement in generating new practices of organization (as
evidenced by Occupy Sandy)—but to point out an important change in the scale of organization and its
capacity for intervention in the political field. Of course, some would deny that that political change was
ever the object of these movements, which is true for some, but certainly not all or even most participants.
126
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practice is an important part of this struggle. So may be the creation of new popular political
identities that can help give form coalitions against the domination of capital. Research on these
processes might be integrated with the exploration of existing alternative institutional
arrangements for the production and distribution of wealth. Micael Burawoy (2003) suggests
that such a research agenda should explore the convergence of Polanyi’s concerns with society’s
self-protective reaction to the market with Gramsci’s attention to the lived forms of class
domination and the possibilities for transformative coalitions, which is something like what I
have tried to do here. I have suggested that in exploring alternative political and economic
projects, we should be attentive to the diversity of forms that government and property can take
just as we are attentive to the diversity of democratic forms, with the hope of expanding our
capacity to recognize, and act on, promising possibilities in the present.
One of the most important things to take away from the movement against CAFTA in
Costa Rica is the value its protagonists accorded to the institutions of the social state, the heart
of Costa Rica’s particular version of Latin American social democracy. The achievements of
these institutions in Costa Rican are substantial, sometimes remarkable, and provide an
important set of non-utopian alternatives to neoliberal doxa. And despite the concerns of the
NO, these are resilient and adaptable institutions that have survived prior rounds of
liberalization (Sandbrook et al. 2007). This has not been a eulogy for a social democracy lost to
ineluctable forces of globalization; it is the story of a movement for which a social state was
something worth fighting for.
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